Panagiotis Kondylis (Panajotis Kondylis)

THE POLITICAL AND MAN (DAS POLITISCHE UND DER MENSCH)

Basic features (characteristics) of social ontology (Grundzüge der Sozialontologie)
THE POLITICAL AND MAN (DAS POLITISCHE UND DER MENSCH)

Basic features (characteristics) of social ontology (Grundzüge der Sozialontologie)

VOLUME I (BAND I)
SOCIAL RELATION, UNDERSTANDING, RATIONALITY (SOZIALE BEZIEHUNG, VERSTEHEN, RATIONALITÄT)

VOLUME II (BAND II)
SOCIETY AS POLITICAL COLLECTIVE (GESELLSCHAFT ALS POLITISCHES KOLLEKTIV)

VOLUME III (BAND III)
IDENTITY, POWER, CULTURE (IDENTITÄT, MACHT, KULTUR)
SOCIAL RELATION
UNDERSTANDING
RATIONALITY

From Kondylis’s unpublished text, edited by Falk Horst


Reference was also made to the Greek language translation, which was accorded minimal weight as it was not a translation by Kondylis himself - Κονδύλης, Παναγιώτης: Το Πολιτικό και ο Άνθρωπος, Αθήνα: Θεμέλιο, μετάφραση: Λευτέρης Αναγνώστου, 2007.

© all rights reserved 2015. This translation should not be reproduced in any form whatsoever without the express written permission of its author C.F. contactable through the following email address: pkproject@live.co.uk
Table of contents (Contents) (Inhaltsverzeichnis)

Preliminary note ................................................................. 5

I. Social theory and mass-democratic ideology ............................. 7
   1. General remark .............................................................. 8
   2. The becoming and forming of contemporary mass-democratic social
      theory ................................................................. 26
   3. Differentiation, complexity and evolution: the relapse into the
      philosophy of history .............................................. 102
   4. Community and society: a legend rich in consequences .......... 145
   5. Mass-democratic social theory and anthropology ................. 165
   6. The political in mass-democratic social theory and in the constitution
      of the social ....................................................... 228
   7. Outlook ................................................................. 262
Panagiotis Kondylis departed this life on 11. 7. 1998 owing to a mishap and consequently left behind his social ontology, which was conceived as three volumes, in the form of a fragment, because there is only a textual version of the first volume. Of the approximately 900 handwritten pages, approximately 10 pages are missing in regard to the final subchapter “The formal (form-related) parameters of language and their content-related concretisation by the social relation”, whose material (supporting thoughts (notes), evaluations of [the relevant] literature) are able to give [us] sufficient indications of the content; however the publication [of the said material] must take place separately on account of the immense delay [in preparing this material for publication].

The author began with the writing (down) of a text when he had “everything ready (done, completed) in his mind (head)”, he only had to just “copy (transcribe) it from his mind (head, memory)”; from his verbal indications (remarks) and enthusiastic accounts it becomes clear that he had [in relation to individual matters even] detailed ideas (conceptions, images, pictures, representations) also for volumes 2 and 3. How extensively (widely, far) these [ideas] can be inferred (derived, reconstructed) from the written preliminary notes (drafts, works, sketches, writings, jottings), what scope they have, could not be ascertained until now. He wanted published, in any case, by 1999 the first volume of the social ontology, which would have included as a whole what had hitherto been created by him in a great overview (survey, synopsis); he had not set (stipulated, determined) a schedule for the subsequent volumes, since he had (already) again, through his wide-ranging studies, come upon (was being led to) issues (problems, ways of putting a question) which took him beyond the concept of what was originally imagined (thought of) for his social ontology, nevertheless an important part of the specific (special, particular) research was apparently
already concluded (completed), so that he could finish (complete) the [remaining two] volumes within a one or two-year interval (gap) between each other.

The text before us (present (existing, available) text) was changed vis-à-vis the manuscript from the point of view of better intelligibility (there) where this would have met with Panagiotis Kondylis's approval, who did not manage to do the correction (proof reading). Thanks for their tireless assistance in regard to [the undertaking of] necessary work(s) (labours, tasks) is owed to (must go to, is meant for) Dr. Markus Käfer, Jochen Benkō and the publisher Dr. Gerd Giesler.

Falk Horst
I. Social theory and mass-democratic ideology
(Sozialtheorie und massendemokratische Ideologie)
1. General remark (observation) (Allgemeine Bemerkung)

The mass-democratic revolution (Die massendemokratische Revolution), under whose influence (sign; Zeichen) the 20th century is (stands, is found, finds itself) at the planetary level (auf planetarischer Ebene), is now (has now (been)) concluded (completed, ended). Its victory not only swept away (sidelined) the traditional patriarchalisms in the extra-European space (traditionellen Patriarchalismen im außereuropäischen Raum), but it also dissolved (broke up) European oligarchic(al) liberalism (oligarchischen Liberalismus) and the new-times (modern(-era)) European culture (neuzeitliche europäische Kultur) which had grown together (resulted) with it, although deep-rooted (ingrained) thought (or intellectual) habits (habits of thought) (tief verwurzelte Denkgewohnheiten) still obstruct (block) insight into the scope (extent) and radicality (radicalness, radical nature) of this turn (die Einsicht in Umfang und Radikalität dieser Wende). Local (Domestic) conditions and the necessities of worldwide economic or political competition will of course effect (bring about) the formation of several types of mass democracies (Die einheimischen Bedingungen und die Notwendigkeiten der weltweiten wirtschaftlichen oder politischen Konkurrenz werden freilich die Herausbildung mehrerer Typen von Massendemokratie bewirken); nevertheless, on the other hand it is to (must) be stressed (emphasised, noted) that mass democracy constitutes the first literally global social formation since the coming into being (genesis, emergence)
of high cultures (developed civilisations) (die Massendemokratie die erste buchstäblich globale Gesellschaftsformation seit der Entstehung der Hochkulturen), and that the questions which interrelate with its functioning (Funktionieren) either way – from the question of the limits of consumption and of growth (Grenzen des Konsums und des Wachstums) in their interweaving (intersecting, entanglement, crossing over; Verschränkung) with ecological and demographic development (up) to the question of the reshaping (remoulding) of political units (unities or entities) (Neugestaltung der politischen Einheiten) in view of simultaneous atomisation (i.e. breaking up or fragmentation of society into individuals) and globalisation (Atomisierung und Globalisierung) –, will dominate the horizon of the coming century [i.e. the 21st century]. This however does not at all entitle us to talk of the end of history, not even in the very general or (and) minimal sense that mass democracy (die Massendemokratie) will be the final (definitive, conclusive) political-economic form of the social living together (i.e. co-existence) of humans (people, men) (die endgültige politisch-ökonomische Form des sozialen Zusammenlebens der Menschen). Circumstances are conceivable under which completely (entirely, totally) different hierarchies and ideologies [other] than the mass-democratic ones [hierarchies and ideologies] would develop and prevail (be imposed)\(^1\).

It would be odd (strange, peculiar) if a revolution of (on) such a scale (magnitude, an extent) (such dimensions) had not found its ideological expression in social theory (ideologischen Niederschlag in der Sozialtheorie) – and it would be even (still) odder had (if) the [this] social theory, especially in its most popular directions (tendencies, lines

---

\(^1\) In regard to the content of this paragraph (section) see Kondylis, Niedergang and Planetarische Politik.
(schools) of thought), proved to be immune against ideology (Ideologie). Western mass democracy (Die westliche Massendemokratie) is certainly (indeed) in the habit of boasting of (about) the end of ideologies (Ende der Ideologien) [, such end of ideologies being] allegedly (supposedly) brought about by it, yet (but) this is only one aspect of its own ideological self-understanding (ihres eigenen ideologischen Selbstverständnisses). Its [Western mass democracy’s] way (mode, manner) of functioning requires (demands, necessitates) or actually (in fact) (and) produces (brings forth) pluralism or even relativism in the ideational field (auf ideellem Gebiet), however that does not in the least mean that the constituent (integral) elements (parts) (components) of the pluralism seeming (appearing [to be]) in the [its] overall (general) picture (image) unideological are not themselves of an ideological character (die Bestandteile des im Gesamtbild unideologisch anmutenden Pluralismus nicht selber ideologischen Charakters sind). Talk of the end of ideologies can therefore actually mean only the discontinuance of monolithic and totally (by itself, alone) dominant (ruling) ideology (alleinherrschenden Ideologie) (if such [an ideology] was supposed to have ever existed in historical reality); however not even this has been completely encountered (found) [i.e. the existence of a monolithic and totally dominant or ruling ideology]. Because where pluralism and relativism (Pluralismus und Relativismus) threaten to break open (burst) (blow up) the framework (go beyond the scope) of that which is defined or felt (seen, regarded, perceived) (definiert oder empfunden wird) to be (as) mass-democratic normality (Normalität), there supreme (highest) and unassailable (invulnerable, impregnable) (fundamental, basic) principles (höchste und unangreifbare Grundsätze) are summoned, which for their part are derived (deduced) from anthropological (anthropologische) [axioms] or from “Reason” („Vernunft“), in any case they are reduced
(traced back) to universal axioms (universale Axiome). Universalism (Universalismus) and relativism consequently constitute both complementary aspects of mass-democratic ideology. Put differently: the different world-theoretical (view, graphic, representative, illustrational) and practical stances (positionings, attitudes) (weltanschaulichen und praktischen Einstellungen) are tolerated with the reservation of (subject to) the exclusive validity (force) of the principle of tolerance (tolerance principle) (Geltung des Toleranzprinzips), which again is founded on the aforementioned incontestable (indisputable) (fundamental, basic) principles². From that point of view, one is quite justified in [making] the banal, but rich in consequences (consequential) ascertainment that the mass-democratic social formation could just as little as every other modern or past [social formation] do without a ruling (dominant) ideology (einer herrschenden Ideologie).

The orientation of (social-theoretical) thinking (thought) (in social theory) (sozialtheoretischen Denkens) towards factual (topical, objective) questions and practical (or situational) constraints (or necessities) (Sachfragen und –zwängen), which for their part are subject (subordinate) to the great practical (or situational) constraint (or necessity) [which is] comprehensible (understandable, grasppable, intelligible) as a system of society (social system; Gesellschaftssystem), seems to offer a way out from the turbid (murky, dull, dim) realm (kingdom) of ideology. Now, which are the “genuine” or “relevant” factual (topical, objective) questions and practical (or situational) constraints (or necessities) is decided beyond (on the other side of) these same [factual questions and practical constraints (or necessities)], and the theoretical decision to comprehend (grasp, understand) society as a system-like practical

² Kondylis, „Universalismus“, passim, und „Jurisprudenz“, esp. p. 343ff..
constraint (or necessity), which determines (conditions) its individual (separate) functions, is again founded (based) on supra-empirical and intuitive pre-decisions. Here, however, another source of ideological notions (perceptions, representations) interests us. To the extent that the origin and guarantee of ideology-free thinking (thought) is seen in, in itself, neutral technology (technique) and in the dependent on it [this technology (technique)] highly technicised (i.e. technologically advanced) complex society (hochtechnisierten komplexen Gesellschaft), which in contrast to earlier (previous) societies has to deal with factual (topical, objective) questions and practical (or situational) constraints (or necessities), a cybernetic or technomorphic (social-theoretical) thought style (way (manner, mode) of thought) (in social theory) is formed which lives based on (from, off) the [its] claim that it is supposed to be in a theoretical respect just as compelling (coercive, compulsive) and ideology-free as the aforementioned factual questions and practical constraints (or necessities) (bildet sich ein kybernetischer oder technomorpher sozialtheoretischer Denkstil heraus, der vom Anspruch lebt, in theoretischer Hinsicht ebenso zwingend und ideologiefrei zu sein wie die gennanten Sachzwänge und -fragen es angeblich sind). The character of (as) a model is here ascribed to a certain (particular) field of the (contemporary) social [element, sphere] (Einem bestimmten Gebiet des (zeitgenössischen) Sozialen wird hier Modellcharakter zugesprochen), the thinking in terms of a model (model thought (thinking); Modelldenken) is simultaneously declared (announced) a model of thinking (thought) (Modell des Denkens) in general, and upon these epistemologically dubious (questionable) bases (basics, fundamentals) a technomorphic construction of the social (in general) is then undertaken (und auf diesen epistemologisch fragwürdigen Grundlagen wird dann eine technomorphe Konstruktion des Sozialen (im
allgemeinen) unternommen). However, to construct the whole (Whole) on the basis of a model of the part and to give (concede) to the so (thus) constructed whole (Whole) absolute priority over every part (even [over] the originally model-like [part]), constituted since time immemorial (long ago, for ages) a typical trick (contrivance, subterfuge, artifice) of traditional metaphysics, which after all built (constructed) its world image (picture) not only on the basis of biomorphic and sociomorphic, but already (even) on the basis of technomorphic patterns (Aber das Ganze auf Grund eines Modells vom Teil zu konstruieren und dem so konstruierten Ganzen absoluten Vorrang vor jedem Teil (auch dem ursprünglich modellhaften) einzuräumen, bildete seit eh und je einen typischen Kunstgriff traditioneller Metaphysik, die übrigens ihr Weltbild nicht nur an Hand von biomorphen und soziomorphen, sondern bereits an Hand von technomorphen Mustern aufbaute). The overall picture (image) of society now takes the place of the all-embracing world image (picture), but the thought figure (schema), which serves as the law of construction (building) of the theory remains untouched (unaffected) by that [replacement], and the decisive (crucial) ideological component hides exactly in it [the said (that) thought figure] (An die Stelle des allumfassenden Weltbildes tritt nun das Gesamtbild der Gesellschaft, doch die Denkfigur, die als Aufbaugesetz der Theorie dient, bleibt davon unberührt, und die ausschlaggebende ideologische Komponente steckt eben in ihr).

In the same example a further (additional) typical feature (characteristic) of ideological thinking (thought) becomes visible, which marks (characterises, typifies) mass-democratic social theory in all its variations. What is meant is (We mean) the precedence (priority) of its [mass-

---

3 Topitsch, *Vom Ursprung*; Lloyd, *Polarity*, ch. IV; already [before them,] Gomperz, “Problems”.
democratic social theory’s] underlying general thought pattern (Denkmusters) vis-à-vis concrete historical, political, economic etc. analyses of a situation (situational analyses) (gegenüber konkreten historischen, politischen, ökonomischen etc. Lageanalysen). It makes no essential difference (Wesensunterschied) that this thought pattern is no longer called e.g. [a] “world theory (i.e. world view)” but for instance [a] “model” and is “methodologically (methodically)” constructed (z. B. „Weltanschauung“ sondern etwa „Modell“ gennant und „methodisch“ konstruiert wird); it remains subject to ruling (dominant) world-theoretical(view, graphic, representative, illustrational) points of view, and the etymological relationship (affinity) of “model” and “fashion (fad, vogue, mode)” (die etymologische Verwandtschaft von „Modell“ und „Mode“) reminds us, besides (with that), in an ironic manner, of the fateful entanglements of today’s thinking in terms of a model (model thought (thinking)) with [today’s] thinking in terms of a fashion (fashion (fad, vogue, mode) thought (thinking))⁴. The [A] proneness (predisposition, susceptibility) to (in respect of) ideology, in fact (even) the ideological programme (programmatic approach) of the thinking in terms of a model (model thought (thinking)) in social theory came to light (appeared) early on in the various constructions of a social contract (in den verschiedenen Konstruktionen eines Sozialvertrags), and it [this proneness to ideology] did not in the meantime become slighter (smaller, lesser) because the art of model formation (fashioning, shaping) in many cases copied the so-called exact sciences and is exercised (practised, performed, carried on) with the help (assistance) of seemingly irresistible (irrefutable) mathematical formalisations (die Kunst der Modellbildung in vielen Fällen den sogenannten exakten Wissenschaften abgeguckt und

⁴ Kaplan, Conduct, p. 258.
mit Hilfe unwiderstehlich anmutender mathematischer Formalisierungen ausgeübt wird). With that, something is not supposedly being (meant to be) said against the heuristic fertility (fruitfulness, productivity), in fact (even) hermeneutic and cognitive inevitability of models and types (ja hermeneutische und kognitive Unvermeidbarkeit von Modellen und Typen). But this fertility (fruitfulness) and this inevitability can only be ascertained by means of (through) the constant contrasting of (social-theoretical) thought models (in social theory) with (to) concrete analyses of a situation (situational analyses) (durch die ständige Kontrastierung der sozialtheoretischen Denkmodelle mit konkreten Lageanalysen), whose [the contrasting’s] absence frequently leads to that [state of affairs (situation)] in which the products of contemporary model constructors (designers or makers of a model (of models)) and methodologists hardly differ from the intellectual accomplishments (achievements) of the ontologists of the 17th century (sich die Produkte zeitgenössischer Modellkonstrukteure und Methodologen kaum von den intellektuellen Leistungen der Ontologen des 17. Jahrhunderts unterscheiden). Certainly, (the) reference to social facts and historical developments, as vague as it may be, cannot be by-passed (circumvented, got around) in [relation to] (social-theoretical) construct(ion)s (creations, shapes, formations) (in social theory), nevertheless, the tendency to let realia (i.e. realities) ((real) facts) be absorbed into (assimilated by) a thought framework (framework of thought), which constitutes the product of a certain (particular) thought style and at the same time the condensation (compression) of normative preferences or of polemical positionings (statements, opinions), is much stronger. Gains in knowledge are not in the process (course of this) definitely (absolutely) excluded, but the primum movens of the [an] effort at thought (thought effort) does not lie therein [in the gains in knowledge]. The specifically mass-democratic quality of such
constructions now becomes noticeable (evident, clear) in [the fact] that the realia (i.e. realities) ((real) facts), in relation to which they [such constructions] are principally (mainly) invoked, are those with which today’s (Western) mass democracy connects its ideal self-understanding, and that the systematic framework, inside of which these realia (i.e. realities) ((real) facts) are either way joined (fitted) together, corresponds with a thought style (way (manner, mode) of thought) which reveals (shows, displays) parallels with the way (mode) of functioning of this same mass democracy (Gewiß, die Bezugnahme auf soziale Tatsachen und geschichtliche Entwicklungen, so vage sie auch sein mag, läßt sich in sozialtheoretischen Gebilden nicht umgehen, viel stärker ist dennoch die Tendenz, die Realien in einem Denkrahmen aufgehen zu lassen, der das Produkt eines bestimmten Denkstils und zugleich die Verdichtung von normativen Präferenzen oder von polemischen Stellungnahmen darstellt. Erkenntnisgewinne sind dabei durchaus nicht ausgeschlossen, aber nicht darin liegt das primum movens der Denkbemühung. Die spezifisch massendemokratische Qualität solcher Konstruktionen macht sich nun daran bemerkbar, daß die Realien, worauf sie sich vornehmlich berufen, jene sind, mit denen die heutige (westliche) Massendemokratie ihr ideales Selbstverständnis verbindet, und daß der systematische Rahmen, innerhalb dessen diese Realien so oder so zusammengefügt werden, einem Denkstil entspricht, der zur Funktionsweise dieser selben Massendemokratie Parallelen erkennen läßt). As a whole, it is here a matter of a thought figure (schema) which can be outlined as follows: on a sole (unique) level (flat, smooth) and homogenous surface, which knows no curvatures, that is, [it knows] no substantial (essential) and hence unabolishable hierarchisations, the ultimate (last, final) and irreducible elements of a functional whole are spread (out) (stretched out), which can in principle change (exchange, interchange) their places
and enter into all conceivable combinations with one another; [the] mobility, interchangeability (exchangeability, replaceability) and combinability of atoms vouch for (guarantee) the full (complete, absolute) imposition (pushing through) of functional points of view (perspectives) against (vis-à-vis) every substantialistically understood (conceived, regarded) magnitude (Insgesamt handelt es sich hier um eine Denkfigur, die sich folgendermaßen umreißen läßt: Auf einer einzigen ebenen und homogenen Fläche, die keine Krümmungen, also keine substantiellen und daher unaufhebbaren Hierarchisierungen kennt, sind die letzten und irreduzierbaren Elemente eines funktionalen Ganzen ausgebreitet, die grundsätzlich ihre Plätze austauschen und alle denkbaren Kombinationen miteinander eingehen können; Mobilität, Austauschbarkeit und Kombinierbarkeit der Atome bürgen für die völlige Durchsetzung der funktionellen Gesichtspunkte gegen jede substantialistisch aufgefaßte Größe)\(^5\). Transferred to social theory, this thought figure (way of thought) points to the partly real, partly ideal self-understanding of a society whose way (mode) of functioning in principle (basically) requires (demands, necessitates) and at the same time effects (brings about) the unhindered (unimpeded, unobstructed) mobility and putting (setting) aside (elimination, removal, abolition) of all the known hierarchies or substances (Hierarchien bzw. Substanzen) from the historical past. And indeed: today’s predominant (prevalent, prevailing) mass-democratic social theories or [mass-democratic social] models postulate a limine the existence of originally independent, equal and equivalent individuals (equivalent individuals having equal rights), whose interactions constitute society (Die heute vorherrschenden massendemokratischen Sozialtheorien oder -modelle postulieren a limine

\(^5\) Further details about this thought figure in Kondylis, *Niedergang*, esp. pp. 16ff., 49ff..
das Vorhandensein von ursprünglich unabhängigen, gleichberechtigten und gleichwertigen Individuen, deren Interaktionen die Gesellschaft konstituieren) – irrespective of whether these individuals are defined as “utility maximizers” (as in the economistic social theories), as rational (reasonable) partners in (of) communication (as in the theory of communicative action) or as the functional units (unities, entities) of a system (as in (the) cybernetically inspired system (systems) theory) ((wie in den ökonomistischen Sozialtheorien), als vernünftige Kommunikationspartner (wie in der Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns) oder als funktionelle Einheiten eines Systems (wie in der kybernetisch inspirierten Systemtheorie))⁶. If the social theory of societas civilis starts from the oikos [household] as the fundamental (or basic) (elementary) unit (unity) of society and bourgeois social theory tied (bound, connected) the individual, as such a unit (unity), to hyper(supra)-individual normatively understood authorities and hypostases (Man, Nature, History), (so, thus, then) the individual in the mass-democratic context appears detached (removed) from every substantial or hyper(supra)-individual bond (tie), in order thereby to be suitable for constituting the ultimate (last, final) constitutive unit (unity) of unlimitedly (boundlessly, indefinitely) mobile society (Ging die Sozialtheorie der societas civilis von oikos als grundlegender Einheit der Gesellschaft aus und band die bürgerliche Sozialtheorie das Individuum als solche Einheit an überindividuelle normativ verstandene Instanzen und Hypostasen (Mensch, Natur, Geschichte), so erscheint das Individuum im massendemokratischen Kontext von jeder substantiellen

---

⁶ Cybernetic system(s) theory of course starts from the notion of the system as an entirety (wholeness, totality), however the pursued (striven for, sought after) complete reduction of the system to functions would for its part be impossible without the consistent atomisation of its constituent (integral) elements (parts) (components); because only this [atomisation] removes (takes, extracts) every substantial character from the constituent elements (deprives the constituent elements of every substantial character).
oder überindividuellen Bindung losgelöst, um dadurch geeignet zu sein, die letzte konstitutive Einheit einer unbegrenzt mobilen Gesellschaft zu bilden); even in the case in which his [the individual’s] own rationality (Rationalität) still appears indispensable (unentbehrlich) for the continued existence (Bestand) or at any rate the thriving (prosperity, flourishing, success; Gedeihen) of society, he [the individual] must derive (draw) this unit (unity) from himself. Either way, it is (lies) in the logic of the “social model” („Sozialmodells“) to theoretically eliminate all the factors which stand in the way of the atomisation of the ultimate (last, final; letzten) constituent (integral) elements (parts) (components) of society, since only consistent atomisation allows an extreme functional flexibility (da nur konsequente Atomisierung eine extreme funktionale Flexibilität gestattet). In the course of this, it is irrelevant whether the atomisation takes place under the influence (sign) of liberal-economistic, cybernetic-functional or ethical-normative (autonomy, self-realisation) preferences (ob die Atomisierung im Zeichen liberal-ökonomistischer, kybernetisch-funktioneller oder ethisch-normativer (Autonomie, Selbstverwirklichung) Präferenzen erfolgt). And likewise it is irrelevant whether the confession of faith in ethical universalism (das Bekenntnis zum ethischen Universalismus), consideration for the extensive (spacious) or (and) planetary character of the modern economy or for instance the systematic idea (notion) of the in principle (basically) unlimited (boundless, unbounded) ability at (capacity for) the absorption of (the) functional networks, drive towards (are up to, result in) putting (placing, setting) next to the atomising tendency, the globalising tendency, as the second basic (fundamental) feature (characteristic) of (social-theoretical) constructions (in social theory) (die Rücksicht auf den großräumigen bzw. planetarischen Charakter modernen Wirtschaftens oder etwa die systemische Vorstellung vom grundsätzlich unbegrenzten
Absorptionsvermögen funktionaler Netze dazu treiben, neben die atomisierende die globalisierende Tendenz als zweites Grundmerkmal sozialtheoretischer Konstruktionen zu stellen). Atomisation and globalisation logically, and as regards content, belong together (are logically and in terms of content interrelated), since the desubstantialisation, which accompanies atomisation, enables (makes) global interchangeability and combinability (possible). No less do they [atomisation and globalisation] belong together sociologically and historically inside of mass democracy, which could become the first genuinely planetary social formation exactly because of the fact that it [mass democracy] atomised individual (separate) societies and fostered (promoted, encouraged, furthered) the economic, political and ethical stances (attitudes, views) accompanying (the) atomisation. The globalising tendency is of course not merely contained (included) in mass-democratic (social-theoretical) constructions (in social theory) as the ascertainment of facts, but as the constitutive element of theory itself or as the point of view from (with, in relation to) which the realia (i.e. realities) ((real) facts) are supposed (meant) to be looked at (observed, regarded) and classified. Both in [relation to] atomisation as well as globalisation, the idealised mode (way) of functioning of mass democracy makes itself the mode (way) of construction of theory (Die gloabalisierende Tendenz ist freilich in den massendemokratischen sozialtheoretischen Konstruktionen nicht bloß als Tatsachenfeststellung enthalten, sondern als konstitutives Element der Theorie selbst oder als Gesichtspunkt, unter dem die Realien betrachtet und eingestuft werden sollen. Sowohl bei der Atomisierung wie auch bei der Globalisierung macht sich der idealisierte Funktionsmodus der Massendemokratie zum Konstruktionsmodus der Theorie).
The ideological [element, sphere] (Das Ideologische) consists, nevertheless, not only in the structural adaptation (adjustment) of the (social-theoretical) construction (in social theory) to a thought figure (schema), which constitutes the ideational counterpart of the mode (way) of functioning of a certain (particular) social formation. Over and above that, it [the ideological] comes (arrives) on the scene (there) where the guarantees of ponderability (calculability) for the behaviour of individuals or of systems (Berechenbarkeitsgarantien für das Verhalten der Individuen oder der Systeme) are sought and offered. Ideologies would have a much (far) smaller social influence if they were not able to fulfil, next to their narrower legitimization (legitimising) tasks (functions), more general tasks (functions) of the relieving of the tension of existence too (as well) (Ideologien hätten einen viel geringeren sozialen Einfluß, könnten sie neben den engeren Legitimations- nicht auch allgemeinere Entlastungsaufgaben erfüllen). Angst (or fear) (anxiety, worry) comes into being out of (from) the imponderability (incalculability) and unforeseeability (or unpredictability) of human behaviour or of social processes (Angst entsteht aus der Unberechenbarkeit und Unvorhersehbarkeit von menschlichem Verhalten oder von sozialen Vorgängen), and that is why the reduction of behaviour and processes to the (what is) ponderable (calculable) and the (what is) foreseeable (or predictable) (auf Berechenbares und Vorhersehbares) is supposed (meant) to ultimately exorcise (cast out, banish, avert) angst (or fear) – as well as the other way around (conversely): angst (or fear) vis-à-vis angst (or fear) pushes (presses) towards such (kinds of) reductions, which in advance may be certain (sure, assured) of massive sympathies [sympathy]. In mass-democratic social theory the specifically mass-democratic matters of concern (or demands) are therefore fused (merged) with an age-old and fixed (firm, set) matter of concern (or demand) of every normativistic
theory and every world theory (i.e. world view), in order namely to gain (win) intellectual(-spiritual) and psychic(al) relieving of the tension of existence through the offer (supply) of the most far-reaching (extensive) possible guarantees of ponderability (calculability) and of foreseeability (predictability) (In der massendemokratischen Sozialtheorie verschmelzen also die spezifisch massendemokratischen Anliegen mit einem uralten und festen Anliegen jeder normativistischen Theorie und jeder Weltanschauung, um nämlich geistige und psychische Entlastung durch das Angebot von möglichst weitgehenden Berechenbarkeits- und Vorhersehbarkeitsgarantien zu gewinnen). After the collapse (breakdown) of (the) theological or rationalistic metaphysics and of the bourgeois anthropologies of Reason (Vernunftanthropologien) or teleological philosophies of history, such relieving of the tension of existence may of course be promised only with reservations and restrictions, yet on the other hand one cannot help taking up traditionally tried and tested means for this purpose (goal, end) like for instance a comprehensive concept of rationality. The debate over rationality did not by chance dominate the (social-theoretical) scene (in social theory) of recent decades: “rationality” became (turned into) the great buzzword exactly in the search for new universal guarantees of ponderability (calculability) under (in) the tricky (difficult, awkward) circumstances of mass-democratic relativistic pluralism (des massendemokratischen relativistischen Pluralismus). Against this background, it appears as unimportant (irrelevant, minor, trivial) whether rationality is understood (grasped, conceived) primarily economistically ("rational choice") or ethically-“communicatively” or as hyper(supra)-personal “system (systemic) rationality (rationality of the system)” („Systemrationalität“). Also unimportant is whether the anthropological factor is reduced to the dimension of rationality or is dissolved in system-determined(dependent,
conditioned) (systembedingte) functions. The intention remains common to avoid (get out of the way of) its [the anthropological factor’s] imponderabilities (imponderables, incalculabilities; Unwägbarkeiten) at least in theory and consequently to increase (enhance) the ponderability (calculability) of social behaviour or of social processes. Nonetheless, a consistent detachment (breaking away) from anthropological question formulations (formulations of the [a] question, problem examinations, examinations of (a [the]) problem(s), central themes) (eine konsequente Loslösung von anthropologischen Fragestellungen), despite (with) all the paraphrases and disguises of the same [anthropological question formulations], can hardly (barely, scarcely) succeed 7.

First of all, though, the guarantees of ponderability (calculability) and the prospects of the relieving of the tension of existence are offered only inside of (the) (social-theoretical) models and constructs (in social theory) (innerhalb von sozialtheoretischen Modellen und Konstrukten). They [the guarantees of ponderability and the prospects of the relieving of the tension of existence] would possess a real basis only (then) if the social theories in question (concerned) had not merely made sure of their own logical coherence (cohesion) (die eigene logische Geschlossenheit), but also [had made sure] of the real social and historical preconditions (presuppositions; Voraussetzungen) of their own validity claim (claim to validity) (Geltungsanspruchs). Their ideological character is seen (shown) not least (of all) in [the fact] that such questions do not come up (arise, come to the fore, appear on the horizon). They [the said social theories] are undoubtedly clear that they refer to differentiated and (or) atomised societies (differenzierte bzw. atomisierte Gesellschaften), and they develop their conceptuality (Begrifflichkeit) with regard to them

---

7 See section 5 in this chapter.
[differentiated and (or) atomised societies], so that, as [we] said, their underlying thought figure (schema) corresponds with the (ideal) mode (way) of functioning of mass democracy. Differentiation, complexity and atomisation (Differenzierung, Komplexität und Atomisierung) are however registered as facts which sprang (arose) from an irreversible evolution (einer unumkehrbaren Evolution), and not primarily as contingent realities (kontingente Realitäten) which must be reproduced every day on the basis of certain (particular) material preconditions (prerequisites, presuppositions; Voraussetzungen) and in themselves are not at all immune from (to) social changes. Accordingly, it is not reflected upon how social theory would look after the possible discontinuation (cessation) of these preconditions – which on the other hand implies that social theory remains connected for better or worse with the continued existence of a prospering (prosperous) mass democracy. Between the social-historical particular (situation) (Zwischen dem sozialgeschichtlich Besonderen), to which mass-democratic social theory actually refers, and its [mass-democratic social theory’s] claim to generality (Anspruch auf Allgemeinheit), yawns a gulf, which is by no means smaller (slighter, lesser) than the corresponding [one (gulf)] in the social theories of the more recent or more distant past. The conceptual spectrum is incapable of grasping the varying (different) social-historical situations and widely divergent (diverging) from one another social-historical possibilities in themselves, because it [the said conceptual spectrum] is exactly not constituted out of consideration for (in view of) this theoretical aim (goal), but in accordance with the commands of the outlined (described) mass-democratic thought figure (schema) [outlined above].
With regard to our own theoretical program on this point the following can be anticipated. If the ideological component of social theory consists, not least (of all), in the privileged treatment of (dealing with) or (and) structural generalisation of a certain (particular) social-historical situation as well as in the being oriented (i.e. orientation) of the used conceptuality towards the (idealised) specific character of this situation, then (so) conversely a scientific way of looking at things (observation, consideration) (eine wissenschaftliche Betrachtung) must a limine broaden (expand, widen) the conceptual spectrum in such a way that a contingent, real particular [phenomenon] (Besonderes) in [an] abstract format (layout, guise, presentation; Aufmachung) can no longer occupy the place of the, for every theory, indispensable general [phenomenon] (Allgemeinen). The (social-theoretical) overcoming (in social theory) of the standing still at (i.e. adherence to) (Stehenbleibens) a certain (particular) situation through the creation of the conceptual presuppositions for the intellectual coping (dealing) with every situation implies the acceptance (assumption) [of the fact] that every situation is in principle two-dimensional, i.e. it contains next to (alongside) its specific features (characteristics) (spezifischen Merkmalen), factors which either way are activated in every state of affairs (situation; Lage) of the human social situation (Situation). Social theory, whose conceptual axes are based on (idealised) specific given (actual) facts (actualities; Gegebenheiten) of today’s mass-democratic societies, must elevate (necessarily elevates) a differentia specifica to [a] genus (muß eine differentia specifica zum genus erheben), instead of understanding (grasping) that [differentia specifica] against the background (backdrop) of this [genus]. Obviously (Evidently), the apprehension (grasping; Erfassung) of the genus requires a social-ontological (sozialontologische) deepening of social theory (eine sozialontologische Vertiefung der
Sozialtheorie), while the concrete description of the differentia specifica should lead to [the] social-historical broadening (expansion, widening) of social theory. On both fronts (From both sides (angles, standpoints, points of view)), at any rate, that thinking in terms of a model (model thought (thinking)), which is committed (commits itself) to (enlists) the mass-democratic thought figure (schema), proves (turns out) to be scantly (not very) helpful.

2. [The] becoming and forming (moulding) (forms) of contemporary mass-democratic social theory (Werden und Formen zeitgenössischer massendemokratischer Sozialtheorie)

Contemporary and mass-democratic social theory are not identical (do not coincide). No society has hitherto (until now) reached such a social-political homogeneity that in it next to the decisive (crucial) phenomena or components (Erscheinungen oder Komponenten) there are no elements (Elemente) which existed already in earlier or other societies – or even took root in archaic, immemorial or simply animal ways (manners) of behaviour and (of) thinking (thought) (oder gar in archaischen, unvordenklichen oder einfach animalischen Verhaltens- und Denkweisen wurzelten). Correspondingly no society until today was characterised (marked) by such an ideological coherence (cohesion) (ideologische Geschlossenheit) that each and every respective predominant (prevailing) world theory (i.e. world view) or thought figure (schema) did not have to compete with one or more other [world theories (i.e. world views) or thought figures] openly or latently (i.e. on the path of the struggle over (in
respect of) their “genuine” interpretation) (die jeweils vorherrschende Weltanschauung oder Denkfigur nicht doch mit einer oder mehreren anderen offen oder latent (d. h. auf dem Wege des Kampfes um ihre „echte“ Interpretation) konkurrieren müßte). The ascertainment of the social-ontologically and social-historically necessary multidimensionality of every social formation of course in no way implies the impossibility of their (every social formation’s) typification (i.e. rendering into types) (classification under typifying forms) (Die Feststellung von der sozialontologisch und -geschichtlich notwendigen Multidimensionalität jeder Gesellschaftsformation impliziert freilich keineswegs die Unmöglichkeit ihrer Typisierung), especially through the working out (elaboration) of the differences in comparison with other social formations. The (What is) different [element] (Das Unterschiedliche) does not nevertheless extend to all strata (layers) and corners (areas, facets) of those social formations (alle Schichten und Ecken derjenigen Gesellschaftsformationen) which are compared or contrasted with one another on each and every respective occasion, but refers first and foremost (mainly) to their specific differences and to their concomitants, as these emerge against the background of greater or smaller similarities (common ground, commonalities), which are partly anthropologically, partly social-ontologically and culturally, partly social-historically determined (conditioned). The driving force (motor) of the social formation lies in the specific difference, regardless of whether the social phenomena (standing) under its [the said specific difference’s] influence (sign) quantitatively predominate (prevail) or not. Social models and ideal types may only be constructed with an eye on this overall picture (image) and one should declare (indicate) whether one

---

means the latter (overall picture) or merely its specific difference. If one transfers the model or the type of the specific difference to the whole, then (so) social theory becomes ideological in the sense explicated (elucidated) above (Das Unterschiedliche erstreckt sich indes nicht auf alle Schichten und Ecken derjenigen Gesellschaftsformationen, die jeweils miteinander verglichen bzw. kontrastiert werden, sondern es bezieht sich vornehmlich auf ihre spezifischen Differenzen und auf deren Begleiterscheinungen, wie sich diese vor dem Hintergrund größerer oder kleinerer Gemeinsamkeiten abzeichnen, die teils anthropologisch, teils sozialontologisch und kulturell, teils sozialgeschichtlich bedingt sind. In der spezifischen Differenz liegt der Motor der Gesellschaftsformation, gleichviel, ob die in ihrem Zeichen stehenden sozialen Phänomene quantitativ überwiegen oder nicht. Sozialmodelle und Idealtypen dürfen nur mit diesem Gesamtbild vor Augen konstruiert werden und sie sollen angeben, ob sie letzteres oder bloß seine spezifische Differenz meinen. Überträgt man das Modell oder den Typ der spezifischen Differenz auf das Ganze, so wird Sozialtheorie in dem zuvor erläuterten Sinne ideologisch).

The specific features (or characteristics) and (or) the, interwoven with them [these specific features], fields of mass democracy do not in the least therefore make up (constitute) our society in toto, and mass-democratic social theory by no means coincides with overall contemporary social theory. In the main (chief, principal) forms in which mass-democratic social theory emerged (came to the fore, appeared, stood out), especially since the 1960s, the specific phenomena (−), which in (during) the same period constituted the locomotive (driving force) of social development in the West, and through the extensive (far-reaching) putting (setting) aside (elimination, removal) of the until then strong
remnants of the bourgeois age, brought about (effected) the maturation
and consolidation (stabilisation) of the mass-democratic social structure,
(−) are condensed and idealised around the axes of the (previously
outlined) general thought figure (schema) (outlined beforehand (above))
(In den Hauptgestalten, in denen massendemokratische Sozialtheorie
insbesondere seit den 1960er Jahren hervorgetreten ist, verdichten und
idealisieren sich um die Achsen der zuvor umrissenen allgemeinen
Denkfigur die spezifischen Phänomene, die im demselben Zeitraum die
Lokomotiven der sozialen Entwicklung im Westen abgegeben und durch
die weitgehende Beseitigung der bis dahin starken Überbleibsel aus dem
bürgerlichen Zeitalter die Reifung und Festigung massendemokratischer
Sozialstruktur bewirkt haben). (A) breathtaking technological upturn
(advance) (progress) (Ein atemberaubender technologischer
Aufschwung), the overcoming (exceeding, getting over) of the shortage
(scarcity, dearth) of goods (die Überwindung der Knappheit der Güter) as
[an] extremely consequential (momentous) historical novum (new thing,
novelty) and a downright cultural revolution, which caught (included,
captured) or shook (up) all aspects of the lifeworld (Lebenswelt),
accompanied that [mass-democratic social structure, associated thought
figure etc.] and considerably (significantly) reinforced the atomisation of
the ultimate (final, last) constituent (integral) elements (parts)
(components) of the system, its mobility and (or) interchangeability
(exchangeability, replaceability) and consequently the primacy of the
functional point of view (perspective) – that is, all that which constitutes
and supports the analytical-combinatory mass-democratic thought figure
(schema) (die analytisch-kombinatorische massendemokratische
Denkfigur). The notion (idea) of a fluid whole without hierarchical
hardening(s), whose elements alternately or complementarily fulfil self-
perpetuating or modifying functions, i.e. the notion (idea) of a constant
(continuous, steady) social movement inside of a historical motionlessness found expression (was reflected) in the differently varied theory, [that] mass democracy inaugurates (initiates, induces) the “posthistoire (post-history)” or the end of history; [that] society therefore cannot from now on undergo (experience) radical changes and breaks in the linearity of time, but only the functionally determined (conditioned) recurrence (return) of the same [thing(s), [time]] in the circularity of space (Die Vorstellung von einem flüssigen Ganzen ohne hierarchische Verhärtungen, dessen Elemente abwechselnd oder komplementär sich selbst verewigende oder modifizierende Funktionen erfüllen, d. h. die Vorstellung von einer stetigen sozialen Bewegung innerhalb einer geschichtlichen Unbeweglichkeit schlug sich in der unterschiedlich variierten Theorie nieder, Massendemokratie leite die „posthistoire“ oder das Ende der Geschichte ein; Gesellschaft könne also nunmehr keine radikalen Wandlungen und Brüche in der Linearität der Zeit, sondern nur die funktional bedingte Wiederkehr des Gleichen in der Kreisförmigkeit des Raums erfahren). Not for the first time in the history of ideas (in der Geistesgeschichte) did a social formation here elevate its own mode (way) of function(ing) (Funktionsmodus) or its own picture (image) of it (that [mode of functioning]) to the key for the solution of the enigma (riddle, puzzle) of the future. Because the announced (planned, expected) abolition of the future also constitutes a statement (opinion, pronouncement, assertion) about the future.

We begin (start) our analysis with a look at system (systems) theory, whose internal (inner) development has in (respect of) central points [a] paradigmatic character, not least because of the increasing and open (overt) orientation of the theory towards cybernetic-technomorphic thought models. Sociological system(s) theory interrelates originally (at
the beginning) and organically with the sociological way of looking at things and [sociological] discipline (der soziologischen Betrachtungsweise und Disziplin) as such, in so far as the latter [sociological way of looking at things and discipline] was shaped (formed, moulded) through the [a] delimitation against (vis-à-vis) the philosophy of history and historical science (Geschichtsphilosophie und historische Wissenschaft), that is, it broke away (detached itself) from the notion (idea) of a constant flow of events in time in order to emphasise (stress, hold to) constants (Konstanten), which were then ordered (sorted, organised) systematically inside of a functionally coherent and spatially conceived whole (die dann innerhalb eines funktional kohärenten und räumlich konzipierten Ganzen systematisch geordnet wurden). System(s) theory appeared in this general sense already in the tight interweaving (intersecting, crossing over) with the older theory (teaching, doctrine) of the state (political science) (e.g. in Montesquieu) or with the philosophy of history [in respect] of progress (Geschichtsphilosophie des Fortschritts) (e.g. in Marx); however only the epistemological autonomisation of sociology could help (assist) the (specifically system(s)-theoretical) notion (idea) (specifically pertaining to system(s) theory) in achieving a breakthrough. First of all (To start off with), the question had to (in the course of this) be posed as to what is the specific weight of the individual factors or constants inside of the system and how they should be hierarchised in order to best comprehend (understand) the functioning (of) and changes of (in) the system. Because the existence of a certain (particular) hierarchy was assumed (presumed, adopted, accepted) from the outset, all the more as its [this hierarchy’s] each and every respective constitution (composition) reflected [the] ethical-normative preferences as well as [the] polemical considerations of sociologists. The renunciation of liberal economism (liberalen
Ökonomismus) and the conviction that a society completely left to the free play of economic forces would have to return (revert) to the law of the jungle, led Durkheim eventually (in the end, ultimately) to the sharp contradistinction (contrasting) (scharfen Gegenüberstellung) between (of) “services économiques” and “influence morale” and therefore (as a result) to the perception (view) that [a] stable social equilibrium (balance) can only be restored (established) on the basis of moral (ethical) factors and their institutional safeguarding (protection)\(^9\). In this way, a schema of the balanced social system (Schema des balancierten Sozialsystems) (structurally anticipated by Comte’s religion of humanity) came into being (emerged) in which the ethical-normative factors stood at the summit (top, peak, head) of the sociological hierarchy, i.e. they [the said ethical-normative factors] seemed to guarantee the continued existence of society.

When Parsons, for his part, emphasised the primacy (precedence) of the ethical-normative factors inside of (within) the social system, he followed up on (became attached to) Durkheim’s critique of economism, which though (however) was subsumed by him [Parsons] under the broader and at the same time conceptually vague (fuzzy, unsharp) rubric (category) of “utilitarism (i.e. utilitarianism)” („Utilitarisms“)\(^10\). This time, however, this critique took place with one eye on a new and perhaps still (even) worse foe (enemy), namely the base-superstructure teaching (doctrine) of historical materialism (die Basis-Überbau-Lehre des historischen Materialismus), to whose reversal the social-systemic precedence (priority) (auf deren Umkehrung der sozialsystemische Vorrang) of “values” and “norms” amounted. Parsons thought [that] Weber’s treatise

---

\(^9\) See the, for Durkheim’s thought (intellectual) development, illuminating (revealing) Introduction to the 2\(^{nd}\) edition of *La Division*, esp. pp. v, vii, xi, xii.  
\(^10\) *Structure*, esp. pp. 51ff, 161ff.; as regards Parson’s vague concept of utilitarianism see Barry, *Sociologists*, p. 76ff..
(writing, work, paper) on Protestantism must be read in this sense, and
over and above that he made an effort (endeavoured) at [achieving] an
overall interpretation of Weber and Pareto [directed] towards (for, in the
course of) the underpinning (founding, consolidation) of his basic theses
(positions). Nevertheless, with regard to his own matters of concern
(demands), only his invocation of (reference to) Durkheim was on the
whole legitimate. Pareto’s sociology, in terms of content, constitutes
something other than his political economy, i.e. equilibria do not have in
it [Pareto’s sociology] any privileged status (importance), and neither the
lions nor the foxes can be tamed by normative bonds (ties); and the
decision to read Weber in (the) light of Durkheim, but at the same time to
adopt from him [Weber] the definition of sociology as [the] science of
social action (als Wissenschaft vom sozialen Handeln), gave rise to
(caused, created) an irreparable contradiction in Parson’s undertaking.11
For Weber it was self-evident that the category of social action and (or)
of social interaction equally and equivalently contain(s) (encompass(es),
comprise(s), consist(s) of)12 consensus and struggle (war es
selbstverständlich, daß die Kategorie des sozialen Handelns bzw. der
sozialen Interaktion Konsens und Kampf gleichberechtigt umfaßt) and (that) that is why (as a result) values and
norms can constitute both a basis of mutual understanding as well as a
battlefield (Werte und Normen ebenso eine Verständigungsbasis wie ein
Schlachtfeld abgeben können). In view of the one-sided system-
preserving functions (or tasks), with regard to which Parsons provided the
values and the norms, he [Parsons] had to accordingly narrow down
(restrict, limit, curb) the category of social interaction (die Kategorie der
sozialen Interaktion), that is, set (put) up (erect, found) values and norms

11 See Ch. II, Sec. 2A in this volume.
12 In relation to that, Ch. III, Sec. 4 in this volume.
as dams in order to call a halt (put a stop) to the conflict-bearing(laden) aspect of interaction (um dem konfliktträchtigen Aspekt der Interaktion). The form-related (i.e. formal) framework of interaction (Der formale Rahmen der Interaktion) is filled correspondingly selectively with those contents which serve the integration and the preservation of the system; that is why that which Parsons calls the “voluntaristic” (that is, subjective) element of his theory hardly goes beyond the psychological mechanisms of the internalisation of the established collective values and norms. The ultimate guarantee for (of) (the) social equilibrium consequently lies in nothing other than the manner (mode, way) of the theory formation itself. Parson’s undertaking to think of (imagine, reflect upon) the normatively safeguarded system and (the) social interaction (die soziale Interaktion) together (jointly) failed (foundered) – not because the system does not consist in interaction, but because the concept of interaction, if it is taken in (to) its full extent, does not necessarily (have to) bring forth (about) (lead to) a system in Parsons’s sense. If one wants to judge somewhat strictly and yet not unjustly, then one might say [that] Parsons has not considerably enriched (expanded, increased) our knowledge of the system-preserving role of ideological construct(ion)s (creations, shapes, formations) over and above that which, for instance, the Marxist teaching (doctrine, theory) [in respect] of ideology (Ideologielehre) (including its further developments (shaping(s)) as regards the sociology of knowledge) had already accomplished; but instead of that he [Parsons] was landed (inflicted) with (acquired, got, ended up with) a substantial (sizable, considerable) theoretical difficulty, as by the narrowing (shortening, curtailment or reduction) of the concept of interaction in relation to (around) its dimension of struggle, he blocked a limine a thorough (complete, exhaustive) explanation of (for) the “dysfunctionalities” of the social system (Wenn man etwas streng und
trotzdem nicht ungerecht urteilen will, so darf man sagen, Parsons habe unsere Kenntnisse von der systemerhaltenden Rolle ideologischer Gebilde nicht wesentlich über das hinaus bereichert, was etwa die marxistische Ideologielehre (einschließlich ihrer wissenssoziologischen Weiterbildungen) schon geleistet hatte; statt dessen hadelte er sich aber eine beträchtliche theoretische Schwierigkeit ein, indem er durch die Verkürzung des Interaktionsbegriffes um seine Kampfdimension eine gründliche Erklärung der „Dysfunktionalitäten“ sozialer Systeme a limine blockierte).

The individual (separate) weaknesses of Parsons’s system (systems) concept (concept of the system; Systemkonzept) were criticised (queried, objected to) a long time ago and often\(^{13}\), and need (ought) not concern (occupy) us any further. For us it is important that the further shaping (development, formation, education) of system (systems) theory in the 1950s and 1960s, as it took place under the dual (double) and heterogeneous influence of (the) technological upturn (advance) (progress) and the advancing technomorphic thought models, and, the [Western mass-democratic] cultural revolution, absorbed in themselves important topoi (Topoi) of the critique of Parsons, and eventually (finally) turned against what for very many [theoreticians, sociologists] made up both pillars (or mainstays) of Parsons’s social system (Sozialsystem): the idea (notion; Vorstellung) of the internal (inner) equilibrium (balance) of a distinctly (solidly) outlined (clearly defined) whole and the conviction of the role, having effective priority, of values and norms in the maintenance (maintaining, upholding) of this equilibrium (der Aufrechterhaltung dieses Gleichgewichts). If (Were)

sociology and (or) the, with its [sociology’s] approach, interwoven idea (notion) of the social system (verwachsene Gedanke des sozialen Systems), (w)ere thereby bound from the beginning to the mass-democratic thought figure (schema), [in] that they [sociology and the idea of the social system] put in the place of historical time, functional space as the fundamental (basic) category of social perception, so now a second step in this same direction is taken: inside of this space, in which the, as it were, timeless system extended (stretched), the hierarchies and the boundaries were abolished (done away with, got rid of), so that the openness of the system towards all sides made its [the system’s] support (backing) by (through) values and norms superfluous, in fact impossible. Through this expansionistic theory (theoretical) strategy (strategy of theory) (diese expansionistische Theoriestrategie), the old reproach (accusation, criticism) against system (systems) theory had to be weakened (refuted, invalidated), [that] it is of [its] essence (sie sei vom Wesen her) a theory of social statics, which cannot account for change and conflict; the concept of equilibrium was accordingly (correspondingly) reinterpreted (i.e. meta-interpreted) and (or) functionalised (der Begriff des Gleichgewichts wurde entsprechend uminterpretiert bzw. funktionalisiert), and the new mobility of the system finally led to its inclusion (incorporation) in an evolutionary overall perspective, whose basic (fundamental) concepts (Grundbegriffe) were called “differentiation”, “reintegration” and “adaptation”14. The sociological belittlement (downgrading) of norms and values (Die soziologische Herabsetzung der Normen und der Werte) helped for its

14 A.D. Smith, from whom the expression “expansionist strategy” comes, vividly describes the American intellectual (-spiritual) climate (atmosphere) (geistige Klima) of the 1950s and early 1960s, which led to this change (transformation) in (of) system (systems) theory, see Concept, esp. p. 8ff, p. 14ff.. Cf. Blalock-Blalock, “Clarification”, esp. pp. 88-91. Parsons’s efforts (endeavours) to take into account the new development and to accordingly make his own system (more) flexible, does not interest us here, cf. footnote 34 below.
part (the) rejuvenated system (systems) theory, in addition (into the bargain, besides), to get rid of (cast off) the reputation of the old-fashioned (outmoded) custodian (keeper, guardian) of manners (customs) which stuck (attached) to Parsons and which in that (cultural-revolutionary) decade (of the [Western mass-democratic] cultural revolution) was no longer well regarded.

The demand for the opening and dynamicisation (making (more) dynamic; Dynamisierung) of the system through the reinforced inclusion of the functional point of view was raised (made) early on by sociologists, such as e.g. by Merton, who summed up (summarised) his matter of concern (purpose, request) in that he wanted against Parsons’s “monism” to think of (imagine, reflect upon) structure and change or conflict together (jointly) and thus reconcile Durkheim and Marx with one another15. Younger sociologists, who wanted to see in the proceeding structural differentiation of the system or in the functional autonomy of its parts (in der strukturellen Ausdifferenzierung des Systems bzw. in der funktionalen Autonomie seiner Teile) not so much a danger for its [the system’s] (continued) existence (Bestand), but rather a flexible adaptation mechanism (mechanism of adaptation, adaptive mechanism) and hence a guarantee of [the system’s] existence (einen flexiblen Anpassungsmechanismus und daher eine Existenzgarantie), invoked (referred to) Merton as [the] initiator of a functionalistically watered down (weakened) system (systems) theory (einer funktionalistisch aufgeweichten Systemtheorie); without that autonomy the system would have to entirely (completely) go to pieces (be ruined, be destroyed, founder) during the occurrence (appearance) of

dysfunctionalities or be (completely) reorganised (from the ground up)\textsuperscript{16}. For (In regard to) the character of the development which we are studying here, nevertheless, the fact remains revealing (instructive, informative) that, despite these and similar sociological approaches, the decisive step for (in) the reshaping (remodelling, restructuring) of system (systems) theory took place (occurred, ensued) through (by means of) the wholesale (general, sweeping) adoption (adopting) of a thought model which came into being outside of the sociological discipline. The “open system” („offene System“) has (had) been (was) the construct of a cybernetics (das Konstrukt einer Kybernetik) which saw itself as the method par excellence for the analysis of highly (extremely) complex systems\textsuperscript{17}. The contingency and interchangeability (exchangeability, replaceability) of the constituent (integral) elements (parts) (components) of the system (Die Kontingenz und Austauschbarkeit der Bestandteile des Systems) as prerequisites (requirements, conditions) of its [the system’s] own purely functional character were ensured (guaranteed) by the fact that cybernetics in principle has (keeps) in mind a totality of possibilities or potentialities, not topicalities (actualities) (eine Totalität von Möglichkeiten oder Potenzialitäten, nicht Aktualitäten). Its (Cybernetics’s) basic (fundamental) concepts (Grundkonzepte), which for their part cannot be separated from the concept of information, are called difference (between two things or two states (conditions, situations) [in respect] of the same thing) and variety of form (multiformity; Vielfalt). In this, first of all, confusing (unclear) ensemble of possibilities and differences, the compulsion (coercion, force, pressure) towards [the] reduction of (in) (the) complexity causes (produces, yields) order or


\textsuperscript{17} Ashby, \textit{Introduction}, p. 5ff..
“system”; a selection constantly (continually) takes place (happens), which is based on the reducibility of the world, and seen (looked at) in this way, information theory amounts (is tantamount) to (means exactly the same as) a selection theory (theory of selection) (In dieses zunächst unübersichtliche Ensemble von Möglichkeiten und Differenzen bringt der Zwang zur Reduktion der Komplexität Ordnung oder „System“; ständig muß eine Selektion stattfinden, die auf der Reduzierbarkeit der Welt beruht, und so gesehen bedeutet Informationstheorie ebensoviel wie eine Theorie der Selektion)\textsuperscript{18}. The system, which is constituted through (by (means of)) such a selection, is then an [something] open [system], when it is not isolated from its environment, when it constantly (continuously) changes its behaviour in the sense of adaption and self-organisation, and when it interacts (interagiert) with its observer, this [observer] is consequently (therefore) situated (found, is) inside of rather than outside of it [the said system]\textsuperscript{19}.

This thought model took over (possession of) the area (realm) of the sciences humaines (social sciences) with remarkable (noteworthy) quickness (swiftness, rapidity, speed)\textsuperscript{20}. It [The said thought model] nurtured (nourished) the old partly alluring (tempting, seductive), partly foolhardy (reckless, daring) dream of the unification of all [the] fields of knowledge, so that now physical, biological and social interaction (Interaktion) could be brought to a common denominator, and it promised, through its consistent functionalism, to completely put (set) aside (remove, sideline) the conventional (or traditional) concept of causality and every substantialism interrelated (belonging together) with

\textsuperscript{18} Loc. cit., pp. 3, 9, 131, 140, 261ff.; Rapoport, “Promise and Pifalls”.


\textsuperscript{20} See in general David, La cybernétique; Geyer-Zouwen (eds.), Sociocybernetics. On selection and combination as fundamental operations in linguistics see Jacobson-Halle, Fundamentals, p. 60ff.
it (und jeden damit zusammengehörenden Substantialismus). Under these preconditions, system (systems) theoreticians were prepared to dispense with (dispose of), at one blow (stroke) (all at once), both [the] traditional or psychoanalytical anthropology of drives (urges) as well as with (of) Parsons’s binding (joining, connection) of a still substantialistically understood (construed, interpreted) individual to (with) values and norms; now there was talk of “personal systems”, which are forever put together (assembled, made up) anew on the basis of a selection from all levels of the personality, and as flexibly functional construct(ion)s (creations, shapes, formations) [constructs] are absorbed, as it were (so to speak), by [a] likewise (equally, in the same way) functionalistically meant (intended, thought, imagined) open system, that is, [an open system] constantly (continually) shifting its centres of gravity (Schwerpunkte) and needs (Unter diesen Voraussetzungen schickten sich die Systemtheoretiker an, sowohl die traditionelle bzw. psychoanalytische Triebanthropologie als auch Parsons’ Bindung eines noch immer substantialistisch aufgefaßten Individuums an Werte und Normen mit einem Schlag zu erledigen; nun war von „personal systems“ die Rede, die sich immer neu auf der Basis einer Selektion aus allen Ebenen der Persönlichkeit zusammensetzen und als flexible funktionale Gebilde im gleichermaßen funktionalistisch gedachten, also seine Schwerpunkte und Bedürfnisse ständig verlagernenden offenen System gleichsam aufgehen)\textsuperscript{21}. So the [aforesaid] thought model seemed to be in a position to cope (deal) with (manage) even the trickiest (most delicate, thorniest) and most subtle question, namely the question of individual subjectivity in the [its] relation with (to) (in relation to) [the] social whole. Though a look at the

relevant literature shows that its [this thought model’s] greatest advantage in the eyes of political scientists and of sociologists lay (was) in its supposed (assumed) ability to take into account, at least to some extent, the facts of change and of conflict. These facts were propounded (put forward) against Parsons even (still) in the 1950s, when the subsequent (later) (cultural-revolutionary) neo-Marxism (of the [Western mass-democratic] cultural revolution) or more moderate related schools (lines) of thought (trends, directions) were already on the rise; however, soon it came to light (emerged) that a not in the least (by no means) revolutionary interpretation and reinterpretation (i.e. meta-interpretation) or interpretive way (Interpretation bzw. Um- oder Weginterpretation) [in respect] of [these] same [facts] was possible, which was able to be reconciled with the acceptance (assumption) [that] the Western, that is, mobile and continually (constantly, always) capable of renewal mass democracy, could best be regarded (looked at) as (considered) an open system, which not only endures (puts up with, stands) internal (inner) conflicts, but (is) even (is) able to use [them, such conflicts] as [a] vital adaptation mechanism (mechanism of adaptation, adaptive mechanism)\textsuperscript{22}. When Easton e.g. distanced himself from his own earlier system (systems) concept (concept of the system), which was based (rested) on the notion (idea) of equilibrium, and instead of this declared himself in favour of the open system, he criticised (found fault with) in [regard to] the former [concept of the system] above all its closed character, i.e. its inability (incapacity) to set aims (goals; Ziele) other than its own preservation; but of decisive importance (significance) would be (the) adaptive ability (capability, capacity) or the suitability to appropriately

\textsuperscript{22} See in relation to that Chap. III, Sec. 4 in this volume.
react to pressure\textsuperscript{23}. Cybernetically inspired sociologists, who (made) (adopted, appropriated) the concept of the open system (their own), a long time ago connected with that [open system] the conviction [that] change, innovation and self-transformation are the best means for self-preservation\textsuperscript{24}.

From this dynamicised point of view of things it was objected (said) against Parsons [that] change (alteration, modification) rather than the rigid (stiff) firmness of values and norms contributes to the cohesion of the social system (Kohäsion des Sozialsystems)\textsuperscript{25}, or, more generally (still), social integration (soziale Integration) does not at all need normative consensus, but can be brought off (effected, managed) through (by (means of)) the interplay (synergy, having effect together, interaction; das Zusammenwirken) of several factors like (as) for instance economic interdependence, political coercion (compulsion, constraint) (wirtschaftliche Interdependenz, politischer Zwang) etc.; a functionalistic integration model, which wanted to take into account (consideration) the fact of normative conflicts, would have to, of course, understand (perceive, grasp, interpret; auffassen) integration as [a] constant adaptive reaction and to think [about it (integration)] together with the process (event) of growing complexity and differentiation during (the) adaptation (adjustment) to extra-systemic changes (außersystemische Änderungen)\textsuperscript{26}. Symptomatic of a not unimportant aspect of the (intellectual(-spiritual)-historical) situation (in the history of ideas) (der geistesgeschichtlichen Lage), in which the concept of the open system found (met with) dissemination, was the attempt of this author [van den

\textsuperscript{23} Cf. The Political System (1953), esp. ch. XI, with A Systems Analysis of Political Life (1965), esp. p. 17ff.
\textsuperscript{24} See e.g. Gadwallader, “The Cybernetic Analysis” (1959).
\textsuperscript{25} Cf. Turk, “Social Cohesion”.
\textsuperscript{26} Van den Berghe, “Dialectic”, esp. pp. 697, 698, 703.
Berghe] to point to (out) (stress) fundamental commonalities between functionalism and Hegelian-Marxist dialectics. In this respect a better known author, Blau, quickly followed him27, whose theoretical outline nevertheless above all deserves attention for another reason, and indeed regardless of the later distancing of its originator (author, creator) (Distanzierung seines Urhebers) from it. Here it became clear that the renunciation of [the] Parsonian primacy of value [orientation] and norm orientation in favour of the turn towards exchange relations (die Absage ans Parsonssche Primat der Wert- und Normorientierung zugunsten der Wendung zu den Austauschbeziehungen)28, (in relation to which power relations (Machtverhältnisse) are also reckoned (with) (taken into account),) enabled (made) a tying on (fastening, connecting) of functionalism to individualistic – behaviouristic and economistic – approaches (possible) (eine Anknüpfung des Funktionalismus an individualistische – behavioristische und ökonomistische – Ansätze ermöglichte); these in fact (of course, indeed) were formed outside of Parson’s system (systems) theory or in direct contrast to it (Homans), but nevertheless they could be inspired by the concept of an open system and its functionalism or belatedly had some influence on this concept, in order to continue to reinforce (strengthen, boost) (carry on reinforcing), through the programmatic atomisation of the ultimate (last, final) constituent (integral) elements (parts) (components) of the system, its functional, that is, open character. Blau wants to build the open complex social system (das offene komplexe Sozialsystem) from below while [by] basing (he bases) [it (the open complex social system)] on microsociologically understood interaction (Interaktion) amongst individuals and [while, by] following (he follows) the development of social networks on the basis of

27 *Exchange*, ch. XII: “Dialectical Forces”.
mechanisms of exchange as [the] foundation of social life. It is an open question whether the theoretical construction of a system can succeed under the premise (based on the premises) of methodological individualism (unter den Prämissen des methodologischen Individualismus)\(^29\) or rather whether [one] must start (out) from the system as [a] whole; in any case, even the option of the latter solution did not stop system (systems) theory from portraying (describing) interaction as (like) the individualistic theories had already done it. The logical and content-related (filled) (substantive) heterogeneity (Die logische und inhaltliche Heterogenität), which arose (resulted) from it (that), will yet (still) have to occupy us: it likewise characterises, albeit (even if) in another sense, Blau’s earlier social theory, which paid for its scope (extent) with the abandonment (renunciation) of logical coherence\(^30\) and exactly through that (in this way) encouraged the nonchalant eclecticism of the newer system (systems) theory.

This eclecticism could in practice draw from all schools (lines) of thought (directions, trends), which in the time of the formation of the cybernetic thought model of the open system turned, for their [these schools of thought’] own reasons and [from (with, based on) their own] forces, against Parsons’s construction. To these [schools of thought] belonged, apart from the aforementioned behaviouristic and economistic individualisms, microsociological analyses of interaction (Interaktion), which rested (were based) on the basic (fundamental) schemata of symbolic interactionism or else continued phenomenological ideas (thoughts) (phänomenologisches Gedankengut). In this way (So, Thus), Schütz’s phenomenology of everyday (daily) life led to (flowed into)

\(^29\) See in relation to that Ch. II, Sec. 2Ce in this volume.
\(^30\) Cf. Mulkay, Functionalism, esp. pp. 180, 211ff..
Garfinkel’s ethnomethodology, which likewise cannot accept Parsons’s solution to (for, of) the problem of social order (sozialen Ordnung). Neither the internalisation nor the ethical status of normscurbs (checks, curtails) the anarchy of interests, but a normification (i.e. normative standardisation) (Normierung) of a completely different type (mould), i.e. the perceived normality of acts (die wahrgenommene Normalität von Handlungen) as [the] basis of (for) the ponderability (calculability) (Berechenbarkeit) of future acts, looks after (provides for, takes care of) that [the curbing of the anarchy of interests]; the ascertainment of those acting reflexively (der reflexiv Handelnden), [that] the normification (i.e. normative standardisation) or (and) the normality and hence ponderability (calculability) of one’s own and another’s (someone else’s, alien, foreign) behaviour (eigenen und fremden Verhaltens) in the end (finally) serves the interests of all sides as a result of the thereby achieved (mutual) trust (or confidence building) (Vertrauensbildung), produces (generates) norms which are primarily pragmatically and not for instance ethically meant, which do not come from without (the outside), but make up (constitute, form) the constitutive features of situations perceived to be “normal” (perceived “normal” situations)\(^{31}\). The logically precarious (see below), express or tacit (silent, implicit), wholesale (general) or selective inclusion (incorporation) of individualistic and interactionistic positions in the sociological theory of the open system (die soziologische Theorie vom offenen System) cannot (may not) nevertheless deceive [us] about its origin and character. Incidentally, already (even) for chronological reasons it [this inclusion] could only occur in retrospect (with hindsight), since the process of the formation of the newer system (systems) theory, at least as regards (as far as it concerned) its conceptual framework

(scaffolding; Gerüst) and its content-related(filled) (substantive) baselines, lasted for a little while (quite a short period of time) and already in the mid 1960s was on the whole completed (concluded).

Buckley’s book [Sociology and Modern Systems Theory] testifies to that, which sums up (summarises) this process and at the same time crowns [it (the said process)]. It [Buckley’s book] leaves no doubt as to the cybernetic inspiration of the thought model [in question] and at the same time as to [the fact] that a theoretical and ideological main (chief) concern, in the course of this, was the collecting of [more, then] recent conflict theories (theories of conflict) in a conceptual framework, which it could approve of in principle and yet neutralise – a framework moreover which corresponds with the ideal (notion) (Idealvorstellung) of an extremely dynamic and nonetheless not revolutionary society, that is, with the self-understanding of Western mass democracy. The pointing out of the commonalities between cybernetics and dialectics, wherein Buckley follows the example of van den Berghe and of Blau32, as well as the particular nuancing of the critique (criticism) of Parsons, belong to the strategy of the collecting of originally anti-systemic approaches. So against this, (as) the first [thing] put forward is the argument of conflict theoreticians [that] it [the said anti-systemic approaches] cannot theoretically come to terms (cope) with either the phenomenon of deviating (diverging) behaviour or with [the phenomeon (that) of] change. Accordingly, the most important feature of the system is seen as [being] its tendency to change (alter) its own structure; whereas systems with [a] fixed structure approach (go towards) entropy as soon as they change beyond certain limits, the open system combats entropy through the creation of new structures. The equilibrium system (systems) model is

32 Sociology, p. 18.
thus (therefore, consequently) replaced with a complex and adaptive system (systems) model, which is no longer based on fixed norms, but constantly brings about (generates, engenders, produces) alternatives, between which [one or more] must be selected (chosen, decided on) always anew. Tension (Stress, Strain) inside of the system is a normal and fertile state of affairs (situation) (Spannung innerhalb des Systems ist ein normaler und fruchtbarer Zustand), i.e. it is a necessary concomitant (consequence) of a variety of form (multiformity) which arises (results) from the normative ambivalence and the existence of alternatives, as well as from deviating (diverging) behaviour, innovation and differentiation; it is (becomes) perceived (wahrgenommen wird) through (by means of) selective processes, whose vehicles are communicative networks and information flows (Informationsflüsse). According to that, the communication (communicative) process (Der Kommunikationsprozeß) constitutes the main feature of a system which becomes more and more fluid (flowing), since the interrelations (die Interrelationen) between its constituent (integral) elements (parts) (components) are no longer ensured (guaranteed) through the transference of energy, as was the case in the spatiotemporally conceived equilibrium model, but through the uninterrupted (incessant) flow of information (Fluß von Information); to the extent [that] energy is substituted by (through) information, the autonomy of the system’s constituent elements grows and consequently the significance (importance) of their relations (ihrer Relationen) with one another also grows compared to (vis-à-vis) their substantial constitution (composition or texture) (substantiellen Beschaffenheit). Typically enough, Buckley is willing (prepared), under these preconditions, to accept to a large degree the contingency of the system. He even accepts Homans’s exaggerated formulation (Formulierung) [that] the existence of a social system (das Bestehen eines sozialen
Systems) is already (really) in itself a “miracle”, without of course noticing (realising, sensing) that this formulation can only be meaningful from the perspective of consistent methodological individualism; like other system (systems) theoreticians too, he makes (adopts) the individualistic standpoint (his own) in so far as (the) stable social structures can be based (founded) in the end on exchange processes, which are then consolidated (stabilised) through symmetrical orientations of (the) social subjects and through the distribution of power.\(^{33}\)

The trend towards the model of the open system was so strong in the 1960s, at least amongst the representatives of system (systems) theories, that Parsons himself could not resist (withstand) it. Here, however, we can disregard his later personal development (evolution) because he did not bring any new conceptual-structural point of view to light. Instead, we shall make some remarks (comments, observations) about the thought figure (schema) outlined above and start, at the same time, with its ideational root, that is, its cybernetic origin. If cybernetics is indeed the theory of (the) functional possibilities (die Theorie der Funktionsmöglichkeiten) of informational systems in abstraction (informationeller Systeme unter Abstraktion) from their physical, physiological or psychological peculiarities, so (thus, then) from that, with regard to the construction of a cybernetic social theory, two

\(^{33}\) Loc. cit., esp. pp. 29ff., 51, 159ff., 47ff., 39.

\(^{34}\) See in relation to that above all “Some Problems” (1970) and cf. in relation to that A. D. Smith, Concept, p. 31ff.. Also, Luhmann’s works have contributed very little to the enrichment of the theory of the open system, whose formation was in essence completed (concluded) when Luhmann came to public attention. The consistent functionalisation (Funktionalisierung) of system (systems) theory directed against Parsons was therefore not at all Luhmann’s work, as many [people (scholars)] believe in Germany. Its [This functionalisation of systems theory’s] leading (central) ideas and its conceptual instruments are, all of them, taken from the American literature of the late 1950s and early 1960s, whose arguments (argumentations) and contents were summed up (summarised) or varied, explicated or recombined (newly combined) in Luhmann’s inflated (prolific, excessive, inflationary, blown up) production. Precisely because of that the writings of the German possess (have) a symptomatic value, and on account of this value of theirs they will be cited hereinafter (below).

(different) things can be concluded: either one may, in the course of this, leave out of consideration all peculiarities, and holding on to (stressing, emphasising) what is most general, freely exchange (interchange) the description (portrayal) of geological and zoological systems with that of a social system (die Schilderung geologischer und zoologischer Systeme mit jener eines Sozialsystems), or else one must import into the extensively (generally) accepted (assumed, adopted) general thought model those particularities which can make out of it a recognisable (discernible) geological, zoological or sociological theory. Yet the specific features (characteristics), which enable the specifying (specification) of the thought model, are in no event (not under any circumstances) to be taken from the thought model itself, otherwise this [thought model] would have to refer from the beginning to the corresponding particular contents and consequently it [the thought model] would be restricted (limited), that is, it would have to give up (abandon) its own claim to universality (den eigenen Universalitätsanspruch); they [the said specific features] must, therefore, be brought into the thought model from the outside (without), after they are defined according to criteria which likewise cannot come from the same [thought model].

More concretely: in order that the cybernetic thought model results in (yields) a useful social theory, it must previously (beforehand) be enriched by exactly the specific features which make up (constitute) a society of humans (people, men) – and to these features the cybernetic thought model can possibly be applied in retrospect; logically, however, they [the said specific features] may not (cannot) be derived (deduced) from this [thought model]. Cybernetically inspired sociologists confuse the (supposed (alleged)) applicability of the model with its conceptual and content-related(filled) (substantive) fertility (fruitfulness, fecundity), in which they, as we shall (still, yet) see (below, later), make their
logically unjustified (tacit) loans from other disciplines and methods out to be their own discoveries and proof(s) ((pieces of) evidence) of the productiveness (fertility) of their own approach.

In view of the by definition (per definitionem) inability of the cybernetic thought model to climb (come) down (descend) to the specific features of the individual (separate) ontological strata (layers) of reality\(^4\), if it is (wants) to remain universal, one can say with good reason [that] its disadvantage (drawback) consists not so much in its non-applicability, but rather in its suitability to be applicable everywhere (all over the place) and as one likes (arbitrarily; beliebig)\(^36\). The relationship to reality (Realitätsbezug), particularly (especially) in social theory, is simply feigned (faked) through the selective use of illustrative examples, which for their part are prepared in accordance with the requirements of the underlying thought model and its conceptuality; that is why no advances (progress) in knowledge are (is) to be expected, unless through the smuggling in of additional assumptions which do not arise (ensue) from the thought model itself\(^37\). That concept [i.e. the cybernetic thought model] (Konzept) attains (achieves), therefore, quasi the status which terms (concepts) (Begriffe) possessed (had) in medieval realism. The conventionalistically meant and at any time revisable use (usage) of the means of thought (thought (intellectual) means; Denkmittel) retreats (withdraws, recoils, backs away) from the nonchalant uniform covering over (up) (concealing) of the (phenomenal) variety of form (multiformity) (of phenomena) (phänomenalen Vielfalt) by the constructs of the thought laboratory. The unification of the cognitive space is achieved through the transformation of phenomena into symptomatic cases or illustrations of

\(^36\) A. D. Smith, *Concept*, p. 76.

ideational constructs, which can be put in order (incorporated) in its [the cognitive space’s] formal-logical continuum. The (social-theoretical) questions (in social theory), which are then posed, do not arise (spring) from any real analyses (i.e. analyses of reality) (Realanalysen), but from the logical self-development of the thought model; its (the said thought model’s) development (turns) on the quiet (secretly) (becomes) (into) the development of society, whose questions are identical with those of the thought model, and that is why they [the questions or problems of society’s development] are dealt with in one [the same] breath with the thought model’s inner (internal) aporias (i.e. doubts, contradictions or paradoxes) (mit den inneren Aporien des Denkmodells). Which aspect or concept of the same [(this) thought model] corresponds with which aspect or phenomenon of society, remains in the process open, and this vagueness begins already during the fixing (determination, determining, setting) of the system’s boundaries (limits) vis-à-vis (with respect to) its environment. One calls to mind (recollects, remembers) the arbitrary (as one likes, random) interchangeability (exchangeability, replaceability) of thesis and antithesis in “dialectical” constructions; at least in this sense the cyberneticists (die Kybernetiker), who prided themselves on (boasted about) their proximity (nearness, closeness; Nähe) to Hegel, were not so wrong.

Mutatis mutandis, cybernetic functionalism (der kybernetische Funktionalismus) must in social theory end up in (at) the same formalistic void (emptiness) as a linguistics which would like to deduce (the) semantics exclusively from phonology (the analogy incidentally is not accidental (coincidental) since both approaches are based on the same analytical-combinatory thought figure (schema)). And since this void (emptiness) cannot be filled by the thought model’s own resources, (then)
loans are done (made) (take place) in retrospect from fields (areas) and traditions which are alien (foreign) or even opposed (contrary, conflicting) (in regard) to the systemic approach. Here (system(s)-theoretical) (sociology pertaining to system(s) theory) as well as economistic sociology had it relatively easy and good. As latecomers they could draw from the content-related(filled) (substantive) wealth (richness) of earlier (previous) social theory and social psychology, which had named the basic (social-theoretical) questions (in social theory) and had described the basic social relations (die sozialen Grundbeziehungen). While their overall concepts (drafts, plans) (Gesamtkonzepte) were rejected (dismissed), many of their most important partial conclusions (findings) slipped into (were incorporated in, had influence on) (system(s)-theoretical) (sociology pertaining to system(s) theory) (and economistic) sociology, so that the mere translation of the same [(these) partial conclusions] into their (system(s) theory sociology(‘s) and economistic sociology’s) vocabulary gave rise to the impression that they would constitute empirical findings or logical conclusions (inferences) of (system(s)-theoretical) (approaches pertaining to system(s) theory) (or economistic) approaches in social theory. Yet things (the situation) were (was) the other way around: what in these approaches was not especially (precisely, just, particularly) trivial or tautological, did not come (emanate, stem) from their [these approaches’] premises, but from actual (real) or theoretical assumptions of varying (varied, different) origins (backgrounds) which were incorporated (included) after a fashion in the thought framework (framework of thought) defined by the [said] premises. On (About, In relation to, Regarding) that, there will be (more) discussion (talk, said) in greater detail and more concretely when we deal with the hushed up, disguised or half-hearted (feeble) anthropology of the aforementioned approaches. A few (Some) key words (cues, notes) may
here be enough (should suffice here) in order to clarify what is meant or to indicate that cybernetic theory’s basic concepts can be extracted just as well or even better from a descriptive analysis of action and interaction of concrete human existences (aus einer deskriptiven Analyse von Aktion und Interaktion konkreter menschlicher Existenzen), from which incidentally they [cybernetic theory’s basic concepts] originally came (emerged).

In order to begin with a central point: the thesis [that the] reduction of (in) complexity constitutes the basic (fundamental) operation for the constitution of systems and at the same time the basic (fundamental) achievement (performance) of the same [systems] (Die These, Reduktion von Komplexität bilde die Grundoperation zur Konstitution von Systemen und zugleich die Grundleistung derselben), will not be felt as [a] pioneering (trailblazing, groundbreaking) innovation (novelty) by anyone who for instance is familiar with Nietzsche’s theory of knowledge or with the Marxist teaching (doctrine, theory) (in respect) of ideology, and hence knows through what large-scale (grandiose) simplifications world images and collective or personal identities are formed in order to serve the goal (end, purpose) of practical orientation; (the) recent (newer) ethology has confirmed these insights with regard to animal and man (human(s)) (der etwa mit Nietzsches Erekenntnistheorie oder mit der marxistischen Ideologielehre vertraut ist und daher weiß, durch welch großangelegte Vereinfachungen Weltbilder und kollektive oder persönliche Identitäten herausgebildet werden, um dem Zweck praktischer Orientierung zu dienen; die neuere Ethologie hat diese Einsichten im Hinblick auf Tier und Mensch bestätigt)\(^{38}\). From this

\(^{38}\) Uexküll-Kriszat, Streifzüge; Lorenz, Rückseite, esp. ch. VII. Cf. footnote 131 below and the (subsequent) text (following) (after that).
general standpoint it is only self-evident that [various kinds of] information (Informationen) or meaning (Sinn) and communication about meaning must have a character of selection (Selektionscharakter), since they ([various kinds of] information or meaning and communication about meaning) as a result of the need for simplification and orientation through demarcation (delimitation, separation) from something, come into being and exist, and are dependent on a constant interpretive (interpretation) activity (eine ständige Interpretationstätigkeit) which ought to (must, should) cope (deal) with a never stopping (breaking off) stream (current) of expected and unexpected occurrences (events, incidents, facts; Ereignissen). From that again [it] follows that the refutation (disproving) of the older functionalism (Malinowski, Parsons) does not in the least require (need) the acceptance of the newer [functionalism], [that] accordingly (consequently, therefore) function does not actually mean any fixed (or stable) (steady, firm) achievement (or performance) (feste Leistung) or any fixed (stable) satisfaction of fixed (stable) needs, but alternatives and selection\(^\text{39}\); because theoretically it suffices to keep in mind that that which is “truly” a social achievement (or performance) (eine soziale Leistung) always constitutes an interpretive problem (a problem of interpretation, interpretation problem; Interpretationsproblem), in relation to which interpretive problems (problems of interpretation, interpretation problems) (exactly in their quality (property, characteristic; Eigenschaft) as problems of meaning and of communication, that is of selection) are questions of power (Machtfragen sind), which interrelate (connect) with the splitting (rupture, division) of perspectives, [the] splitting (division) of interested subjects and the formation of alternatives. In a similar sense one can

\(^{39}\) Thus, e.g. Luhmann, *Soziol. Aufklärung*, I, p. 22.
recall that the phenomena of mutuality (or reciprocity) and of exchange as [the] basis (foundation) of the formation of “normal” expectations and institutional “normalities” (die Phänomene der Gegenseitigkeit und des Austausches als Grundlage der Herausbildung „normaler“ Erwartungen und institutioneller „Normalitäten“) were researched (explored) already in the 1920s by important (significant) ethnologists (Thurnwald, Malinowski, Mauss) or that the mechanisms of interaction or interpenetration (die Mechanismen der Interaktion bzw. Interpenetration), likewise even before the Second World War, both in phenomenological anthropology as well as in the school of symbolic interactionism, were (stood) at the centre of theoretical attention. And just as little does the social theoretician (der Sozialtheoretiker) need (require) a system (systems) theory or a cybernetic vocabulary in order to for instance comprehend (grasp, understand) the meaning of the setting of an aim (goal, objective, target) (Zielsetzung) vis-à-vis the outside world for the coherence of a political collective (die Kohärenz eines politischen Kollektivs), or to properly assess (judge) the relevance of the reception (receiving) of information and the reaction to that (it) for the shaping (moulding) of this setting of an aim. All this does not belong only to (social-theoretical) common sense (in social theory), but also to the thought (Gendankengut) of old and new politics or history (Politik oder Historie) – from Thucydides’s description (portrayal) of the rise and fall of alliances and hegemonies to Toynbee’s challenge-response schema. Finally, in order to come to a German debate, it is not at all necessary to summon (the) institutionally safeguarded (protected) system (systemic) rationality (rationality of the system) in order to show (demonstrate) the weak points of the communication (communicative) utopia and the

40 Thus, e.g. K. Deutsch, Politische Kybernetik, esp. ch. 11.
41 Habermas-Luhmann, Theorie der Gesellschaft.
impossibility of the founding (establishing, basing) of social life on discourse (dialogue; Diskurs); a decisionistic teaching (theory, doctrine) of institutions could e.g. – as one of several (social-theoretical) alternatives (in social theory) – come to the same sobering conclusions (results), as they [such conclusions] also indeed had been drawn [as also indeed the said decisionistic teaching had come to] even before system (systems) theory.

The use (usage) of concepts and ideas (thoughts) of a (non-system(s)-theoretical) origin (provenance) (an origin not pertaining to system(s) theory) in the (system(s)-theoretical) framework (pertaining to system(s) theory) could epistemologically (Der Gebrauch von Begriffen und Gedanken nicht systemtheoretischer Herkunft im systemtheoretischen Rahmen könnte epistemologisch) be legitimised only through (the) proof (evidence) [that] these [concepts and ideas] obtain their full (social-theoretical) relevance and meaning (significance, importance) (in social theory) only in the context of the system. However such (a) proof for its part would presuppose a strict (social-theoretical (that is, not merely the general cybernetic)) notion (concept) of the system (Systembegriff) (in social theory (that is, not merely a general cybernetic notion of the system)) or a well-founded (justified) explanation of it, because the context of phenomena to which those concepts and ideas refer must not be called for instance simply “society”, but exactly (precisely, just) and specifically “system”. The burden of proof grows to the extent that (the) system (systems) theory positively took up individualistic (behaviouristic, economistic or interactionistic) intellectual (thought) approaches (Denkansätze), which had appeared programmatically with the claim of disputing (contesting) the system (systemic) character of society. And the problem (task) is nowhere near (far from) dealt with (taken care of,
finished) when the system (systems) theoretician (incidentally rightly, as I think) asserts that on the basis of individualistic premises the fact of the social whole (das Faktum des gesellschaftlichen Ganzen) cannot be reconstructed; because the question is not yet clarified [as to] why this whole should be called “system” – this question is therefore a different matter (another story) than (as regards, compared to) the position which one takes (declares, moves into) in the dispute (quarrel) between methodological individualism and holism\textsuperscript{42}. Now, system (systems) theoreticians precisely do not give [have not given] until now the [an] answer to that [question]\textsuperscript{43}, and their transition to the concept of the open system increased (expanded) their (unacknowledged (unadmitted)) difficulties in this respect (concerning this) rather than it [the concept of the open system] reducing (lessening) them [such difficulties]. This concept was in fact developed, as we know, first and foremost in order to do justice (live up) to (cope (deal) with) the phenomena of change and of conflict, yet exactly through conflict and change beyond a certain intensity or limit “systems” go to pieces (perish). Should the concept be meaningful and useful (usable), then it [the concept] must not merely mean (the) openness in itself and in general, but the openness of a system, which cannot anymore without limits achieve (accomplish, do, perform) what is above all expected of it: the reduction of (in) (the) complexity and the endowment (or provision) (giving) of meaning (die Reduktion von Komplexität und die Sinnstiftung), which, with (during) [the] full (complete) openness and fluidity [of the system], must simply dissolve (break up, disintegrate) in it [the system]. The openness of the system was

\textsuperscript{42} See Ch. II, Sec. 2C in this volume.

\textsuperscript{43} As such [an] answer, the statement cannot apply (be valid) [that] what the theory describes (calls) with the concept "system", is set (placed) eo ipso as part of reality, that is, the notion (concept) of the system describes something which really is [a] system (Luhmann, \textit{Soziale Systeme}, pp. 19, 30). Apart from the fact that the [this] argument structurally calls to mind the ontological proof of God, it can be cited (given) arbitrarily (as one likes) in favour of the faithfulness (fidelity) to reality of every theory.
supposed to enable the substitution of the concept of structure (structural concept) with the concept of function (die Substitution des Strukturbegriffes durch den Funktionsbegriff); since, however, openness must remain the openness of a *system*, (then, so, hence) the undertaken overcoming of the old dogged (obdurate, pig-headed, stubborn) functionalism by a flexible new [one, functionalism] runs (leads, bumps) into (comes across (up against), stumbles on) the old aporias (i.e. doubts, contradictions or paradoxes), and indeed exactly into these: do all observable functions serve the system or have all observable functional elements of social life a systemic function or not? The theory of the open system could answer this question just as little as the earlier (previous) view (perception, conception; Auffassung) of the system as functional equilibrium, and it did (has) not even attempt (try) (attempted) it; actually it [the theory of the open system] served to immunise (protect) system (systems) theory against criticism [in] that exactly that which was expressed (presented, declaimed) against it [the (theory of the open) system] was now accepted (admitted to, taken up) without any further (much) ado in the unlimitedly (boundlessly, unboundedly) open system (in das unbegrenzt geöffnete System).

In light of these ascertainments (observations, conclusions) the same may be said about the “system” [as] what Boudon wrote about (the) “structure”: it is really (frankly) a magical way (manner) of thinking (Denkweise) to think [that] the consideration (observation; Betrachtung) of an object as system would suffice (be sufficient) in order to eo ipso be able to trigger (set, spark) off (produce, cause) a scientific mutation; either the term is used conventionally or for the sake of simplicity – and then it is replaceable – or else it serves as the definition of an object (eines Objekts) – and then it is reminiscent of a realistic metaphysics; it
wants itself to be proof and method in one (er will selber Beweisführung
und Methode in Einem sein), without wanting to contemplate (reflect
upon, visualise) that method and constitution (composition or texture)
(Beschaffenheit) of the object are two different things. The magical way
(manner) of thinking of system (systems) theory was fed by the
ideological intention to impose the ideal self-understanding of a certain
society, as it appears at least from the perspective of a wing of its
ideologues, on this same society as [a(n)] interpretive schema (schema of
interpretation) (Interpretationsschema). Looked at (Seen) in this way,
(the) system (systems) theory is [a] symptom, not [an] interpretation of
society inside of which it [systems theory] was constructed. And if it
[systems theory] is not capable of explaining why (then) society in
general and today’s society in particular must be understood as [a] system
in [the] specific and strict sense, (then, so) one may reverse the question
and formulate [it] as follows (like this): how is that society constituted
(composed, procured) (what is the constitution (composition, nature) of
that society), which would, at least in some of its theoretical products,
like to be understood as [a] system?

With regard to the (social-theoretically) unspecific character of talk [in
respect] of [the] “system” (in social theory), two additional remarks
(comments) are appropriate (fitting, apt). First, the round-the-clock
(continuous, non-stop) functionalisation of system (systems) theory (die
durchgehende Funktionalisierung der Systemtheorie) cannot (further)
state (define) more precisely (specify) the notion (concept) of the
system(,) already because function and system conceptually and as
regards the history of ideas (intellectually(spiritually)-historically) do not
at all belong (go) together. The founders of formal sociology (formalen

---

44 A. quoi sert la notion, esp. ch. II-III.
Soziologie) had already thought through to its ultimate logical conclusion the notion (concept) of function (Funktionsgedanken), because they knew about its [the notion of function’s] constitutive significance (importance, meaning) for the discipline [of formal sociology] which they wanted to set up (construct, found)\(^{45}\). (The) Ethnological functionalism (Der ethnologische Funktionalismus), which afterwards via Durkheim (and not only via him) passed over to Parsons’s system (systems) concept (concept of the system), (has) however related (the) function with (the) social need and its [this social need’s] satisfaction, which let the notion (idea) of equilibrium (balance) come to the fore; and when the champions (advocates, defenders) of the open system directed against this notion (idea) [of equilibrium] the anti-substantialistic point of the notion (concept) of function, then they unconsciously returned to the concept of function of formal sociology, which of course could not and did not want to know anything about any “system”. – Secondly, the in principle connection of the notion (concept) of the system with the achievement (or performance) in (of) the complexity reduction (reduction of (in) complexity) (der Leistung der Komplexitätsreduktion) gives rise to (causes, creates, provokes), already at the base (beginning) (in the basic approach) of cybernetic social theory, a fatal (lethal, deadly) ambiguity (equivocalness). It is a matter of the mixing (blending, mixture) of the perspective of the subjects acting in the real “system” with the perspective of the theoretician, who constructs the “system” as theory and hence deals with (treats) those subjects as the objects of theory. Does system (systems) theory describe the way (manner) [in] which the subjects inside of society reduce (reduzieren) complexity in order to be able to act socially – individually and collectively –, or does it reflect

\(^{45}\) See Ch. III, Sec. 1A in this volume.
The reduction of (in) the complexity of social processes (or series of events) (die Reduktion der Komplexität sozialer Vorgänge), as the system (systems) theoretician has to undertake (do) it, in order to erect (set up, establish) a construction at the level of the abstract-general (auf der Ebene des Abstrakt-Allgemein)? Both reductions obviously move at distinct (different, dissimilar) levels, but over and above that (furthermore), they differ also in their constitution (composition).

Because he who is acting (Denn der Handelnde) (as object of system (systems) theory) is by no means obliged (obligated) to give to his reduction the form of a “system” in [the] (system(s)-theoretical) sense of the word (in system(s) theory), otherwise, in view of the indispensability of reduction for action (angesichts der Unentbehrlichkeit der Reduktion fürs Handeln), only the adherents (supporters, followers) of system (systems) theory would be capable of acting (handlungsfähig). Only the system (systems) theoretician (he who is acting as [the] originator (creator) of a certain theory) must call his own reduction “system”. The reductions taking place (occurring, happening) in society are not therefore absorbed (included, taken) in the “system” as theory unchanged and unshortened (i.e. unabridged or uncurtailed) (unverkürzt), but system (systems) theory is constructed on the basis of its own reflections (considerations) on the way (manner) [in] which those reductions belong together (are interrelated) in order to constitute the overall reduction which should (ought to) be called “system”. Put differently (In other words): reductions are inevitable and indispensable at all levels (that [the level] of the observer and that [the level] of the (what is) observed), there are several useful reductions simultaneously, and that [(the) reduction] of the system (systems) theoretician constitutes one of them. That is why “system” in the (system(s)-theoretical) sense (of (in) system(s) theory) and reduction of (in) complexity do not at all coincide, since the latter can
be achieved (done, accomplished, performed) also by e.g. a theology or by any other ideology (Daher fallen „System“ im systemtheoretischen Sinne und Reduktion von Komplexität keineswegs zusammen, da letztere auch von einer Theologie z. B. oder irgendeiner anderen Ideologie geleistet werden kann). Neither can system (systems) theory monopolise the reduction of (in) complexity for itself, nor does the criterion of this reduction suffice for the acceptance (adoption) of system (systems) theory. The latter [the acceptance of systems theory] would be possible (work) only (then) if the system (systems) theoretician’s standpoint were socially decisive (determinative), that is, if all social subjects carried out (would carry out) their reductions in [the] form of a system (systems) theory. If system (systems) theory looks at (regards, considers) itself already as (to be) [the] correct (right) description of society because in the latter [society] [the] reduction of (in) complexity takes place, then (so, thus) every description of society should (must, could) make (raise) the same claim to (of, on) correctness (rightness; Richtigkeit), since every [description] is achieved (takes place, comes about) on the basis of reductions. Seen in this way, one could put forward (propose, advance, formulate) the paradoxical assertion (claim) [that] the apt (or well-aimed) (telling, striking; treffend) description of a society is that [description] in its [society’s] ruling (dominant, prevailing) ideology (in ihr herrschende Ideologie) (is the ruling ideology in that society), and system (systems) theory describes contemporary society aptly (or in a well-aimed manner) exactly to the extent it constitutes its [contemporary society’s] ideology or it sets (establishes, fixes, determines; festlege) the reductions inside of which action (Handeln) must move.

System (Systems) theory in fact (indeed) wants to avowedly (declaredly, openly) be the self-description (Selbstbeschreibung) of contemporary
society, not however in this paradoxical sense, but literally and as scientific theory. Here the assumption is implied [that] the way (mode, manner) of functioning of this same society itself commands that the self-understanding of the same [this same society] must be scientific, that is to say, cybernetic-system(s)-theoretical (in terms of cybernetic [theory] and system(s) theory) (kybernetisch-systemtheoretisch) and not ideological in accordance with the conventional manner; therefore, [the] self-understanding or self-description of society and [the] correct (right) scientific theory would coincide (coincided) with (one) (each) (an)other. The [This] claim is consequently based on not much more than the banality of the end of ideologies. And even apart from the fact that in it [this claim] that [which is] to be proved is presupposed, (because every theory can invoke (refer (appeal) to) its practicability as proof (evidence) of its scientific truth, but (the) practicability can very well come about (be achieved) in the above-mentioned paradoxical way, that is, the truth of the [a] theory must be proved differently), (so, thus) it remains rather questionable (doubtful) [as to] whether the description of a society should, may (is allowed) or must (ought to) be undertaken on the basis of those concepts which it uses for its self-description46. If functionalistic

46 If one uses for the description of a society its [society’s] own concepts (and indeed not merely as indications of its real situation (reale Lage), but as theoretical instruments), then one must conclude (infer) or presuppose [that] concepts and ideas are mere reflections (Widerspiegelungen) of social processes (or series of events). Luhmann falls into this naive theory of knowledge when he confuses the level of the self-description of human behaviour with that [the level] of social reality or human behaviour (sozialen Wirklichkeit bzw. menschlichen Verhaltens) in general. Thus, (So) he summons descriptions (accounts; Schilderungen) of action (Handeln), or the self-understanding of those acting, from the 18th century, in order to prove that action and the system in the modern era (age, epoch) relate really (in reality, actually, tangibly) differently (real anders) to each other than in pre-modern times (Sozial. Aufklärung, III, p. 59ff.). In the course of this, [Luhmann] proceeds (it is done) highly selectively (in a highly selective manner), so that the multitude of positions and counterpositions in every epoch is overlooked (neglected, forgotten); above all, the symbolic and polemical relevance of (self-) description ((Selbst-) Schilderung) is hardly perceived, and he talks as if the latter ((self-) descriptions) were ideational copies of real action (realen Handeln) and not statements of people (men, humans), who in their concrete situation (in ihrer konkreten Lage) wanted or had to thus (so) describe or rationalise (i.e. explain or justify) their action (describe their action or wanted or had to have their action rationalised (i.e. explained or justified)). In the 3rd volume of this work we shall argue (explain) that, and why, real action changes much (far) less from person (man) to person (man) and from era to era than its justification (Begründung) or description. Cf. footnote 85 below.
system (systems) theory is scientifically recommendable (advisable) because our society is understood as [a] functional system, then (thus, so) e.g. only substantialistic metaphysics would be the appropriate (suitable) means of thought (thought (intellectual) means) for the apprehension (comprehension, grasping, understanding; Erfassung) of the Christian Middle Ages (des christlichen Mittelalters). (The latter [This] example incidentally clearly shows that the identification (equating) of the self-description with the theoretical apprehension of a society must be of (have) an ideological character). Still (Even) further: it can be hard (difficult) to imagine (envisage) what the expression “self-description of society” could mean anyway (after all, in general). There is no society as author which describes itself, as is known; the description of society is tackled in reality simultaneously by several sides, of which every one (lays) claim(s) (to) the monopoly on (of) truth for itself and hence must assert (claim, maintain) [that] its description is actually so genuine (real) that it could provide (give) society’s self-description (cf. the self-assessment of the Hegelian system as self-description of history (History) (vgl. die Selbstinschätzung des Hegelschen Systems als Selbstbeschreibung der Geschichte)). Precisely because there are a number of (several) “descriptions of [a] system (system descriptions)”, that is, a number of reductions of (in) (the) complexity at the level of individual (separate) actors (acting subjects) (also mehrere Reduktionen der Komplexität auf Ebene der einzelnen Akteure), the complexity at the level of the “system” increases. If society is looked at as a whole, in which various reductions of (in) complexity on the part of various individual (separate) actors are contained complementarily, then here it is a matter of the reduction of a third party, i.e. of a theoretician (Wird die Gesellschaft als Ganzes betrachtet, in dem verschiedene Reduktionen von Komplexität seitens verschiedener einzelner Akteure komplementär
enthalten sind, so handelt es sich hier um die Reduktion eines Dritten, d. h. eines Theoretikers). However, we know that system (systems) theory mixes (blends) a limine both types and [both] levels of reduction with one another. The theoretician’s reduction would then be a self-description of society if all actors inside of the “system” identified with it [the theoretician’s reduction]. If we leave aside the theoretician standing (found) outside of the “system” and if we stay (linger) in (at, with) the “system”, then its complexity is reduced due to the fact that one of the proposed (suggested), by the several actors (be they now theoreticians or not), reductions or self-descriptions of society asserts itself (is imposed) against (prevails over) the other(s) [reductions or self-descriptions], that is, it becomes the predominant (prevailing) ideology and mode (way) of acting (action) (vorpherrschenden Ideologie und Handlungsweise). But in this case we come back to our previous paradoxical thesis: system (systems) theory constitutes the self-description of today’s society only to the extent and in the sense [that] (in it [today’s society]) it is the predominant ideology in this [(today’s) society].

Whether the description of a certain society wants to pass itself off (appear) as its [the certain society’s] self-description or not, (so, thus) it must in any case (at any rate) declare (cite, indicate, give) the (its) specific features (characteristics) (of (this) same (society)), which must stand out (be set off) against the corresponding features (characteristics) of other historical societies as well as against those of society as [a] superordinate generic concept (concept of genus) (als übergeordnetem Gattungsbegriff). Now system (systems) theory indeed describes phenomena which are characteristic of (for) Western mass democracy (e.g. (the) “formal organisations”), yet this is not in the least its exclusive privilege. Rather [what is] decisive is that it [systems theory], into the
bargain, uses concepts which can be drawn on (brought into play) in (during) the description of every society or (and) of society in general. Reduction of (in) complexity, meaning (sense) and communication as selection processes (Reduktion von Komplexität, Sinn und Kommunikation als Selektionsvorgänge) etc., etc. are found in all historically known societies, no matter how they come into play (are brought into play) on each and every respective occasion. As a result of this, there remains ((is) left over) finally (after all), as [the] sole (only) statement of the real specific features (characteristics) (differentiae specificae) (realen Spezifika) of modern society, the pointing out of its enormous complexity. If, however, this complexity can be apprehended (grasped) with the help of the same (conceptual) instruments like the way (mode) of functioning of less complex societies too, then (so) complexity constitutes a merely quantitative magnitude, something which simply grows, without its growth ever attaining (achieving, reaching, obtaining) that qualitative character which would have to find expression in an essentially new conceptuality (Läßt sich aber diese Komplexität anhand desselben Instrumentariums erfassen wie die Funktionsweise weniger komplexer Gesellschaften auch, so bildet Komplexität eine bloß quantitative Größe, etwas, das einfach wächst, ohne daß sein Wachstum je jenen qualitativen Charakter erreicht hätte, der sich in einer wesentlich neuen Begrifflichkeit niederschlagen müßte). Certainly (No doubt), one could object [that] complexity has now assumed (taken on) such an extent (size, magnitude) that a transition to [a] functionalistic way of looking at things appears [to be] compelling (inescapable, unavoidable). Yet apart from the fact that functionalism and system (systems) theory, as [already] observed, by no means have to go hand in hand (together) (accompany each other), that objection is based (rests) on the confusing (mixing up, confusion) of method and object (Gegenstand), or of the theoretical
understanding of acting (action) (von theoretischem Verstehen von Handlungen) and [the] self-understanding of actors, with one another. If, e.g., the theory of the open system associates (connects, combines) the programmatic functionalisation of theoretical analysis with the rejection of the thesis of the primary significance (importance, meaning; Bedeutung) of norms and values for (the) social order (order of society; soziale Ordnung), (thus, so, then) it is assumed [that] with (to) that (it, [the open system’s said association]) corresponds a(n) actual (real) prevalence (predominance; Durchsetzung) of the functional way (manner) of thinking amongst (in respect of) those acting in a society constantly (continuously, continually) being differentiated (or differentiating itself) (bei den Handelnden in einer sich ständig differenzierenden Gesellschaft). It is nevertheless inconceivable (not to be seen, incomprehensible) [as to] why a society in which [one believes in] norms and values, like substances, (are believed in,) cannot be described functionalistically – unless one takes the self-understanding of the actors at (its) face value. This naturally implies that one does not have to accept the functionalistic self-understanding of a society, even if one has nothing against the functionalistic way of looking at things: because functionalistic self-understanding is not socially functionalised without fail (absolutely, necessarily; unbedingt) in the sense of the functionalistic way of looking at things.

The supposed “self-description” of the system proves (turns out) in the end therefore to be [an] ideological construct and product of wishful thinking, because it is oriented towards an ideal perception (view) of the system, (already the concept “system” contains a(n) intensely (strongly, profusely) idealising component (eine stark idealisierende Komponente)), which is supposed (meant) to (should) be brought about (made to happen)
through its declaration as [a] real given fact (actuality) (Erklärung zur realen Gegebenheit). A close colleague (collaborator) of Parsons praised his [Parsons’s] theory, because it, while it describes (describing) the consensual foundations (bases) of societies, constitutes an aspect of that process through which societies would become “even more consensual”\(^47\). It is no (Things are not) different with the newer system (systems) theory and the “self-description” of the system, although consensus is no longer (found) (at) the centre (focus) of attention. The “system” is thereby helped to [come to, achieve] predominance in society [so] that its idealised version is called the self-description of society. Since in the scientific fiction (in der wissenschaftlichen Fiktion), which is called “self-description of society”, order must prevail (dominate, rule) (Ordnung herrschen muß), (thus, so) then from the (logical) order of the fiction (der (logischen) Ordnung der Fiktion), (the) real (reale) order in society is deduced (derived), or (that is) this [real order] identifies with that [logical order of the fiction]. And since (the) logical order makes up (constitutes) a totality (eine Totalität), (then, so, thus) (the) order in the system is not regarded (looked at) as (considered to be) [the] effect (result; Wirkung) of one or another of its constituent (integral) elements (parts) (components) (e.g. of norms and of values), but is equated with the totality. Above all, order is not allowed to (may not) depend on the action of concrete actors (Vor allem darf Ordnung nicht vom Handeln konkreter Akteure abhängen). Both the concept of the end (goal) (purpose) as well as [the concept] of rationality (Sowohl der Zweck- als auch der Rationalitätsbegriff) are transferred from the theory of acting (i.e. action) (Handlungstheorie) to (the) system (systems) theory; there are indeed (of course) no absolute criteria for the rationality of action

\(^{47}\) Shils, “The Calling of Sociology”, esp. pp. 1420ff., 1429ff., 1432, 1440ff..
(Rationalität des Handelns) of “psychic(al)” or “social” (part-)systems (von „psychischen“ oder „sozialen“ (Teil-)Systemen), yet (but) their controllability and ponderability (calculability) (Kontrollierbarkeit und Berechenbarkeit) with regard to the question of order is irrelevant, since order will be (becomes, is) guaranteed through (the) “system (systemic) rationality (rationality of the system)”, which possesses (has) the capacity (ability) to turn even coincidences and mistakes (errors) into [a, something] positive\(^{48}\). This hint (sign) points to (indicates) an important (intellectual(-spiritual)-historical) source (in the history of ideas) [in respect] of the overall concept (draft, plan). We mean (are thinking of) the old liberal-economic mythology of the invisible hand (der unsichtbaren Hand), which is able to convert (transform) “private vices” into “public benefits”. Here, as (like) in system (systems) theory, (however, in the meantime), the effect (impact, influence) of the heterogony of ends (die Wirkung der Heterogonie der Zwecke) is unilaterally (one-sidedly) fixed (set) (in regard) to(wards) the happy end of order, and it is deliberately (intentionally; geflissentlich) overlooked that in several historical situations not only can it [the heterogony of ends] go beyond (force (break open) the bound(arie)s (limits) [bounds]...

\(^{48}\) See e.g. Luhmann, *Politische Plannung*, p. 74; *Soziale Systeme*, pp. 157, 165. Luhmann here repeats Buckley’s repetition of Homans’s dictum [that] in view of the contingency of individual action, social order (soziale Ordnung) (“custom”) is in itself unlikely (improbable, implausible; unwahrscheinlich), a true “miracle” (*Human Group*, p. 282; cf. Devereux, “Parsons’ Sociological Theory”, p. 33ff.. Parsons’s concern about (the) social equilibrium was founded on the conviction “that society represents a veritable powder keg of conflicting forces ... That any sort of equilibrium is achieved at all ... represents for Parsons something both of a miracle and challenge”; we should recall that Gehlen too described culture as “unlikely (improbable, implausible)”, *Urmensch*, p. 105). We (have) already said [that] entitled to such an assumption is someone who, like Homans, would like to construct society and social order based on the premises of methodological individualism (Gesellschaft und gesellschaftliche Ordnung an Hand der Prämisse des methodologischen Individualismus konstruieren möchte). Since the system (systems) theoretician for his part started from the fact of the system and its rationality, he can accept order as an equally original fact and disorder only within (inside of) the bound(arie)s (limits) [bounds] of order (die Ordnung als gleichursprüngliches Faktum und Unordnung nur innerhalb der Grenzen der Ordnung gelten lassen); the contingent or free mixture (mixing), or the mutual (reciprocal) changing (alternation) (die kontingente oder freie Mischung bzw. gegenseitige Abwechslung), of order and disorder, nevertheless makes talk of [a, the] “system” meaningless (pointless, senseless; sinnlos). In relation to (On) our social-ontological solution to the problem of order and disorder see Ch. II, Sec. 3B in this volume.
of (the) existing order (die Grenzen der vorhandenen Ordnung) in favour of another, unintended (unintentional, unwanted; ungewollten) and unforeseen (unexpected; unvorhergesehenen), order, but it also can, for shorter or longer periods of time, convert (transform) (the) bearable (tolerable, endurable) disorder into an unbearable (intolerable, unendurable) [one, disorder] (die erträgliche Unordnung in eine unerträgliche)\(^49\). In addition, the possibility is not taken into consideration that precisely system-conforming behaviour on all sides could bring forth (about) (produce) extremely (exceedingly) harmful (detrimental) consequences for the “system” as [a] whole (this would be the reversal of the channeling of private vices into public benefits), and also (there is hardly any reflection upon) the interrelation (connection, correlation; Zusammenhang) between [the] complexity of societies and [the] imponderability (incalculability; Unberechenbarkeit) of the “system” (is hardly reflected upon). Actually (In reality), there is a lot (much) to be said for the supposition (assumption) [that] utopias of cybernetic steering (i.e. management or directing) (kybernetische Steuerungsutopien) would be unrealisable precisely through this complexity, especially as the growing (increasing) resources and options, which more and more individuals have at their disposal, can increase the probability (likelihood) of [the] unforeseeable (unpredictable) effects of collective action (die Wahrscheinlichkeit unvorhersehbarer Effekte kollektiven Handelns)\(^50\).

In [a] darker premonition (presentiment) of such imponderabilities (imponderables, incalculabilities) (In dunkler Vorahnung solcher Unwägbarkeiten), system (systems) theory incorporated ((installed, fitted, inserted) in(to) its corpus (body, entirety)) certain guarantees of

\(^{49}\) See in relation to that Ch. II, Sec. 2Cb in this volume.

\(^{50}\) Boudon, *Unintended Consequences*, p. 8.
ponderability (calculability), which go beyond (surpass) the usual total silence in respect of [the, a] state of emergency (Ausnahmezustand). It [Systems theory] does not dare (venture) to think through (out) the thesis about (regarding, of, on) the independence of (the) system (systemic) order (Systemordnung) from the ponderability (calculability) and controllability of its constituent (integral) elements (parts) (components), and accordingly it [systems theory] does not let (the) system (systemic) rationality (rationality of the system) prevail (rule) for instance over blind passions (die Systemrationalität nicht etwa über blinde Leidenschaften walten), with which (the) Hegelian cunning (guile, craftiness) of Reason (reason) (die Hegelsche List der Vernunft) could cope without any difficulty (problems), however (the) human raw material, which it [systems theory] hands over (entrusts) to (the) system (systemic) rationality (rationality of the system) for processing, is already tame(d) and refined: (the) “personal systems” („Personalsysteme“) are supposed indeed (in fact, of course) to be something other than (different to) (the) conformist homo sociologicus, yet (but) they function as well via exchange mechanisms, which fulfil expectations, build trust ((create, establish) confidence) and consolidate (strengthen, stabilise) lasting (enduring, permanent) normalities (dauerhafte Normalitäten). At any rate, behaviouristic and economistic assumptions, which (the) system (systems) theory in actual fact shares with other contemporary main schools of thought (directions) in social theory, are behind this concept (conception, notion, idea, view), although it [systems theory] does not want to accept their individualistic premises. As a result, it [systems theory] finds connection (becomes connected) (there is a connection [of systems theory]) to important aspects of the Zeitgeist (i.e. spirit or general outlook of the time) shaped (stamped, moulded) by economistic rationality, without, in the process, totally (completely) letting down
(disappointing) its individualistic tendencies (inclinations) through (by means of) the primacy of the system. The levelling of hierarchies between the subsystems (or part(ial) systems) (Die Nivellierung der Hierarchien zwischen den Teilsystemen) and the putting aside (abolition, doing away with, elimination) of normative authorities (tiers (grades, levels, stages) of jurisdiction) (die Beseitigung der normativen Instanzen) in the “open system” revalue the “personal system” in the sense of mass-democratic individualism, they [the said levelling and putting aside] open up for (to) it [the “personal system”] a greater variety of possible relations and offer its selectivity broader spaces – and all this in fact as the presupposition of the functioning of the system, in whose framework its [the personal system’s] own selectivities become compatible\textsuperscript{51}. [A(n)] Abundant (copious, ample, wealth of) choice (selection) without normative-ethical pressure – this is not very far (far removed) from the ideal of mass-democratic individualistic hedonism (Ideal des massendemokratischen individualistischen Hedonismus). The mitigating (extenuating, alleviating) feeling that one’s own wrong decisions or small sins are compensated by (the) system (systemic) rationality (rationality of the system) is added, so that in the end (ultimately, finally) evil serves good. (So (Thus) seems) (This is what) the theodicy of the atheistic or pantheistic age (era) (looks like).

Our content-related(filled) (substantive) confrontation (dispute, altercation, examination, discussion, debate; Auseinandersetzung) with the theory of communicative action (Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns) and economistic social theory is found in other parts of this volume\textsuperscript{52}. Here we want to briefly point out (refer to) those structural

\textsuperscript{51} See e.g. Luhmann, „Interpenetration“.
\textsuperscript{52} Ch. IV, Sec. 1E, 2Db.
aspects of both [the theory of communicative action and economic social theory], which make clear (obvious, evident, us aware of) their common affiliation with (incorporation in) the mass-democratic thought figure (schema). Communication theory (The theory of communication; Die Kommunikationstheorie), as it was outlined (sketched, devised, designed) by Habermas, apportions (attributes, ascribes) to the ethical-normative element (ethisch-normativen Element) a pre-eminent place, and as far as that is concerned it seems to separate itself from its opponents (antagonists) by means of (through) an unbridgeable gulf (chasm, gap). The rehabilitation of the ethical-normative [element, sphere] (des Ethisch-Normativen) incidentally necessitated (presupposed, caused; bedingte) its [communication theory’s] delimitation (demarcation) from the theory of the open system and its (partial) return to those sociologists, against which exactly (the) cybernetic system (systems) theory (die kybernetische Systemtheorie) had turned, namely Parsons and Durkheim\textsuperscript{53}. Undoubtedly, communication theory (the theory of communication) also adopted central mottoes (slogans) of the [Western mass-democratic] cultural revolution (zentrale Lösungen der Kulturrevolution), while it coupled autonomy with “self-realisation”; on the other hand, it however curtailed (cut (down), trimmed) the hedonistic and anarchical overgrowths (hypertrophies) (die hedonistischen und anarchistischen Überwucherungen) of these latter [the said autonomy and “self-realisation”] through their inclusion (incorporation) (with)in the overarching (superior, general) ideal of a universal ethics (das übergreifende Ideal einer universalen Ethik). As in Parsons, so too here the ethical-normative was supposed (meant) to take care of (see to, look after) or even guarantee (vouch for; bürgen) (the) cohesion

\textsuperscript{53} Theorie des komm. Handelns, I, pp. 69ff., 297.
(Zusammenhalt), that is, ultimately [to take care] of [or even guarantee] the ponderability (calculability) of the social [sphere, element] (die Berechenbarkeit des Sozialen). We now know that also (the) cybernetic system (systems) theory, despite all [the, its] opening to conflict and change, had ponderability (calculability) no less at heart (was no less concerned about ponderability). However, whereas communication theory (the theory of communication) wanted to drive away (out) (expel) the spectre (phantom, phantasm) of the (what is) imponderable (incalculable) or of the (what is) chaotic (das Gespenst des Unberechenbaren oder Chaotischen) through the universal boundness of the ethical (durch die universale Verbindlichkeit des Ethischen) and through the quasi pre-established harmony of the spirits (-intellects) (durch die quasi prästabilisierte Harmonie die Geister), as this had to result (arise) from the structure of “true” communication itself, (the) renewed system (systems) theory summoned against exactly this spectre (the) “system (systemic) rationality (rationality of the system)”, which for its part had to dissolve (break up, disintegrate) in(to) functions (in Funktionen auflösen) both the ethical-normative as well as the “personal systems” bearing it [the ethical-normative] (die es tragenden „Personalsysteme“) and hence (as a result) [had to] contemplate (consider, regard) [look at them (the ethical-normative and the “personal systems”)] instrumentally (instrumentell betrachten), while at the same time (in relation to which) the (what is) content-related (das Inhaltliche) retreated (shrank back, shied away, backed away, moved back) all along the line from (before) the (what is) formal(form-related)-procedural (Formal-Verfahrensmäßigen). Precisely here however do the very important, for our question formulation (putting (formulation) of the [a] question, problem examination, examination of the [a] problem, central theme) (Fragestellung), structural commonalities between functionalistic
system (systems) theory and communication theory (the theory of communication) begin (start). Because the latter [communication theory] wanted just as little as the former [systems theory] to be captive of (rooted in) traditional substantialism (traditionellen Substanzialismus) (in ontology or in anthropology (in der Ontologie oder in der Anthropologie)), that is why it ruled out (precluded) a content-related (filled) (substantive) deduction (derivation; Ableitung) of the ethical-normative from substantially pre-given magnitudes (substanziell vorgegebenen Größen). For (In relation to) the deduction (derivation) of content(s) after the putting aside (abolition, doing away with, elimination) of substances only processes remain (are) left over; the observance (keeping) of (to) a certain process advanced (was elevated (promoted)), in other words, to [a] yardstick (criterion, benchmark) (avancierte m. a. W. zum Maßstab), against which the plausibility of the content(s) had to be measured. Genuine (Real, Authentic) consensus (Echter Konsens) is achieved (attained, reached) (there) where the rules of genuine (real, authentic) communication are applied (used), but between [the] so (thus) understood genuine consensus and [the] true content(s) no logically compelling (cogent) relation can be restored (manufactured, made, produced, established) \(^{54}\); during (in) the full observance (keeping) of (to) the planned (provided (allowed) for, chosen) communicative process (procedure) (vorgesehenen kommunikativen Verfahrens), a community of humans (people, men) or the human genus (i.e. race) can e.g. opt for (decide in favour of) collective suicide, unless some consensual content is prohibited (forbidden, banned) from the outset (beginning, start) and forever. But by whom and on the basis of which (what) criteria? System [Systems] theory too is by no means free from similar aporias (i.e.

\(^{54}\) In relation to (Regarding) that: Bernsen, “Elementary Konwledge”; Ferrara, “A Critique”.
doubts, contradictions or paradoxes) concerning (pertaining to) the content-related (filled) (substantive) outcome (inhaltlichen Ausgang) of (the) formally-functionalistically understood (grasped, interpreted, conceived, construed) (formal-funktionalistisch aufgefaßten) system (systemic) rationality (rationality of the system), and it [systems theory] eludes (dodges, escapes from, gets out of) them [the said (such) aporias] only in that [aforementioned] way, that [is] it, as [we have] said, adopts (assumes, takes on) the airs and graces (affectations) of a theodicy. While it does ((In) Doing) that, in order to put a stop to unforeseeable (unvorhersehbaren) and imponderable (incalculable, unpredictable; unberechenbaren) catastrophes (disasters; Katastrophen), it [systems theory] meets communication theory (the theory of communication) at a second and deeper level, that of wishes (desires; Wünsche) and intentions (Absichten). It [Systems theory] seems to imply [that] also in a higher ethical respect it does not finally have much to learn from communication theory, because precisely [from] the putting (setting) aside (elimination, removal; Beseitigung) of ethical-normative factors in favour of (the) system (systemic) rationality (rationality of the system) ((freely,) according to (based on) Hegel (Hegel would have said): of morality (Moralität) in favour of the quality or system of manners, morals and customs (Sittlichkeit)), in the end (good comes to) (benefits) what, beyond moralistic rhetoric, matters ethically (is benefitted) – (to) the cohesion of society and (the) “normality” in social life (auf den Zusammenhalt der Gesellschaft und die „Normalität“ im sozialen Leben). If there were not this deeper ethical-normative common ground (commonality; Gemeinsamkeit) between the two positions, (then, so) they [these two positions of systems theory and communication theory] would not be distinguished by one and the same structural gap (hole). Because neither does system (systems) theory explain how and why a system goes
to pieces (is destroyed (ruined)), nor does communication theory (the theory of communication) know [how] to account for war and enmity (Krieg und Feindschaft). It seems both sides are not disturbed that in the course of this [said lack of explanation] elementary epistemological rules (laws, commands or requirements) are violated (breached, transgressed) (elementare epistemologische Gebote verletzt werden). Because the first [thing] that (which) a theory, which wants to be scientific, must offer (give, accomplish, achieve), is an explanation exactly of those phenomena which prima facie contradict it (Denn das erste, was eine Theorie leisten muß, die wissenschaftlich sein will, ist eine Erklärung eben jener Phänomene, die ihr prima facie widersprechen).

The initial contrast(ing) between communication [theory] and systems theory as (with regard) to the assessment of the ethical-normative factor is toned down (lessened, softened, weakened, mitigated) particularly by means of (through) their common renunciation of (the) philosophy of consciousness (consciousness philosophy) (durch ihre gemeinsame Absage an die Bewußtseinsphilosophie). As a result of this renunciation, communication theory (the theory of communication) puts itself in the precarious position of defending (advocating, championing) the ethical-normative ideals of rationality, which originally came from (had as its home) (the) philosophy of consciousness (consciousness philosophy), while it simultaneously does not want to accept their [the ideals of rationality’s] classical context of founding (and justification) (Begründungszusammenhang); it [communication theory] comes to the defence of the Enlightenment modern era (age, epoch) (die aufklärerische Moderne) against the relativistic postmodern era (age, epoch) (die relativistische Post moderne) and simultaneously declares its support (stands up) for the same paradigm shift (Paradigmenwechsel), which
marked the transition from the former to the latter. In his zeal to not miss the boat as regards the currently prevailing (dominant, prevalent) trends, Habermas is not even taken aback by the telling (meaningful, significant, important) fact that (the) (bidding) farewell (saying goodbye) to (parting from) (the) philosophy of consciousness (consciousness philosophy) and anthropology (has) constituted (provided, gave, produced, made) the intellectual starting point of exactly those lines (and schools) of thought which most resolutely (decidedly, emphatically, firmly) turned their back on the ethical-normative ideals of the bourgeois Enlightenment. One is here reminded virtually automatically of the leading (decisive, important) versions of structuralism (Strukturalismus), but still (even) more instructive is perhaps a pointing out (indication) of the origin (background) of the “linguistic turn” („linguistischen Wende“) from the efforts of neo-positivism to dispel (remove, eliminate) the seductive (seducing, enticing, tempting) influence of language, and in general the imponderabilities (imponderables, incalculabilities) of “subjective” or “human” factors, through the creation of a lucid and communicatively binding linguistic (language) organ. It may sound paradoxical and yet it is true: if the theory of communicative action evades (avoids) (the) philosophy of consciousness (consciousness philosophy) and anthropology in order to bring together and to think about (of) the bindedness of the ethical-normative and the bindedness of linguistic(language)-communicative rules, then it attempts in the field (area) of social theory the same [thing] that (which) neo-positivism undertook (has undertaken) in vain in the field (area) of the theory of knowledge and epistemology, namely to derive (deduce, infer) acts from (the) correct (right) linguistic (language) usage (use of language) (Wenn die Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns der Bewußtseinsphilosophie und der Anthropologie ausweicht, um die Verbindlichkeit des Ethisch-
The devaluation (debasement, depreciation; Abwertung) of the concept of “action” („Handeln“) in favour of the concept of “communication” at the level of social theory corresponds with (to) the driving out (displacement, dispelling, supplanting; Verdrängung) of (the) philosophy of consciousness (consciousness philosophy) by that [the philosophy] of language at the level of the philosophical question formulations (formulations of the [a] question, problem examinations, examinations of (a [the]) problem(s), central themes); the expression “communicative action” signals the new priorities within (inside of) this correlation. The unreflected following (Die unreflektierte Anlehnung) by communication theory (the theory of communication) of intellectual (thought) approaches, of which it otherwise does not want to know much, comes to light (the surface) anew in relation to this crucial (key, main) point. Because the programmatic definition of society by communication and no longer by action is the (a) work (deed, act) (ein Werk) of cybernetics\(^5\), which weakened (debilitated, enfeebled, invalidated) the concept (notion) of acting (i.e. action) (Handlungsbezug) [and] thereby (in this way, as a result, because of this) it [cybernetics] detached (removed) it [the concept of acting] from subjectively meant meaning (subjektiv gemeinten Sinn), while it [the said cybernetics] accepted (adopted, assumed) (accepting) ends (goals, purposes; Zwecke) free of every intention or motivation

\(^5\) Wiener, *Human Use*. See more in relation to that in Ch. IV, Sec. 1Ea.
(Intention oder Motivation); the connection (association) of [the] cybernetic approach in biology with the way of looking (consideration, observation, contemplation), having effective priority, at (of) man (der vorrangigen Betrachtung des Menschen) as *animal symbolicum* put (placed, set) the theoretical primacy of communication on an even (a still) broader basis (foundation). And since the interrelation (connection, correlation) between communication and selection had been worked (carved) out (processed) likewise already within (inside of) the cybernetic thought model, (so, thus, then) the theory of (the) open social systems (die Theorie der offenen sozialen Systeme) could effortlessly (easily) follow (endorse, support) this conceptuality, that is, (to) perceive (comprehend, grasp, understand, interpret; auffassen) the social system as communication system (system of communication) and its “subsystems (or part(ial) systems)” as communication media (das Sozialsystem als Kommunikationssystem und seine „Teilsysteme“ als Kommunikationsmedien). That is why its [this theory’s, the theory of open social systems’] concept (notion) of communication was of necessity (unavoidably) all-embracing, i.e. it equally contained (included) ethically-normatively praiseworthy (laudable, commendable) and reprehensible acts, acts of consensus and of conflict (Akte des Konsens und des Konflikts). The consequences of that [the said concept of communication of the theory of open social systems] for the cohesion of the system were of course hardly thematised (i.e. made a subject of discussion) (wurden freilich kaum thematisiert), that is, it was hardly explained what it means (signifies) for the system (systems) concept (concept of the system) as such, when e.g. civil wars are held to be

56 Rosenblueth-Wiener, “Purposeful and Not-Purposeful Behavior”.
57 Cf. Bertalanffy, ...*aber vom Menschen*.
(considered) (regarded as) communication acts (acts of communication; Kommunikationsakte). The theory of communicative action went a step further in the direction of ponderability (calculability) [by, in] contrasting (contradistinguishing, comparing) (while it contrasted) “genuine” communication to (with) strategic “action”, and at the same time giving (it gave) the same [“genuine” communication] priority as [an] act for the realisation of the ethical-normative ideals it had in mind (vorschwebenden ethisch-normativen Ideale). Whatever (Whichever) theoretical difficulties this narrowing (contraction, constriction) of the concept (notion) of communication (Verengung des Kommunikationsbegriffes) must entail (bring with it)(,) will be examined in another place (elsewhere)⁵⁹. Here of interest are the common perception (view; Auffassung) of the social [sphere] as [a] communication network (web, net) (Kommunikationsnetz) as well as the social conditions under which this perception (view) is evident (clear) (makes sense) to many [observers, thinkers, theoreticians].

One would supposedly not go wrong (be wide (off) the mark) with the assumption (supposition, hypothesis) [that] the factor “communication” (in the broader (wider) sense) would (then) gain the upper hand (get the better of) in the social perception [in general] (in der sozialen Wahrnehmung) vis-à-vis the factor “action” (in the narrower (strict) sense) if industry and agriculture were so productive that they only had to make use of (engage, occupy) the labour (work) of a minority of the population, while the majority would carry out its labour (work) mainly via the exchange of signs and symbols (über den Tausch von Zeichen und Symbolen) (to say nothing of (let alone, not to mention) the increasing (growing) penetration (permeation; Durchdringung) of the production

⁵⁹ Ch. IV, Sec. 1C of this volume.
process itself by the communicative-informative factor (kommunikativer-informativen Faktor). “Communication” becomes autonomous, in other words, ideationally vis-à-vis “acting (i.e. action)” („Handlung“) in the same sense and to the same degree (extent) as fewer and fewer people produce what they consume, and as a result the production of goods for the most part (mostly, largely) is covered over (up) (concealed) or is even absorbed by symbolic exchange (exchange of information and money, but also of services, which can be perceived (understood, grasped, interpreted) as symbolic interaction (symbolische Interaktion)). Consequently the impression comes into being (is produced (created)) as if (though) (that) production or acting (i.e. action) (Handlung) (would) mean (signify) very little and [as if, that] exchange or communication [(would) mean (signify)] very much. However, it is [here] a matter (in the course of this) of an optical illusion. Because the surplus of communication or exchange is reduced (traced back) to a completely (an entirely) particular constitution (composition or texture) of action (Beschaffenheit des Handelns) or of production, and under given circumstances it [the said surplus of communication or exchange] must be produced (generated, manufactured) so that action or production can be developed: e.g. without mass consumption(,) [there is] no mass production (ohne Massenkonsum z. B. keine Massenproduktion). As the exchange network of modern technicised societies (moderner technisierter Gesellschaften) would have to become much more wide-meshed should the production of goods suffer serious (severe) setbacks, so too the hard core of acting (i.e. action) (der harte Kern der Handlung) – if one may say so – would put (eclipse) its narrower communicative aspect (in the shade), if communication ground (came) to a halt (stalled, came to a standstill). That should mean that the communication process (or communicative event) (Kommunikationsvorgang) as [a] whole
unfolds (happens, takes place) against the background (a backdrop) and under the influence (aegis, sign) of that hard core, just as without the near (close) or far (distant) presence of tangible goods, exchange values eventually become fictive (fictitious) and uninteresting. (The) Communication theoreticians of [an] ethical-normative or cybernetic type (mould, stamp), however, place no particular value on such considerations. They internalise the criteria of (for) perception (perception criteria) (Wahrnehmungskriterien) of mass democracy and at the same time contribute their own [criteria of perception] for the theoretical underpinning (propping up) of its (mass democracy’s) notions (ideas) of harmony, while they reduce the real conflicts (contrasts; Gegensätze) of action to obstacles (impediments) to (hindrances of) communication (Kommunikationshemmnisse).

The prevalence (i.e. popularity) of the concept (notion) of communication, which has found expression (been reflected (echoed)) in the popularity of corresponding social theories, however also takes root in a(n) still (even) more conscious way (manner) in the mass-democratic perception of the social [sphere]. Irrespective of how this concept [of communication] is founded (established) in each and every respective theoretical context, it [the said concept of communication] has an (takes) effect (works) on (for) the broader (wider) reading public as a magnetising magic word because it directly or indirectly is mixed (blended) with (the) “intersubjective exchange”, the “I(Ego)-you-relation” and the (interrelated) ideologies of self-realisation (connected with them) (mit dem „intersubjektiven Austausch“, der „Ich-Du-Beziehung“ und den damit verbundenen Selbstverwirklichungsideologien). The mass-democratic blurring (or effacement) (obliteration) of the bourgeois dividing line (line of
separation) between the private [sphere] and the public [sphere] (Die massendemokratische Verwischung der bürgerlichen Trennungslinie zwischen Privatem und Öffentlichem) resulted, in many cases (frequently) within (inside of) social theories, in [the] form of a revaluation of microsociological investigations (examinations) and points of view, which for their part could fasten (connect, be tied) to phenomenological and existentialistic analyses of “intersubjectivity” and the intersubjective “lifeworld” (einer Aufwertung der mikrosoziologischen Untersuchungen und Gesichtspunkte..., die ihrerseits an phänomenologische und existenzialistische Analysen der „Intersubjektivität“ und der intersubjektiven „Lebenswelt“ anknüpfen konnten). From the perspective of the (intellectual(-spiritual)-historical) main actors (in the history of ideas), this displacement (shift) was understood as [a] paradigm shift, during (in, with) which the precedence (priority) of the relation between I (Ego) and object (Ich und Objekt) was superseded (replaced) by the precedence (priority) of the relation between I (Ego) and you (Ich und Du). Whereas the former paradigm [precedence of the relation between I and object] neglected the qualitative distinction (difference) between the world (or society) of one’s contemporaries and the environment (Mitwelt und Umwelt), and contrasted both to (the) objects as well as to the (rest of the) subjects a more or less stable (or fixed) (firm, steady) I (Ego) (festes Ich), the world (or society) of one’s contemporaries is at the centre (focus) of attention (interest) of the latter [paradigm (i.e. the precedence of the relation between I and you)], and an in itself fluid I (Ego) gains (obtains, wins) its contours (on each and every respective occasion) in an increasingly open intersubjective communication (communicative) process. This process was now, as was to be expected against the background of the mass-democratic turn towards the private-subjective [sphere] and towards hedonism, loaded with all sorts (kinds) of
content(s), from the hurriedly modernised Christian love of one’s neighbour (i.e. charity) to Oriental group ecstasies and practices (or exercises) for the widening (broadening, extension, expansion) of the “boundaries (limits) of the I (Ego)” (von der eilig modernisierten christlichen Nächstenliebe bis zu orientalischen Gruppenekstasen und Übungen zur Erweiterung der „Grenzen des Ich“). The especial (exceptional, principal) connection (association) (Die vornehmliche Verbindung) of the concept (notion) of communication with ethical-normative matters of concern (or demands) was only one of its [the concept of communication’s] possible uses – at any rate, not that which has helped it to [gain] popularity; here, rather, the reverse has happened (it has been the other way around).

A last (final) important and indicative (characteristic, typical) commonality (commonness) between the theory of communicative action and (the) system(s)-theoretical, but also economistic approaches (approaches pertaining to system(s) theory, but also to economism,) lies (is found) in their historical-philosophical or evolutionistic assumptions (suppositions) (assumptions as regards the philosophy of history or evolutionism) (in ihren geschichtsphilosophischen bzw. evolutionistischen Annahmen), which will occupy us, in terms of content, in the next section. The core of these assumptions – namely, the perception (view) regarding the definitive (conclusive, final) overcoming (getting past, surpassing) of the pre-modern age (era, epoch) (Vormoderne) through the increasing differentiation and complexity of society – amounts (comes) to a not merely historical, but really (absolutely, actually, frankly) ethically meant legitimation of the “system”, which [both] communication theory (the theory of communication) as well as system (systems) theory describes from the
perspective of exactly these assumptions. Its [The system’s] refined structure is supposed (meant), namely, to make “power politics” in the “pre-modern” sense („Machtpolitik“ im „vormodernen“ Sinne) largely (to a great extent, for the most part) obsolete and impossible, while (the) technical compulsions (constraints, coercion) (die technischen Zwänge) as well as (the) growing juridification (or legalisation) (Verrechtlichung) encourage pragmatic-sober cognitive stances (attitudes, views) and thus (consequently, as a result) are meant (supposed) to (should) set “[the] potential for rationality (i.e. possibilities of rationality)” („Rationalitätspotentiale“) free. It seems, therefore, to be certain (definite) that the objective historical preconditions (prerequisites, presuppositions; Vorraussetzungen) have never been so favourable (opportune) for the cause of the ethicist. (Standing opposite (Facing) that of course is) The ascertainment, fed (sourced, powered) by strong (cultural-critical) reminiscences (in respect of cultural critique (criticism)) and (cultural-revolutionary) visions (as regards (of) the [Western mass-democratic] cultural revolution [of the 1960s and 1970s]), of, or [the] fear of (apprehension (misgivings) with regard to) the one-sided (unilateral) imposition (predominance, prevailing, pushing through) of (the) “instrumental” rationality of the system (system (systemic) rationality), of course stands opposite (faces) that [the aforementioned objective historical preconditions]) (Dem steht freilich die von starken kulturkritischen Reminiszenzen und kulturrevolutionären Visionen gespeiste Festellung oder Befürchtung von der einseitigen Durchsetzung der „instrumentellen“ Rationalität des Systems gegenüber). The “lifeworld” („Lebenswelt“) now appears as the refuge (stronghold, safe retreat; Hort) of the ethical [element, sphere](,) enriched by wishes (desires) of self-realisation; it [the “lifeworld”] should (ought, is supposed) shake (throw) off (get rid of) the “colonisation” by the
“system” and contribute what it has (its own share (portion, thing)) towards (for) the realisation of an unshortened (unabridged, uncurtailed) [unshortened (i.e. uncurtailed)] rationality. The logically and sociologically extremely unclear relation(ship) (Beziehung) between system and lifeworld in the framework of communication theory (the theory of communication) can here remain an open question (unexamined)\(^6^0\). In view of our considerations (reflections) regarding the social character and origin of contemporary social theory the following is of interest. The Habermasian lifeworld does not rebel (revolt) against the existing “system” in order that (for) it [the “system”] (to) be replaced with such a [system] which would not be exposed to similar dangers (threats), that is, it would fully (completely) obey the logic of an intact (unscathed) lifeworld beyond every system (systemic) constraint (compulsion, coercion) (Systemzwanges). Both, lifeworld and system, should (ought (are supposed) to) exist next to each other (side by side) (co-exist) in [an] [the form of an] ideal image (or form) (picture) (im Idealbild), mutually complement (supplement) each other, but also not stand irreconcilably in the way of each other. It seems obvious to me whose dreams are realised by this construction: the realm (kingdom) of communication and of self-realisation belongs to partly ethical, partly (cultural-revolutionarily) inspired (by (in terms of) the cultural revolution), (seen) on the whole (all in all) moderate or adapted (or conformist) intellectuals, who, despite all the critique of culture (cultural critique) (Kulturkritik), would after all (all the same) (like to) rather preserve the “system” as [the, a] basis (foundation) of material affluence (prosperity) (materiellen Wohlstands) and of the free space(s) [for individual action] connected to that [material affluence] (und der damit

verbundenen Freiräume). If we take pure types as a basis (Wenn wir reine Typen zugrundelegen), we can safely say [that] communication [theory] (the theory of communication) and system (systems) theory differ on the whole from one another like those intellectuals differ from administrative officials (administrators). The latter [administrative officials] can in our society obviously feel luckier or at least more confident (optimistic) than the former (those) [intellectuals].

A third highly representative social type (sozialer Typ) of Western mass democracy, namely the entrepreneur (businessman) or economic (or business) manager (der Unternehmer oder Wirtschaftsmanager), comes to mind when we turn (ourselves) to economistically inspired social theory; it was incidentally principally (mainly) designed (sketched, planned, outlined) or defended (advocated, championed) by (national) economists, who have a positive attitude towards (approve of) today’s mode of function(ing) of the “free” economy as [the] central (main) pillar (or mainstay) of the overall (whole, entire, total) system. It is in itself not surprising (astonishing, amazing) that the image (picture; Bild) of society in general is developed as [the] image (likeness; Ebenbild) of one(,) or of the decisive (determinative) aspect(,) of present-day existing society. The (precisely) predominant (prevailing) field in every society develops its own form of discourse, which strives after (for) (the) ideological predominance and as a rule attains (reaches, gains, achieves) [it] too. If in earlier (previous) centuries the economic [sphere] (das Ökonomische) was apprehended (grasped) by the vocabulary of the theological or [the] ethical (“just price”) (das Vokabular des Theologischen oder Ethischen („gerechter Preis“) erfaßt wurde), (then, so, thus) under the conditions (circumstances) of the “society of the economy (economy society)” („Wirtschaftsgesellschaft“)(,) things (the situation) must be the other way
around (the reverse); but the mechanism remains, in spite of (notwithstanding) [the] “rationalisation” of (the) world theory (i.e. world view) („Rationalisierung“ der Weltanschauung), the same in both cases, and this is here decisive. Already under the influence (in the wake) of the (incipient) industrial revolution (Industrial Revolution) (getting under way) (Schon unter dem Eindruck der einsetzenden industriellen Revolution), as it were (so to speak) as ideological by-product (spin-off) of economic liberalism (Wirtschaftsliberalismus), elementary economistic sociologies came into being, in which a(n) in principle (fundamental, basic) connection between the form of the economy (economic form) and the structure of society (i.e. social structure) (Wirtschaftsform und Gesellschaftsstruktur) was restored (manufactured, made, produced, established)\textsuperscript{61}, and Marxism, if one wants to look at (regard, consider) it [Marxism] exclusively from this perspective, merely constituted liberal economism thought through (historically) to (the) (its (ultimate) historical) conclusion (end) (bildete bloß den historisch zu Ende gedachten liberalen Ökonomismus). The unprecedented (unparalleled) development of technology (technique; Technik) and industry after the Second World War, which moved (made) the processes (or series of events) of mass production and mass consumption to centre stage (the focus (centre) of attention) and thus brought (drove, lead) the mass-democratic revolution to completion (a close), had to give fresh impetus, but even (also) partially new shape (or form) (Gestalt), to economistic sociology. As Max Weber remarked (observed), one of the sources of scientific (national) economics lies (is found) in the attentiveness (heed, attention) [given to, displayed] in respect of (for) the phenomenon that the “orientation towards one’s own and other (foreign (alien)) naked

\textsuperscript{61} In relation to that: Skinner, “A. Smith”, esp. p. 156ff.
(bare) interests” brings forth (gives rise to, produces) social effects (results) (soziale Wirkungen hervorbringt), which are quite (absolutely, perfectly, thoroughly) comparable to those of normification (i.e. normative standardisation) or settled (established) manners (morals, customs, practices) (manners that have taken root) (eingelebter Sitte)\textsuperscript{62}. The interest(s)-oriented and calculating (Der interessenorientierte und kalkulierende) \textit{homo oeconomicus} was certainly a construct of bourgeois-liberal origin (provenance, derivation), however this construct did not encompass (span) the entire spectrum of bourgeois-liberal thinking (thought), but it existed and had an (took) effect (worked, acted, operated; wirkte) next to (beside) heterogeneous or even opposing (conflicting, contrasting, opposed) (entgegengesetzten) ethical and anthropological motives. The synthetic-harmonising overall (total) character of the bourgeois-liberal thought figure (schema) (Der synthetisch-harmonisierende Gesamtcharakter der bürgerlich-liberalen Denkfigur) is explained exactly from (by) the very rich in tension (tense, strained, aggravating, exacerbating) (sehr spannungsreichen) co-existence (Koexistenz) of different elements, which (it) [the bourgeois-liberal thought figure] had to (be) simultaneously appropriate(d) (them) in respect (out) of concrete polemical considerations.\textsuperscript{63}. It would never have occurred to the author of \textit{The Theory of Moral Sentiments} [i.e. Adam Smith] to make (explain) churchgoing or suicide (understandable, clear) [on the basis] of “maximizing behavior” like (as) (the) today’s (present-day) representatives of the “economic approach” attempt (try) [to do] it\textsuperscript{64}. The pure and all-embracing in its claim (in accordance with) economism made its presence felt only after the decline of the bourgeois thought

\textsuperscript{62} \textit{Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft}, p. 15.

\textsuperscript{63} In relation to that: Kondylis, \textit{Niedergang}, p. 23ff.

\textsuperscript{64} Typical (Characteristic) and educative (instructive) [is] Becker, \textit{The Economic Approach}. 
figure (schema) inside of (within) the mass-democratic “society of the economy (economy society)”.

It is not by chance (without reason) (It is no accident), therefore, [that] economistic social theory, like the cybernetic theory of the open system too, was shaped (formed) on the basis of a(n) in principle (fundamental) renunciation of the Parsonian assessment of the social viability (soundness; Tragfähigkeit) of the ethical-normative factor. Norms and values, however, are not entirely or not always simply eliminated in the economistic context; rather, they are subjected (subjugated, subordinated) to the logic of the economic, while (the) marginal utility (or benefit) analysis (die Grenznutzenanalyse) is applied to non-economic exchange events (or processes) and differentiation processes (nichtwirtschaftliche Tauschvorgänge und Differenzierungsprozesse), without, though, saying clearly [it being clearly said] in every case whether it is, in the course of this, a matter of (an) economic motivation and calculation (Motivation und Kalkulation) in the narrower (strict) sense of marginal utility (or benefit)(,) or [a matter] of a translation of motivation in general into the language of economic motivation and calculation. If cybernetic system (systems) theory broke up (disintegrated, dissolved) the compact presence of norms and values through the openness of the system, (so, then) (the) economistic social theory expanded (extended) the concept (conception, notion; Konzept) and the range (scope) of the economic so much (to such an extent) that its (economistic social theory’s) contradistinction (contrasting) to (with, vis-à-vis) the sphere of the ethical-normative was redundant (unnecessary); this sphere simply came undone in the inflated (overblown) and expanded (widened, extended) economic [sphere]. And

65 Pioneering (Pathbreaking) in this school (line) of thought was Homans’s marriage of behaviourism (Behaviorismus) and economism, see Social Behavior; likewise Blau, Exchange. In this early pragmatistic article(.) Coleman explained his intention to apply Homans’s “general strategy” to macroscopic social structures (“Collective Decisions”, p. 167, n. 3).
as the open system placed (put) individuals before continual (continuous, constant) tasks (problems, questions) of adaptation and of selection, thus (so) it [the sphere of the ethical-normative] did not apply (vanished, was dropped (eclipsed)) in (with) the new openness of the economic of *homo sociologicus*, who acted in agreement with internalised norms and as a result resembled (was similar to) an automaton (robot, (automatic) machine)\(^6\), in order to make room for a human (person, man) who was “wholly free”, that is “unsocialized, entirely self-interested, not constrained by norms of a system, but only rationally calculating to further his own self-interest”\(^7\). Socialisation (Sozialisierung) does not coincide with the internalisation of norms (Normeninternalisierung), but with the process in (by) which one learns to foresee the long-term consequences of one’s acts (acting, action(s); Handlungen) and to calculate [them] more rationally, to accept in the long term useful (utile; nutzbringende) rules or to desert (abandon, leave) the game. The starting point of the theory is accordingly (according to that) the notion (idea) of a sum total of self-interested (selfish, self-seeking; eigennütziger) and (or) rational actors, whose acts intersect and constitute (the) collective action. The problem of order in [respect of, regard to] this [collective] action, i.e. the problem of social order or, as Parsons called it, Hobbes’s problem, is supposed to have been solved by A. Smith\(^8\). Durkheim’s polemic against Spencer or against this kind (sort, type) of solution – a polemic which inspired Parsons’s anti-utilitarian approach (antiutilitaristischen Ansatz) – does not seem anymore to be worth a refutation.

Economistic social theory, just like the theory of the open system, reproached Parsons [(for the fact) that], he, on the basis of his

---


\(^7\) “Collective Decisions”, p. 167.

\(^8\) Loc. cit., pp. 180, 169, 167ff.
normativism (Normativismus), can hardly come to grips (deal) with (do justice to) phenomena like conflict\textsuperscript{69}. And just like the theory of the open system, it [economistic social theory] (has) simultaneously went to a lot of trouble (tried hard, endeavoured) to keep (maintain) the concept of conflict in(side) (within) those boundaries (limits) which guarantee (vouch for) the preservation (maintenance) of (the) economistically set up (established, arranged) social order (ökonomistisch eingerichteten Gesellschaftsordnung) – and [(which guarantee) the preservation] of the economistic sociological concept. A war of all against all indeed constantly takes place, since everyone tries to expand (extend) his [their] power over those acts in relation to which he has an interest; but it [the said war] is waged (conducted) with the means of rational calculus (i.e. calculation) (Mitteln rationalen Kalküls) and out of consideration for the “pay off”, something which according to economistic logic precludes (excludes, rules out) bloody degeneracy (degeneration). Because (the) rational man (person, human) regulates (controls), through (by means of) “a special kind of economic transaction”, the exchange mechanism [in respect] of power (Austauschmechanismus der Macht) such that the (afore)mentioned boundaries (limits) of (to) conflict are not overstepped (exceeded, transgressed)\textsuperscript{70}. Precisely (Especially) in its intrinsic (essential) connection with the self-interest (Eigeninteresse) of individuals, rationality means (signifies) heightened (increased) calculability (erhöhte Kalkulierbarkeit), and this [heightened calculability] again forges links (builds bridges) between [the] individual and society, so that the individualistic starting point of the theory (theoretically) does not have to endanger (threaten) (put) social cohesion (den sozialen Zusammenhalt) (at risk). (The) Society as whole (Die

\textsuperscript{69} Loc. cit., p. 167.
\textsuperscript{70} Loc. cit., pp. 169, 170.
Gesellschaft als Ganzes) should (is meant to) even become ponderable (calculable; berechenbar) because the rationally calculating individuals constituting it [society as whole] appear (to be) (seem) ponderable (calculable) (die sie ausmachendenen rational kalkulierenden Individuen berechenbar erscheinen). [The fact] That both [economistic and cybernetic social theory] narrow (reduce or curtail) (shorten) the concept (notion) of conflict through the assumption of self-interested (selfish, self-seeking) and therefore (because of that) rationally acting individuals (rational handelnder Individuen) is therefore added to the already noted parallels between economistic and cybernetic social theory. We remind ourselves (remember) in fact (very well) that the theory of the open system did not go so far as to believe in (the) “system (systemic) rationality (rationality of the system)” that it would have wanted and could entirely do (go) without (forego, renounce) the calculating rationality of the self-interested (selfish, self-seeking) individual.

The parallels between economistic and cybernetic social theory can be explained at least part(ial)ly through the ascertainment that “Economic Man” is the brother of “Administrative Man”, while it [economistic social theory] on the whole shares with this [cybernetic social theory] the perception (view) of rationality. The paths (roads) of both part (separate) (there) where the economistic approach stands up for (stands by, professes its belief in) the principle of methodological individualism and does not comprehend (grasp, understand) society as [a] pre-given system, but only wants to construct [it] on the basis of individual actions. This is not of course a theoretical (novum (novelty)) or (intellectual(-spiritual)-historical) novum (in the history of ideas). The in principle (fundamental) coupling of economism and individualism already marked

71 Thus, Simon, Models, p. 7.
(distinguished) early liberalism (Frühleralismus) and ended up (resulted), for its part, in (flowed (led), for its part, into) (contract-theoretical) reconstructions (, in terms of contract theory,) of the fact of society. Accordingly, the age-old (ancient, immemorial) commonplaces (banalities) of contractualism and of consensualism constitute the keystone of contemporary economistic social theory. Here, though, of interest is not its [contemporary economistic social theory’s] theoretical, but its symptomatic value (worth). Through the stressing (emphasis(ing)) of (on) the constitutive meaning of rational consensus for (with regard to) the institutional construction (building) of society and for (in respect of) the founding (establishment) of individual rights (Durch die Betonung der konstitutiven Bedeutung rationalen Konsenses für den institutionellen Aufbau der Gesellschaft und für die Begründung individueller Rechte)72, economistic social theory comes close to (arrives in the vicinity of) the perceptions (views, notions) and concepts (Vorstellungen und Begriffe), from which i.a. also the theory of communicative action in the broader (wider) sense draws, (something) which in itself indicates how freely combinable and able to be founded (i.e. establishable) (frei kombinierbar und begründbar) such perceptions (views, notions) are in the mass-democratic social-political context. Rational consensus is indeed now based (indeed now rests) on utilitarian calculus (i.e. calculation) (utilitaristischem Kalkül) and not for instance on moral stances (positionings, attitudes) (moralischen Einstellungen) (e.g. “truthfulness (honesty)” (“Wahrhaftigkeit“), however, economistic social theoreticians do not, because of that, have a bad (wicked) moral conscience (schlechtes moralisches Gewissen). Because even though (if) the motivation of rational calculus (i.e. calculation) is not, or [is] not necessarily, moral,

72 Coleman, Foundations, pp. 949, 520ff., 334.
so, thus) its result, i.e. consensus and the settlement of conflicts, nevertheless is sufficient (satisfies, fulfils) (for) (the) current social-ethical requirements (or demands) (sozialethischen Anforderungen). Without ethics in the beginning (at the start), it seems [that] exactly in the end, what every ethics strives for (after), better succeeds (is managed (accomplished)). We ascertain similar implications in cybernetic system (systems) theory.

All in all, the theoretical yield (fruits, output) of economistic social theory remained quite meagre (paltry) and for it [economistic social theory] the same for system (systems) theory applies (holds, is valid): what is remarkable (noteworthy) in it [economistic social theory] comes from different approaches, in relation to which their translation into (the) economistic language is supposed (meant) to give the impression [that] it [their translation] constitutes the logical result (outcome; Ausfluß) or even the exclusive find (i.e. discovery) of economistic social theory. Both its [economistic social theory’s] axes, i.e. the concept of rationality and the legitimacy (die Legitimität) of the general social-theoretical usage (use) of economic concepts, will be discussed elsewhere (in other places)\textsuperscript{73}. Two remarks (comments, observations) must nonetheless be said (made) in advance (mentioned beforehand). Economistic social theory does not take (infer) its concepts and criteria from the economic [sphere] in itself and in general (whatever this could be), but from a certain (particular) perception (view) of the essence of the economic, which, as it were, accepts (adopts, assumes) its [the economic’s] chemical purity and at the same time its social-ontological priority; the economic is not therefore apprehended (grasped, understood) in the context of historical, social-political and institutional factors in order thereby for its

\textsuperscript{73} Ch. IV, Sec. 2D in this volume.
concept (notion) to be qualitatively enriched and broadened (expanded, extended, widened), but the extension (expansion) of its range (scope) merely has [a] quantitative character, i.e. it takes place (is carried out) through the simple subordination of the rest of the “subsystems (or part(ial) systems)” of society to its independent and supposedly absolutely peremptory (imperious) logic. The economic self-understanding of the mass-democratic “society of the economy (economy society)” is elevated (raised (in status), promoted) to [a] fundamental (basic) theoretical premise (theoretischen Grundprämissen), and there are no reflections (thoughts) on the historical relativity of economicistic laws or at least on the dependence of their effect (impact; Wirkung) on time, place and circumstances (conditions)\textsuperscript{74}. On the other hand, economicistic social theory – tacitly (silently) but unmistakably (unequivocally) – basically (essentially) takes a (historical-philosophical) view (pertaining to the philosophy of history), while it deduces (derives) from (out of) calculus (i.e. calculation) accompanied (convoyed, escorted) by (with) interests ((self-)interest) (interessengeleiteten Kalkül) the possibility of a(n) comprehensive (extensive) consensus. Also on this point, of course, there is no gain in knowledge (Erkenntnisgewinn), but a (recti)linear return to the thoughts world (or ideological universe) (Gedankenwelt) of early liberalism. Because the world-historical (weltgeschichtliche) perspective of a permanent replacement of war with trade was founded (established) already in the 18\textsuperscript{th} century through (by means of) the assumption [that] only (interest(s)-directed(conducted, led)) calculus (i.e. calculation) (directed by interests), whose prototype lies (is found) in

\textsuperscript{74} Such question formulations (formulations of the [a] question, problem examinations, examinations of (a [the]) problem(s), central themes) nevertheless perfectly (absolutely) belong to the problem area (circle, cycle) of classical (national) economics. See the, still always worth reading, comments (remarks, explanations) of Cairnes, Character, esp. pp. 100ff., 118ff.; cf. Marshall, Principles, p. 30ff. (“every change in social conditions is likely to require a new development of economic doctrines”); already [in] Marx, Grundrisse, p. 25ff..
economic activity (dessen Prototyp in der wirtschaftlichen Tätigkeit), (by virtue of it [this assumption],) (is to) [has the capacity to] discipline(s) the “passions”, which exactly leave (exit (depart) from, have nothing to do with) the concept (notion) of (self-)interest (der Begriff des Interesses), and consequently (is to) [(has the capacity to) rationalise(s) (i.e. organise(s) or systematise(s)) (zu rationalisieren) social behaviour in its entirety (totality)\textsuperscript{75}. We know what has happened since the 18th century.

Hopefully the brief (short) analysis has shown (revealed) that the main forms of contemporary mass-democratic social theory, despite all divergences (deviations) or conflicts (contrasts) between one another, share common ground, and also apart from that, make statements (comment) (give opinions) on (about) the same question formulations (formulations of the [a] question, problem examinations, examinations of (a [the] problem(s), central themes). On the whole (All in all), they [the said main forms of mass-democratic social theory] constitute an ensemble which came into being out of (from) the variation and the different treatment (handling) of certain basic motifs (i.e. themes). (The) Variations and (the) differences are reduced (traced back), for their part, to real dilemmas and contradictions of (in) Western mass democracy. The colliding (clashing, conflicting) opinions over (about, regarding) the possibility or necessity of a(n) underpinning (propping up) of [a] (the) social consensus or the smooth functional development of the “system” through ethical norms and motivations, can be cited (referred to) as an example of that [those said variations and differences reduced to real dilemmas and contradictions in Western mass democracy]. The pluralism of values and of the ways (modes) of life (Der Pluralismus der Werte und der Lebensweisen), which are very compatible (go very well together)

\textsuperscript{75} See Hirschman, \textit{The Passions and the Interests}. 
with the hedonistic orientation (hedonistischen Ausrichtung) of the, on a mass scale, unceasingly (incessantly) and variedly (diversely, differently, variously), consuming mass democracy (der massenhaft, unablässig und verschiedenartig konsumierenden Massendemokratie), had to shake (i.e. destabilise or unsettle), in the decades of growing affluence (prosperity) and of the [Western mass-democratic] cultural revolution, the older sociological assessment of norms and values (as well as of ideologies in general: “end of ideologies”); calculus (i.e. calculation) accompanied (convoied, escorted) by (with) interests ((self-)interest) or (the) “system (systemic) rationality (rationality of the system)” filled (jumped (leaped) into) the theoretical void (gap). However at the same time, the reasons, which call for (require, demand, command) the ideological adherence (holding (on), persistence, perseverance) of Western mass democracy to (with) universalistic ethical and anthropological principles, continued to have an undiminished effect. In this catch-22 situation (or tug of war), in which the “system” is objectively found (objectively finds itself), social theories, like that of communicative action and the economistic [social theory], exactly in their (after all (at any rate), not total) opposition (contrast(ing), conflict) to (with) one another, fulfil (carry out) complementary ideological functions, they differ in terms of content with one another and, all the same (nevertheless), belong together like the heads and the tails of a coin. The situation is (things are) similar in regard to the opposition between individualistic (no matter (irrespective of) whether economistically or ethically oriented) and cybernetic social theory. Mass democracy distinguishes itself through (is characterised by) the parallel and in itself contradictory development (unfolding) of individualism ((with)in the dimensions of the “dignity of man” (“Würde

76 See footnote 2 above.
des Menschen“), of “self-realisation” or of social mobility and of possibilities of advancement (promotion), and of administrative apparatuses (mechanisms). What is released (or set free) in individualistic energies must then more or less be channeled and regulated by (through) these apparatuses (durch diese Apparate kanalisiert und reguliert werden), which give rise to the impression [that] they would work (operate, function) on the basis of their own [logic] vis-à-vis every individual (separate) independent (or autonomous) logic. “(The) System (systemic) rationality (rationality of the system)” appears therefore as [a] real magnitude, which cannot be deduced from the mere summation of autonomous and at the same time coordinated individual wills (volitions), but in its coherence (or unity) (Geschlossenheit) corresponds with the coherence (or unity) of a model and may only be apprehended (grasped, understood) on the basis of (based on) a (not personal) model (not referring to people (persons)). (The) Cybernetic thinking in terms of a model (model thought (thinking)) (tellingly (meaningfully), it [the said cybernetic thinking in terms of a model] was applied early on and with particular preference (predilection) during (in) the investigation of (research into) (the) so-called “formal organisations”77) stands in (the) social theory opposite to (contract-theoretical) (thought pertaining to contract theory) and consensualistic thinking (thought) or to the approach of methodological individualism in exactly the [same] sense (as) the individual (as ethicist, consumer or entrepreneur (businessman)) and administration or bureaucratic organisation of every kind (sort) stand opposite to (face) one another in the reality of mass democracy (dem vertragstheoretischen und konsensualistischen Denken oder dem Ansatz des methodologischen Individualismus in eben dem Sinne gegenüber wie

77 Instead of many [others]: Thompson, Organizations in Action.
sich Individuum (als Ethiker, Konsument oder Unternehmer) und Verwaltung bzw. bürokratische Organisation jeder Art in der Wirklichkeit der Massendemokratie). The relation(ship) (Die Beziehung) remains of course ambivalent, since both the individual cannot develop entirely (completely, totally) outside of (the) “administered (or managed) (verwalteten) life” as well as (and also) (the) administration must take effect (work; wirken) inside of (within) a society, which is demarcated (delimited) against the authoritarian state (Obrigkeitstaat) and admits to (i.e. acknowledges) individualism. In the language of theory this means: the system remains indeed [a] system, but in its openness it absorbs (takes) in itself elements (factors; Momente) which in themselves come (emanate, stem) from (the) individualistic tendencies. Theory formation proceeds (goes forward) on such intersecting paths (routes) (crossroads) and detours (roundabout ways). In the self-understanding of every individual (separate) theory, the contrasts (or conflicts) in respect of (towards) (the) other(s) [theories] naturally occupy a more important place (position) than the internal, positive or negative interrelations (connections, correlations) with [regard to] them [every individual theory]. But the self-understanding of theories gives (sound and dependable) information about (an insight into) their character just as little as the self-understanding of a collective [entity] (eines Kollektivs) or of an individual [who] [supposedly] provides (supplies, furnishes) the most reliable (dependable, trustworthy) guide for its [the individual’s] assessment (judgement, evaluation) by third parties.
3. Differentiation, complexity and evolution: (the) relapse into (reversion to) the philosophy of history (Differenzierung, Komplexität und Evolution: Der Rückfall in die Geschichtsphilosophie)

Although the ideologists of mass democracy have repeatedly bid their farewell (said their goodbye) to every metaphysics and have announced (proclaimed) the end of all ideologies, they make, as [we have] remarked (observed), not only ample use of the early liberal ideologies of the social contract and of the invisible hand (den frühliberalen Ideologien des Sozialvertrags und der unsichtbaren Hand), but over and above that, they appropriate the core (central) theses (positions) of the eschatologically moulded (shaped, marked, oriented, determined) philosophy of history [in respect] of progress (eigen sie sich Kernthesen der eschatologisch geprägten Geschichtsphilosophie des Fortschritts an). (The) Relapse into the philosophy of history can hardly be by-passed (circumvented, evaded) when the social-theoretical analysis of present-day (today’s) society takes place against the background (backdrop) of a comparison with past societies from an evolutionistic perspective (in evolutionistischer Perspektive) and on the basis of the assumption (supposition) [that] that [today’s] society is superior to the rest [of societies] in accordance with certain criteria. In the course of this it is of secondary importance (unimportant, irrelevant) whether these criteria have [an] ethical-normative character (e.g. the Hegelian “freedom of (for) all (everyone)” („Freiheit aller“)) or whether they can in a certain respect be measured (“complexity”); [it is] enough (sufficient) that they [the said criteria] concern the constitution of the social itself in an aspect held to be central. This aspect is however defined in agreement with that which is looked
upon (regarded, considered) as particularly noticeable (striking, conspicuous) and social-historically pioneering (trailblazing, enterprising) in today’s society, so that the, prepared (or made ready) from a certain point of view, social present can be declared as the universal-historical yardstick (measure, criterion, benchmark) (or yardstick pertaining to world history) and simultaneously as the highest (supreme) tier (grade, level, stage) of universally-historically ascendant (rising, ascending) movement [i.e. movement pertaining to world history] (Dieser Aspekt wird indessen in Übereinstimmung mit dem definiert, was als besonders auffallend und sozialgeschichtlich bahnbrechend an der gegenwärtigen Gesellschaft angesehen wird, so daß die unter einem bestimmten Gesichtspunkt zurechtgemachte soziale Gegenwart zum universalhistorischen Maßstab und gleichzeitig zur höchsten Stufe der universalhistorisch aufsteigenden Bewegung erklärt werden kann). Thus (So, In this way), “differentiation” and “complexity” were passed off, without more detailed justification (substantiation) (ohne nähere Begründung), not merely as important, but (albeit, even if) perhaps deduced (derived), (however) really (virtually, almost, absolutely) as the deciding (decisive) and self-sown features (characteristics) (die entscheidenden und eigenwüchsigen Merkmale) of the present(,) and moreover as the criteria on the basis of which past social formations would have to be classified sociologically. In itself the matter (thing) is old and banal (trite): societies (like individuals too) tend to emphasise (underline, stress) their own uniqueness and in this way are existentially legitimised, (that) they lump the earlier [societies] or the other [societies] together, and contrast (contradistinguish) to them all their own specific and new (type of) (novel) qualities (i.e. characteristics) (An sich ist die Sache alt und banal: Gesellschaften (wie Einzelne auch) neigen dazu, die eigene Einmaligkeit herauszuheben und sich dadurch existentiell zu
legitimieren, daß sie die früheren oder die anderen in einen Topf werfen und ihnen allen die eigenen spezifischen und neuartigen Eigenschaften gegenüberstellen). They believe that these qualities (i.e. characteristics) (put) (eclipse) existing commonalities more or less (in the shade) and feel downright (absolutely, really) offended when a third party ascribes (attributes) to certain (particular) commonalities a much higher status (much more importance). The task, nevertheless, at least from a social-ontological perspective, consists exactly in apprehending (grasping) each and every respective new kind of (novel) thing and [that which] in the given historical point in time is forward-driving (i.e. drives or forces things into the future) (Vorwärtstreibende), against the background (a backdrop) of the great (major) constants (der großen Konstanten). These [great constants] can be got rid (disposed) of (discarded, eliminated) (done away with) through the changing (alteration, modification) of (change in) the social-theoretical conceptuality (sozialtheoretischen Begrifflichkeit) just as little as humans (people, men) can be declared [to be, as] non-existent through the putting aside (abolition, doing away with, elimination) of anthropology.

Looking at things more specifically (More particularly considered), the turn towards consistent functionalism, as it happened (occurred) in [during] the delimitation (demarcation) against the remnants of traditional and bourgeois substantialisms (Spezieller betrachtet, machte die Wendung zum konsequenten Funktionalismus, wie sie in der Abgrenzung gegen die Überbleibsel der traditionellen und bürgerlichen Substantialismen erfolgte), made out of the social-theoretical putting first (Voranstellung) of “differentiation” and “complexity” a(n) virtually (really, absolutely) methodical (i.e. methodological) necessity (eine geradezu methodische Notwendigkeit). Because extreme differentiation
can only take place inside of a whole, which is fully (completely) atomised, i.e. it is broken down (taken apart) into [the] ultimate interchangeable (exchangeable, replaceable; austauschbare) constituent (integral) elements (parts) (components) – and only inside of such a desubstantialised whole do functions, on the other hand, constitute (represent) the only possible kind (sort) of communication, and with that (as a result, because of that), [the only possible kind] of creation of complex systems (Denn extreme Differenzierung kann nur innerhalb eines Ganzen stattfinden, das vollständig atomisiert, d.h. in letzte austauschbare Bestandteile zerlegt ist – und nur innerhalb eines solchen entsubstanzialisierten Ganzen stellen wiederum Funktionen die einzig mögliche Art der Kommunikation und damit der Erschaffung komplexer Systeme dar). “Differentiation” and “complexity” are, in other words, only from [a] functionalistic standpoint, (the) decisive (deciding, crucial) and irreducible social-theoretical magnitudes (die entscheidenden und irreduzierbaren sozialtheoretischen Größen), while evolutionism (der Evolutionismus), which is supposed (meant) to describe the becoming (das Werden) of these magnitudes, constitutes (is, represents) a retrospective projection of the functionalistic point of view in(to) [onto] the past, or an interpretation of history from the functionalistic point of view, whose victory in the present is regarded as (considered to be) irrevocable precisely because (on account) of (the) (effected, done) extreme differentiation (, which has taken place). [The] Method, [the] interpretation of history and of the present therefore prove [themselves] to one another (with)in a most beautiful (handsome, lovely, attractive) tautological harmony (eine retrospektive Projektion des funktionalistischen Gesichtspunktes in die Vergangenheit bzw. eine Geschichtsdeutung unter dem funktionalistischen Gesichtspunkt darstellt, dessen Sieg in der Gegenwart gerade wegen der erfolgten extremen
Differenzierung für unwiderruflich gilt. Methode, Geschichts- und Gegenwartsdeutung beweisen somit einander in schönster tautologischer Harmonie). Still further (Even more): namely, “differentiation” and “complexity” are not simply ascertainable facts but already postulates of the way of looking at things, (so, thus, in this way) they appear [to be] self-sown and self-reproducing, as definitive (conclusive, final) achievements and at the same time motors (i.e. engines or driving forces) of historical movement (Motoren der geschichtlichen Bewegung), explanans (i.e. explaining) and not explanandum (i.e. to be explained). Thus (In this way), their (“differentiation’s” and “complexity’s”) material preconditions (prerequisites) are hardly reflected upon, nor the realities (facts) of the division of labour as [the] basis of social multiformity (polymorphism) (die Realitäten der Arbeitsteilung als Basis der sozialen Vielfalt) and neither the consequences of the overcoming (exceeding, getting over) of the shortage (scarcity, dearth) of goods for the variety (diversity) (or multifomity) (Vielfalt) in the field (area, domain) of values and of world theories (i.e. world views) (auf dem Gebiet der Werte und der Weltanschauungen). But with regard to these concrete questions, (the) historical, sociological and economic analysis completely (perfectly) suffices, therefore every teleology of differentiation and of complexity (jede Teleologie der Differenzierung und der Komplexität) is superfluous (unnecessary, needless)78. The rejection of evolutionistic teleology does not of course (naturally) have to entail a questioning (calling into question) of evolution in the general historical sense. Yet the fact of historical evolution does not offer (present, provide) any confirmation of evolutionism as a law, which has to determine the course of history (den Lauf der Geschichte) forever. This lesson (moral, teaching) is (ought) to

78 Cf. the good observations (remarks) of A. D. Smith, Concept, p. 76ff.
be drawn (learnt) from the concrete consideration of the material preconditions (prerequisites) of the evolution of modern, that is, differentiated and complex societies (Diese Lehre ist aus der konkreten Berücksichtigung der materiellen Voraussetzungen der Evolution moderner, also differenzierter und komplexer Gesellschaften zu ziehen).

For (In relation to, Towards) the assessment (judgement, evaluation) of the newer evolutionism, which is based on the theorem of growing differentiation and complexity, (the reminding (recollection), remembering) (it is not superfluous to recollect) that its [the said newer evolutionism’s] principles were formulated approximately one hundred and fifty years ago by Herbert Spencer, is not superfluous). This happened typically in an organicistic context, i.e. evolution was understood as differentiation because society was compared to an organism. Differentiation, according to Spencer, is adaptation, that is, [a] relation towards (with) an environment; society constantly progresses from homogeneity to heterogeneity (simple, compound, doubly compound, trebly compound types of societies) and the increase in heterogeneity, in which exactly progress exists, lies in [the fact] that every cause brings forth (produces, gives rise to) more than one effect (result)\(^79\). The organicistic origin of this type of evolutionism becomes noticeable already in the central concept of differentiation (Differenzierungsbegriff). Because this [type of evolutionism] signifies (means) a process, in (during) which functions, which were originally concentrated in one and the same bearer (carrier, vehicle, supporter, representative) (Träger), are separated from one another and connected with (to) independent (self-sufficient, self-standing) bearers; although the

emerging (coming out) of functions, which beforehand (previously) were latent or did not exist at all, is not in the least precluded, nevertheless the linearity of the process remains decisive (crucial), and (or) also the perception (view, notion) that the provisionally (temporarily) final and most fine (delicate, subtle) organisation of a plant or of an animal eventually (in the end), via innumerable (countless) mediations, had sprung (sprang) (sprouted) from one and the same semen. The process itself is essentially understood as quantitative, even though it is assumed that through it [this process] new qualities come into being. That is why it is very questionable [as to] whether the evolutionistic thought schema (Denkschema) can find satisfactory (satisfying) application to the course of history as [a] whole (Geschichtsablauf als Ganzes). Here, namely, the question of differentiation in every historical age is posed on a new basis; the overall (total) character of a social formation decides (upon) (determines, adjudicates), in other words, on each and every respective occasion, in which direction (the) differentiation runs (goes, moves, works, operates), what will be differentiated and what at the same time will be dedifferentiated (entdifferenziert wird)\(^80\). Hence, the linear evolutionism of differentiation (Der lineare Differenzierungsevolutionismus) cannot explain the great turning points (or changes) (Wenden) in (relation to) (during) which the criterion of differentiation itself is defined. In its [linear evolutionism of differentiation’s] exceedingly smoothed (out) (polished) way of looking at the past, the lack of (lacking, missing) readiness (willingness) to take into consideration [the] possibility and consequences of analogous turning points (or changes) in the future certainly makes its presence felt

\(^80\) On (Regarding) the necessary interrelation (connection) between differentiation and dedifferentiation, evolution and devolution cf. Tilly, “Clio”, esp. p. 455ff.; on (regarding) the in(cap)ability of the concept of differentiation to adequately explain historical “crystallisations” see Eisenstadt, “Social Change”.
(announces its presence, comes forward), [something] which again interrelates (connects) with the (above-)mentioned deficiency in (lack of) serious (genuine) reflection on the material and social-historical preconditions (prerequisites) of the processes of differentiation (Differenzierungsvorgänge) in present-day mass democracy.

In (For the) explanation [of the above], a shorter look(ing) back [in regard] to (review (survey) of) the much-conjured up transition from the “pre-modern age” to the “modern era” (Übergang von der „Vormoderne“ zur „Moderne“), or a synoptic comparison between (the) principally agrarian-feudal [society] and (the) principally industrial society (zwischen der vornehmlich agrar-feudalen und der vornehmlich industriellen Gesellschaft), will be (is) attempted. Differentiation or differentiality (i.e. a differentiated property (quality or nature)) (Differenzierung oder Differenziertheit) meant (signified) for the former [principally agrarian-feudal] a scarcely (hardly) assessable and centuries-long self-reproducing variety (diversity) of local ways (modes) of life and manners (or customs) (lokalen Lebensweisen und Sitten), [as well as a variety] of economic, legal and political regulations (settlements, arrangements). This variety (diversity) was real, and it was also felt by very many, even perhaps by most people, as [a] reality worth preserving. Modern industrial society, in its increasingly (ever) closer (narrower) interplay (synergy, cooperation, having an effect together) (immer engeren Zusammenwirken) with the new-times (modern(-era)) centralistic state (neuzeitlichen zentralistischen Staat), did not come (arrive) on the scene as [the] continuation and deepening of such differentiation, but it [modern industrial society] could, on the contrary, only set in motion its own, i.e. determined (conditioned, necessitated) through (by means of) its own general character, processes of
differentiation (Differenzierungsvorgänge), when it [modern industrial society] swept away (aside) the specific variety (diversity) of societas civilis, while it imposed (carried (pushed) through), very often violently, legislative, administrative, judicial and political unification (standardisation) (legislative, administrative, richterliche und politische Vereinheitlichung). What here was looked upon (at) (regarded) as [the] creation of (the) unfolding space (Enfaltungsraumes) for “genuine”, that is, individualistically comprehended (grasped, understood) differentiation on the one hand, was called dedifferentiation (“uniformity” („Gleichförmigkeit“), “leveling” („Nivellierung“)) on the other [hand], and with exactly these key words long and hard social-political struggles were conducted, since it was clear to those in question (concerned) which kind (sort) of differentiation corresponded with which social model (model of society; Gesellschaftsmodell). The undifferentiated use (usage) of the concept of differentiation or of complexity (Differenzierungs- oder Komplexitätsbegriffes) attests, on the contrary, (to) (bears witness, on the contrary, to) how much, in the meantime, the sense of (for) such concrete questions has been lost. (Just) as (like) system (systems) theory, in particular with the help (on the basis) of its specific, conceptual instruments, cannot say anything definite (particular or determined) or essential (substantial) (nichts Bestimmtes oder Wesentliches) about today’s society, so too evolutionism in general is not in a position(,) with the help of the mere and unadulterated (pure, unmixed, unwatered-down) criterion of differentiation(,) to apprehend (grasp) the qualitative aspects of the processes of differentiation. The historical transition to (the) high cultures (developed civilisations) had to (might) have been accompanied by just as numerous and just as intensive differentiations as the transition from the “pre-modern age” to the “modern era” too – and, all the same,
the social and historical quality of both transitions differ greatly (are very
different) from each other.

In the [his] dual (double, twin) capacity of [as] evolutionist and of [as]
social cyberneticist (des Evolutionisten und des Sozialkybernetikers),
Buckley (has) thought (meant, believed) [that] in (during) [the] transition
from a simpler to a more complex social formation (einer komplexeren
Gesellschaftsformation) the same [thing] takes place in [a] qualitative
respect as (like) in (during) [the] transition from atomic (nuclear) physics
to chemistry and to physiology\textsuperscript{81}. The analogy – of course for Buckley it
[the analogy] is no mere analogy, but a real correspondence – raises more
questions than it solves. On the one hand, it implies that at the highest
level of complexity the laws of the lowest [level] continue to fully have
an effect, that therefore complex societies can just as little neutralise
those basic (fundamental) anthropological and social factors, which
prevail (dominate) in the simple forms of social living together (i.e. co-
existence), as the phenomenon of the organic (das Phänomen des
Organischen) abolishes (cancels) the laws of atomic (nuclear) physics –
on the contrary, every higher level is here dependent for its existence not
least on the unreduced (unshortened, uncurtailed) effect (unverkürzte
Wirkung) of the elementary law bindedness (determinism, law(rule)-
based necessity; Gesetzmäßigkeit) of the lowest [level], but not the other
way around (vice versa). Linear evolutionism can consequently be very
well interpreted against the intention of its representatives to prove the
ontological superiority of the differentiated and of the more complex (des
Differenzierten und Komplexeren). On the other hand, from the
perspective of the aforementioned analogy a (very insufficient
(inadequate)) distinction is made (very insufficiently (inadequately)), if at

\textsuperscript{81} Sociology, p. 111.
all, between the qualitative and the quantitative aspect of differentiation.

A higher level of differentiation can as a whole show new qualitative features (characteristics) vis-à-vis a lower level, this must however by no means mean that the specific new quality consists in a greater qualitative wealth (richness), that is, in the greater quantity of qualities. Evolution can make qualitative leaps, without the new level, at which it is supposed to (should) henceforth (from now on) move, having to produce from its constitution more numerous qualities than the previous (preceding) one, level (Die Evolution kann qualitative Sprünge tun, ohne daß die neue Ebene, auf der sie sich fortan bewegen soll, von ihrer Konsitution her zahlreichere Qualitäten produzieren müßte als die vorherige). That even applies (is valid) when the specific new quality is nothing other than a greater need for or ability at (capacity for) differentiation (Differenzierungsbedürfnis oder –vermögen). Because differentiation, which occurs after the qualitative transition to a new level, can in essence (essentially, substantially) mean an identical or at any rate a structural repetition of the same level. System (systems) [theoreticians] and other theoreticians, who, (with which) (whatever the) normative ulterior motives (whatsoever), from the degree of differentiation (Differenzierungsgrad) of highly technicised (i.e. technologically advanced or hyperdeveloped) mass society (der hochtechnisierten Massengesellschaft) conclude (infer) its [highly technicised mass society’s] higher status within (inside of) evolution, confuse in very many cases differentiation and atomisation (i.e. the breaking up or fragmentation of society into individuals) with each other. The constant creation of new atoms indeed makes the whole on the outside (externally, outwardly) more complex, inside of which these atoms co-exist, but the growing complexity in the sense of the
multiplying of (increase in) the atoms does not amount to any qualitative
structural enrichment. Taken (Absorbed, Included) in the complex whole,
are in fact (of course) atoms or units (or unities) (Atome oder Einheiten),
which have the suitable (right, appropriate) for it [the said complex
whole] structure, and this [structure] again may not essentially
(substantially, fundamentally, considerably) diverge (deviate, differ) from
that which is typical of (for) the whole or the “system”. It therefore in
general does not happen that the separation of subsystems (or part(ial)
systems) from one another and their (relative) functional autonomisation
(Verselbständigung) leads to structural differentiation. On the contrary:
their internal (inner) structures become like one another more and more,
in spite of [the] increase of (in) their functional independence, and (there
is developed) a common thought [style] and work style (Denk- und
Arbeitsstil) (is developed). The experiences and the tendencies of highly
technicised (i.e. technologically advanced or hyperdeveloped) mass
society confirm this (Die Erfahrungen und die Tendenzen der
hochtechnisierten Massengesellschaft bestätigen dies). Through the
mathematisation and computerisation of the life[world] and work world
(world of work) (Mathematisierung und Computerisierung der Lebens-
und Arbeitswelt), the general organisational methods (methods of
organisation; Organisationsmethoden) in the most different (varied) areas
(fields, sectors) of production and of services structurally approach one
another so much as (like) never before. One must therefore have
completely lost sight of the qualitative aspect of the processes of
differentiation in order for instance to be able to think [that] the world
becomes more differentiated because not 1,000 more or less same (like,
equal) skyscrapers, but 100,000 are built, and not only in New York, but
also in Hong Kong or Nairobi.
Just as sobering, with regard to the evolutionistic derivation (deduction, inference) of the higher historical status of mass democracy from its supposedly higher differentiability (i.e. differentiated property (quality or nature)) or capacity for (ability at) differentiation (Differenzierungsfähigkeit), should (must, might) the pointing out (indication, reference, piece of advice) seem (have an (take) effect) [that] the development and even the survival of many atoms and units (or unities), which arise (crop up, result) from the process of differentiation (Differenzierungsvorgang), depend on the existence and on the performance of relatively few functional centres. Highly technicised (i.e. technologically advanced or hyperdeveloped) mass society can attain (reach, achieve) such, or its, complexity because it can create centres or hubs (nerve centres) (Zentren oder Knotenpunkte) which directly or indirectly maintain (support, cater for, feed) the products (produce; Erzeugnisse) of the processes of differentiation through (by means of) energy, [various kinds of] information (Informationen), money etc. etc..

The impression of the autonomy and of the self-sufficiency (autarchy) of these latter [i.e. energy, various kinds of information, money etc. etc.] comes into being (is produced (created)) in the euphoric times of general affluence (prosperity) and fades (dwindles) during every shock (blow, disruption) to the aforementioned centres. All this indicates a particularly high vulnerability of modern societies in comparison to (the) past (agrarian or early-industrial) [societies], in which precisely the lesser differentiation of the division of labour demanded from the social units (unities or entities) material independence. Seen (Looked at) in this way, the polycentrism of modern societies stands (finds itself) on much more unstable bases than for instance (the) feudal [society, one], and what applies (is valid) here to (for) the economy, applies also to mentality and ideology (Mentalität und Ideologie): relativistic pluralism constitutes only
the other (flip) side of universalistic principles. (Just) As (Like) feudal society compensated for its internal (inner) dismemberment (cutting up, breaking into pieces; Zerstückelung) through (by means of, with) a universalistic religion and morality (i.e. ethics), so within (inside of) Western mass democracy, differentiations, which emerge (come) from (the) world-theoretical(view, graphic, representative, illustrational) polytheism and encourage (foster) centrifugal forces, and dedifferentiating or undifferentiated ethical and anthropological universalisms, balance one another (Der relativistische Pluralismus bildet nur die Kehrseite universalistischer Grundsätze. Wie die feudale Gesellschaft ihre innere Zerstückelung durch eine universalistische Religion und Moral kompensierte, so halten sich innerhalb der westlichen Massendemokratie Differenzierungen, die aus dem weltanschaulichen Polytheismus hervorgehen und zentrifugalen Kräften Vorschub leisten, und entdifferenzierende bzw. undifferenzierte ethische und anthropologische Universalismen die Waage).

Processes of differentiation and complexities stand (are), in a word (short), under the sword of Damocles of continued existence (continuance; Fortbestandes) and of the unrestrained (unchecked) reproduction of the material and social-political preconditions (prerequisites) of the “system”, which also determine the quality and extent (magnitude, dimensions, size; Ausmaß) of the former [processes of differentiation and complexities]. In themselves, they [the said processes of differentiation and complexities] bring about (cause) neither greater stability nor greater instability of social organisation, although instability can be more detrimental (harmful) (there) where differentiations and complexities create interdependencies. The conceptual distinction between social organisation and its differentiation or complexity should
not, in any event, mean that these [this differentiation or complexity] are [is] added, as it were, to that [social organisation] in retrospect. It [The said conceptual distinction] implies, however, that both conceptual magnitudes must behave (act) more or less symmetrically, and that differentiation or complexity, considered (regarded, looked at) in themselves and without the help (assistance, effect, doing; Zutun) of other factors, cannot develop a system-revolutionising (or system-altering) own (self-sufficient, independent) dynamics (momentum) (keine systemumwälzende Eigendynamik); they accompany the “system” up to that limit (or boundary) at which exactly the character and direction of differentiation and complexity are defined anew. And also regardless of how one may judge (rate, assess, gauge) the social-historical effect (impact, influence) (die sozialgeschichtliche Wirkung) of differentiation and complexity in light of the historical experiences in (with) the industrial modern era (age, epoch), their social-ontological effect (impact, influence) (ihre sozialontologische Wirkung) must be held to be for (matter) nought (considered to be (regarded (thought of) as nil). There is no indication (sign, evidence) [of (for) the fact] that differentiation and complexity, as they unfolded (developed) in the course of the last 200 years and in particular [in the course] of the increasingly mass-democratic 20\textsuperscript{th} century, influenced (affected) the fundamental social-ontological given (actual) facts (actualities) (die fundamentalen sozialontologischen Gegebenheiten), e.g. [that] they [differentiation and complexity] (have) changed (altered) in this or that sense (one sense or another) [the] spectrum and mechanism of the social relation\textsuperscript{82} (Spektrum und Mechanismus der sozialen Beziehung in diesem oder jenem Sinne verändert hätten). The optimistic implication (and intention), in terms of

\textsuperscript{82} See Ch. III and IV in this volume.
the philosophy of history, of the evolutionism of differentiation (Die geschichtsphilosophisch-optimistische Implikation (und Absicht) des Differenzierungsevolutionismus) comes to light (the surface) (appears) in the assertion [that] in a(n) highly (extremely) differentiated and complex society, the side of conflict in the spectrum of the social relation has to (must) gradually (step by step, bit by bit) throw off (discard) its acutest and most destructive components (in einer höchst differenzierten und komplexen Gesellschaft müsse im Spektrum der sozialen Beziehung die Seite des Konfliktes allmählich ihre akutesten und destruktivsten Komponenten abwerfen)\textsuperscript{83}. It is not, in the process, explained how in the 20\textsuperscript{th} century, of all centuries, conflicts of the greatest intensity and breadth, and indeed between and within (inside of) highly differentiated societies (hochdifferenziertter Gesellschaften), have been (were) possible, and as well, how processes of differentiation were set in motion or driven forward (promoted, pushed along) in part through exactly such (kinds of) conflicts. That does not of course prove that differentiation has to bring forth (about) (produce) such kinds (types) of conflict, but (no doubt, probably) that both [differentiation and such kinds of conflict] do not exclude each other and (or) [(that) (proves) they do not] behave neutrally towards each other.

The claims to social-ontological refounding (re-establishment) (Die sozialontologischen Neubegründungsansprüche) of [made by] the evolutionism of differentiation do not, however, only concern the spectrum, but also the mechanism of the social relation, as this is shaped (formed, moulded) through the pre-given (pre-existing) (pre)disposition

\textsuperscript{83} We can here for example refer to attempts at transferring (translating) (the) evolutionism of differentiation and the functionalistic way of looking at things to the analysis of international relations in order to back up (underpin, support) the future blueprint (outline) of (for) a demilitarised world society (einer entmilitarisierter Weltgesellschaft) against the background (under the aegis) of economistic universalism. Pioneering (Pathbreaking) in this sense [is] E. Haas, \textit{Beyond the Nation-State}; Mitrany, \textit{A Working Peace System}. Cf. footnote 193 below.
(vorgegebene Veranlagung) and the mental potential (i.e. possibilities) of subjects (die mentalen Potentiale der Subjekte). Without serious knowledge of (the) historical sources and also without consideration of (regard to) (the) newer ethnological findings, subjective qualities (i.e. characteristics) or modes of behaviour, which in reality constitute (are) fixed (steady or stable) social-ontological magnitudes, in fact anthropological constants, are attributed (ascribed), in the course of (all) this, to the effect (impact, influence) of modern processes of differentiation (Ohne seriöse Kenntnis der historischen Quellen und auch ohne Berücksichtigung neuerer ethnologischer Befunde werden dabei der Wirkung moderner Differenzierungsvorgängen subjektive Eigenschaften oder Verhaltensweisen zugeschrieben, die in Wirklichkeit feste sozialontologische Größen, ja anthropologische Konstanten darstellen). A gross (coarse, crude) caricature of “pre-modern” man serves as [the] backdrop (background) (Eine grobe Karikatur des „vormodernen“ Menschen dient als Hintergrund) against (before) which these supposedly new qualities (i.e. characteristics) and modes of behaviour are described. Lane thinks like this, [that] (the) pre-modern man had – in contrast to the characteristic reflexivity (Reflexivität) of modern [man] – behaved unreflectedly (unreflektiert) vis-à-vis himself84, while Coleman assures [us that] the distinction between person and role was a “social invention” of the New Times (Modern Era) (die Unterscheidung zwischen Person und Rolle sei eine „soziale Erfindung“ der Neuzeit)85. This specific reflexivity of modern man vis-à-vis himself and others is supposed to have the consequence that he frees himself (is freed) from pre-modern

84 “Decline”, p. 654ff..
85 “Social Inventions”. Luhmann makes these theses his own (adopts these theses) and even goes so far as to claim [that] the social-psychological mechanism (sozialpsychologische Mechanismus) of “taking the role of the other” constitutes an aspect of the increased reflexivity, which characterises (typifies, marks) the end of societas civilis and the beginning of modern complexity (“Evolutionary Differentiation”, p. 121). Mead, however, traced the roots of this mechanism [all the way] back to the animal kingdom! Cf. footnote 46 above.
intolerance, impulsivity and (unquestioning) faith in authority (vormoderer Intoleranz, Impulsivität und Autoritätsgläubigkeit) and (that he orientates) his social activity (is oriented) increasingly (more and more) [according] to objective (factual) and transparent yardsticks (criteria or standards) (an sachlichen und durchsichtigen Maßstäben orientiere)\textsuperscript{86}. Over and above (Beyond) that (Furthermore) – and in that (therein, in this respect) the (historical-philosophical) tendency (propensity; Hang) (, pertaining to the philosophy of history,) of evolutionism of differentiation becomes noticeable (manifest, evident) anew – this individual behaviour is supposed (meant) to (should) constitute partly the expression, partly the basis of a society and of a culture which has left behind traditional political-ideological primitivisms (soll dieses individuelle Verhalten teils den Niederschlag, teils die Grundlage einer Gesellschaft und einer Kultur bilden, die traditionelle politisch-ideologische Primitivismen hinter sich gelassen habe) and has arrived at (reached, attained, achieved) the solution to nascent (emerging, arising, resultant, subsequent; entstehenden) questions with [the] help of scientific knowledge, which consists in one of the most important means of production; the “knowledgeable society” is therefore within reach\textsuperscript{87}.

This construction contains serious historical [mistakes (faults, errors)] and (mistakes (faults, errors)) diagnostic [in the diagnosis] of (as regards) (the) time (period(s of time), era, age) (mistakes (faults, errors)) (schwere historische und zeitdiagnostische Fehler), which must be briefly

\textsuperscript{86} Thus, Lane, “Decline”, p.654ff. Luhmann follows him, see e.g. Politische Planung, p. 61: the human (man, person) of complex society must be “civilised”, be able to control his affects (i.e. emotions) and act impersonally, and this again means a “very far-reaching (extensive) psychical conversion (transformation, re-equipping or adaptation) (Umrüstung) of personalities” vis-à-vis “all pre-new-times (pre-modern(-age)) (vorneuzeitlichen) societies”.

\textsuperscript{87} R. Lane, “Decline”, pp. 650-652, 660. (In) Following such diagnoses, Luhmann also holds out the prospect of the predominance (prevalence, imposition) of the cognitive element against the political-ideological [element], see for instance Soziol. Aufklärung, II, p. 55ff.. Traces of technocratic megalomania are not lacking here, thus e.g. when the possibility is considered [of] society being “modelled” according to cybernetic patterns (models; Mustern) (loc. cit., III, p. 292).
mentioned. First of all, the process of normification (i.e. normative standardisation) and of the reflexive becoming of behaviour (des Reflexivwerdens von Verhalten) was (were) taken for (grasped (understood) as) just as undifferentiatedly (undifferenziert) and (recti)linearly (in a straight line) as the process of differentiation itself: as [an] increasing social differentiality (i.e. differentiated property (quality or nature)) and complexity arises from (out of) the undifferentiated social, so too (the) modern normified (i.e. normatively standardised) and reflected (das moderne normierte und reflektierte) [behaviour] should (is supposed (meant to) to) emerge from an originally not normified (i.e. not normatively standardised) and not reflected behaviour. But even if one wants to completely disregard (ignore, pay no attention to) the ethological-zoological aspect of the normification (i.e. normative standardisation) and ritualisation of behaviour, one must ascertain that there has not hitherto been human living together (i.e. co-existence) without specifically social normifications and ritualisations (Aber selbst wenn man den ethologisch-zoologischen Aspekt der Normierung und Ritualisierung von Verhalten ganz außer acht lassen will, muß man feststellen, daß es bisher kein menschliches Zusammenleben ohne spezifisch soziale Normierungen und Ritualisierungen gegeben hat). These are again connected automatically to (with) both the reflexivity of behaviour – since already the existence of generally known norms motivates [people, humans] towards (accounts for the) constant (tacit (silent)) comparison of one’s own behaviour with the normative commands of society –, and also to (with) the distinction between role and person, since the enforcement (execution, carrying out) of the norm coincides with the taking ( adoption, assumption) of a social role, no matter what the person, in the course of this, wishes (desires) or thinks (Dieze verbinden sich wiederum automatisch sowohl mit der Reflexivität
des Verhaltens – da schon das Vorhandensein von allgemein bekannten Normen zum ständigen (stillschweigenden) Vergleich des eigenen Verhaltens mit den normativen Forderungen der Gesellschaft motiviert –, als auch mit der Unterscheidung zwischen Rolle und Person, da die Vollstreckung der Norm mit der Übernahme einer sozialen Rolle zusammenfällt, egal, was sich die Person dabei wünscht oder denkt.

When Brutus had his own sons put to death (executed), he had long known before the onset of “modern reflexivity” about the difference between role and person, even though he did not associate (combine, link) this difference with the other (different, opposite) content(s) as (like) a present-day bureaucrat. This example leads us to a further, no(t) less important ascertainment. There is (exists) namely no unambiguous (unequivocal, obvious, clear) or necessary interrelation (connection) between [the] extent (range, scope) or intensity of normification (i.e. normative standardisation), and, [the] degree of differentiation or of complexity of society; differentiation does not determine (condition, cause, necessitate) normification (i.e. normative standardisation) (normification does not presuppose differentiation), but the character of normification is defined, just as (exactly like) the character of differentiation, by the general social-historical character of each and every respective social formation (Zwischen Umfang oder Intensität der Normierung und Differenzierungs- bzw. Komplexitätsgrad der Gesellschaft besteht nämlich kein eindeutiger oder notwendiger Zusammenhang; nicht Differenzierung bedingt die Normierung, sondern der Charakter der Normierung wird ebenso wie der Charakter der Differenzierung durch den allgemeinen sozialgeschichtlichen Charakter der jeweiligen Gesellschaftsformation definiert). Very rigorous normifications (i.e. normative standardisations) and tough forms of disciplining (or tough disciplinary measures) (und harte
Disziplinierungen), whose social necessity or at least rationalisation (i.e. as explanation or justification) can be thoroughly (completely, absolutely) understood (comprehended, fathomed) on the part of those in question (concerned), appear (emerge) already in pre-modern or even archaic and “primitive” societies (in vormodernen oder gar archaischen und „primitiven“ Gesellschaften); [in relation] to (with) these [pre-modern or even archaic and “primitive” societies] correspond, on each and every respective occasion, specific free space(s) [for individual action] (spezifische Freiräume) so that every normification (i.e. normative standardisation) has two sides. And since in one society, to free space [for individual action] (Freiraum) belongs exactly that which in the other (another) [society] falls under (into) normification (as well as conversely (the other way around, vice versa)), since, that is, the normifications of various societies are not concerned with the same aspects of social life in the same way (manner), so (thus), no ascending (rising, ascendant) line of normifications can be constructed which is supposed to (should) culminate in the norms system (i.e. system of norms) and (the) normified (i.e. normatively standardised) behaviour of modern complex society. These [normifications] are not the product of an evolution, but of a concrete social-historical constellation (or correlation (of forces)) (Sehr rigorose Normierungen und harte Disziplinierungen, deren soziale Notwendigkeit oder wenigstens Rationalisierung seitens der Betreffenden durchaus nachvollzogen werden kann, tauchen bereits in vormodernen oder gar archaischen und „primitiven“ Gesellschaften auf; ihnen entsprechen jeweils spezifische Freiräume, so daß jede Normierung zwei Seiten hat. Und da in der einen Gesellschaft eben das zum Freiraum gehört, was in der anderen unter die Normierung fällt (sowie umgekehrt), da also die Normierungen von verschiedenen Gesellschaften nicht dieselben Aspekte des sozialen Lebens auf dieselbe Weise betreffen, so
läßt sich keine aufsteigende Linie der Normierungen konstruieren, die im Normensystem und im normierten Verhalten der modernen komplexen Gesellschaft gipfeln soll. Diese sind nicht das Produkt einer Evolution, sondern einer konkreten sozialgeschichtlichen Konstellation).

This becomes more understandable in light of our ascertainment [that] every normification (i.e. normative standardisation) has its two sides, i.e. its constraints (compulsions; Zwänge) and its free space(s) [for individual action] or room to move (leeway, latitude, scope, unfolding space) (ihre Frei- oder Spielräume). The image (picture) of “civilised” and rational-objective man [who is] above (beyond) all “primitivisms” (Das Bild des „zivilisierten“ und über alle „Primitivismen“ erhabenen rational-sächlichen Menschen), [and] who in accordance with the view (perception, opinion) of the evolutionists of differentiation is supposed (meant) to formulate and carry out (put into effect, execute) the normifications of highly complex (hochkomplexen) “knowledgeable society”, formally (i.e. in terms of form) corresponds to (with) the ideal type of highly technicised (i.e. technologically advanced or hyperdeveloped) and highly rationalised (i.e. highly organised or systematised) processes (sequences of events) in industry and administration (hochrationalisierten Abläufe in Industrie und Verwaltung). Such processes (sequences of events) however make up (constitute) only (the) one side of social life in Western mass democracy. The other side, that of mass consumption, is connected with psychological and ethically very different stances (positioning, attitudes) and modes of behaviour – although, both aforementioned sides are equally indispensable for the continued existence (Bestand) of mass democracy, and they [the said sides] must compete and co-exist simultaneously with each other inside of (within) society as well as inside
of (within) the individual psyche (der individuellen Psyche). If industrial mass production and administration require (demand, call for) the activation (actuation, application) of an impersonal instrumental rationality, (so, then, thus) mass consumption favours, on the contrary, (the) individualistic-hedonistic ethic(s) of immediate (or direct) pleasure (or enjoyment) and generally of “self-realisation” (Erfordern industrielle Massenproduktion und Verwaltung die Betätigung einer unpersönlichen instrumentellen Rationalität, so begünstigt der Massenkonsum im Gegenteil die individualistisch-hedonistische Ethik des unmittelbaren Genusses und allgemeiner der „Selbstverwirklichung“). On the basis of the mass consumption of material and intellectual(-spiritual) goods and against the background ((a) backdrop) of [the, a] world-theoretical(view, graphic, representative, illustrational) and ethical pantheism (Pantheismus), all kinds (sorts) of irrationalisms („Irrationalismen“), which spellbind (captivate, enchant, fascinate) all the more people the more (greater, stronger) (the) increased (enhanced, improved) productivity decreases (reduces) the number of those directly participating (involved, taking part) in technical-rational processes, come into being (are created (produced)) and thrive (flourish, prosper). The asymmetry between the “rationality” of technology (technique) and production, and (the) ideological-world-theoretical “irrationality” („Irrationalität“), does not of course constitute a specific feature (characteristic) (differentia specifica; Spezifikum) of mass-producing and mass-consuming mass democracy (der massenhaft produzierenden und massenhaft konsumierenden Massendemokratie), even if it [the said mass democracy] has been connected here with really (absolutely, virtually) contrary (opposite, conflicting) content(s): whereas in societies in which the shortage (scarcity, dearth) of goods held sway (dominated, prevailed; herrschte) the “irrational” [element, sphere] (das „Irrationale“) as a rule
legitimised ascetic virtues and social hierarchies, the “irrational” in a society, which for the first time in history has basically overcome the shortage of goods, promotes (fosters, encourages) hedonistic and individualistic or egalitarian notions (ideas, perceptions) and stances (hedonistische und individualistische bzw. egalitäre Vorstellungen und Haltungen). Nevertheless, from the point of view of our question formulation (putting (formulation) of the [a] question, problem examination, examination of the [a] problem, central theme), not this specific (particular, special) contrast(ing), but the structural commonality is more important. (The) Pre-modern societies (have) also handled (managed, operated) technology (technique) and production on the basis of the instrumental rationality of means and end(s) (the procession (processions) (or litany) and the prayer (prayers for rain) did not mean that one had (did) not otherwise done (do) all that (which) appeared expedient for a good yield (harvest, return, output) through the application of existing empirical findings (knowledge)). But (the) instrumental rationality at this level did not in the least constitute (provide) the method of thought (intellectual method; Denkmethode) which shaped (formed, moulded) the general world theory (i.e. world view). There are no grounds (is no basis (footing)) for the assumption [that] this will now be considerably (fundamentally, essentially) different. Against the background of the same industry and technology (technique), a number of (multiple, several) “rationalisms” („Rationalismen“) and “irrationalisms” are today, as in the past, possible; and the social-ontological or anthropological framework is expected (anticipated), as a result of new technical (and or technological) developments (infolge der neuen technischen Entwicklungen), to change just as little as [it (the said}
framework) changed] through the invention of typography and of ballistics at the threshold of the New Times.\(^8^8\)

The rational-objective new man (rational-sachliche neue Mensch) the evolutionists of differentiation have in mind (imagine) (that is, the ideal economic (or business) manager or administrative official (administrator)), is not, besides, merely hindered (impeded) by the inner logic of the sphere of consumption (Konsumsphäre) as to (regards) his full social predominance (prevailing, imposition), but is apparently also endangered (at risk) on (in) his own terrain (territory, turf). The real development of today’s advanced mass democracies (der fortgeschrittenen Massendemokratien) offers (presents, provides) very strong indications (signs, evidence) for (of) the [fact] that the programmatically striven for (after) (pursued) formalisation of (the) rules (Formalisierung der Regeln) and of behaviour in [the] economy, administration and politics increasingly becomes (turns into) the facade behind which nepotism (cronyism), corruption and also criminality blossom (bloom) and thrive (flourish). One may express the conjecture (supposition, speculation, guess, assumption; Vermutung) [that] the gradual blurring (or effacement) (obliteration) of the boundaries between state and economy, (the) public [sphere] and (the) private [sphere], through (by (means of)) mass democracy entailed (had as a consequence) a refeudalisation (Refeudalisierung) on [a] highly technicised (i.e. high-technology) and highly mobile basis (auf hochtechnisierter und hochmobiler Basis), in relation to which temporary (transient) and varying regulations, which left (let, leave) considerable room to move (leeway, latitude, scope, unfolding space) for personal relation(ship)s and dark manipulations, take the place of steady (stable, solid, firm, fixed)

\(^8^8\) Cf. Kondylis, „Was heißt schon westlich?“.
and general norms (festen und allgemeinen Normen). As a result (With that), however, the impression should not be given (created) that (as if) structural changes in themselves effect (cause, bring about) moral upheavals (radical changes, revolutions) (strukturelle Wandlungen an sich moralische Umwälzungen bewirken), but it [the impression given] should be the pointing out of the concrete circumstances (die konkreten Umstände), with (to) which certain modes of behaviour are today connected, regardless of how old they [the said certain modes of behaviour] are in their substance (essence) (in ihrer Substanz) and how much they had to be modified in their form (in ihrer Form). It should (ought) not at all, in other words, be asserted that “humans (people)” and “society” in comparison with the past have (deteriorated) morally (got worse) – such diagnoses are always (cultural-critically-polemically) inspired (in terms of cultural critique (criticism) and polemics) (sind immer kulturkritisch-polemisch inspiriert) and ought not be taken to heart –, but that even under the circumstances of highly complex (mass democracy) (and) living and operating supposedly under the influence (aegis, sign) of “practical (objective or situational) constraints (or necessities)” („Sachzwängen“) (mass democracy), old, (long ago) familiar modes of behaviour by no means die out (become extinct). It is really (truly) naive to describe (refer to) them [such old, familiar modes of behaviour] as “archaisms” which have to soon be overcome, and indeed i.a. also with the help of the social sciences\textsuperscript{89}. Sober and experienced observers, who, by the way (incidentally), are not necessarily averse to the “system”, arrive at (come to) completely (entirely) different (other) ascertainments and prognoses when they for instance look into

\textsuperscript{89} Thus, Luhmann, Politische Planung, p. 41.
(investigate) the effects (consequences, impact) of corruption etc. in the realm (area, field, sector) of the economy.\textsuperscript{90}

The view (perception) [that] the higher stages (grades, levels, tiers) of evolution (die höheren Stufen der Evolution) find expression in a new type of (hu)man (Menschentyp), who would be up to (a match for) their [the higher stages of evolution’s] increased (heightened) demands of rationality (der ihren gesteigerten Rationalitätsforderungen gewachsen wäre), belongs, as is known, to the old hoard (backlog or treasure) of the philosophy of history; we shall restrict (confine) ourselves here to the pointing out (indication, reference) [that] Spencer, despite other differences of opinion (disagreements) with Comte, shared his [Comte’s] conviction [that] the upbringing (education or training) (Erziehung) of the individual agrees in its manner (way; Art) and sequence (order; Reihenfolge) with the historical upbringing of the human genus (i.e. race).\textsuperscript{91} In addition (Next) to (Apart from) its [the said view of the higher stages of evolution’s] just (now) mentioned version, this view (perception) made its presence felt in [the] form of an application of the Piagetian schema of the gradual (progressive, step by step, stepwise) intellectual development (stufenweisen intellektuellen Entwicklung) of man (a human (person)) in the course of history as [a] whole. In the process, really (absolutely, virtually) grotesque and ethnologically long ago refuted (disproved, confuted) positions had to be heated up (i.e. rehashed) and served (up) anew.\textsuperscript{92} This has, nonetheless, not been able to keep (prevent, stop) (normatively-historically-philosophically inspired) evolutionists (inspired normatively [and] in terms of the philosophy of

\textsuperscript{90} See e.g. Etzioni, \textit{Capital Corruption}.

\textsuperscript{91} \textit{Essays}, II, p. 133. This (historical-philosophical) thought figure (schema) (in the philosophy of history) can be, though, traced back to Lessing or Hegel.

\textsuperscript{92} Thus, e.g. when Hallpike, \textit{Foundations}, places (puts) “primitive” thinking (thought) with the thinking (thought) of European children (with)in the ages [age bracket] of 3-7 years at the same stage (level, phase, grade) of development. Cf. Jahoda’s critique, \textit{Psychology}, p. 224ff.
history) (normativ-geschichtsphilosophisch inspirierte Evolutionisten) from appropriating such constructs\(^93\). In order to call them [these (such) constructs] into question, it does not suffice (is not enough (sufficient)), against Piaget, to deny the coming into being (genesis, emergence, origin) of essentially (fundamentally) new mental principles in the course of development (im Laufe der Entwicklung) or to consider (regard, look at, view) the, on each and every respective occasion, new principle as [the] mere extension (expansion, broadening, widening) or more concrete application of an already existing [one, principle]. Because Piaget’s constructivism is based not only on the acceptance (assumption) of the stages (levels, phases, grades) of development (Entwicklungsstufen) with qualitatively new features (characteristics), but also on the conviction of the coherence and uniformity (or evenness) (regularity, symmetry) of the mental [sphere] as a (on the) whole (all in all) (Gleichmäßigkeit des Mentalen insgesamt). Because of that, he must assert (argue, allege, maintain), apart from the novelty (newness, novel aspect) of all the respective higher mental principles, their (cap)ability at detaching themselves (breaking away) from the context of their coming into being (genesis, emergence) and at, dominantly (in dominating manner (way)), spreading to the rest of (remaining, other) (the) mental contexts or areas (realms, sectors); otherwise, in fact, the mental [sphere] would, exactly through its upward movement, lose its coherence. This coherence of the mental [sphere], nevertheless, remains [an] unproven postulate (unbewiesenes Postulat). Rather, every [one] of its [the mental sphere’s] contexts or areas brings forth (produces, spawns, gives rise to) its own principles or constructs independently, and (the) “progress” in one [context or area] does not automatically bring about (effect, cause) (a)

\(^{93}\) Thus, e.g. Habermas, *Theorie des komm. Handelns*, I, p. 104ff..
“progress” in the other [context or area]. The mental [sphere] is not therefore necessarily unified in accordance with the benchmarks (or standards) (yardsticks) of the highest stage (level, phase, grade) of development (nach den Maßstäben der höchsten Entwicklungsstufe) or, put another way (in other words), cognitive development does not culminate in a few stages in (at) which the lower [stages] come undone (or are absorbed). Both at [the] historical as well as at [the] individual level, all mental elements are found in, on each and every respective occasion, different and also changeable (variable) dosages (doses) at every stage (level, phase) of development\textsuperscript{94}. Empirically, this is confirmed (corroborated) by the very noticeable (perceptible) and widespread effect (impact, influence) of really (actually, absolutely, virtually) magical ways (manners) of thinking in [the] everyday (daily) life and everyday (daily) behaviour of people (humans, men) in highly complex and highly technicised (i.e. technologically advanced or hyperdeveloped) societies (Empirisch wird dies durch die sehr spürbare und weitverbreitete Wirkung von geradezu magischen Denkweisen im Alltagsleben und -verhalten der Menschen in hochkomplexen und -technisierten Gesellschaften bestätigt)\textsuperscript{95}. False conclusions (Fallacies) in [regard to] this question can hardly be by-passed (circumvented, got around, avoided) if (when) one confuses the culturally (right (precisely) now) prevalent (or predominant) (prevailing) belief in (acceptance (avowal) of) (das kulturell gerade vorherrschende Bekenntnis) “rationality” with the real thought processes (Denkprozessen) in concrete people (humans, men) (bei den konkreten Menschen), which in one

\textsuperscript{94} Thus, the excellent (masterly) analysis of Harris-Heelas, “Cognitive Processes”, esp. pp. 218-221, 232ff. In relation to the non-uniformity (or unevenness) (irregularity, asymmetry) of mental development (Zur Ungleichmäßigigkeit mentaler Entwicklung) cf. Flavell, Cognitive Development, esp. p. 248.

\textsuperscript{95} Schweder, “Likeness and likelihood”. In relation to Piaget’s overestimation (overrating) of the “rational” components in [the] behaviour of adults (grown-ups) in (the) modern Western societies see Sinnott, “Everyday thinking” as well as Labouvie-Vief, “Adult cognitive development”.
situation can be guided (led, directed) by magical, religious, “irrational” etc. ways (manners) of thinking, in one ((a)nother) situation by scientific concepts (notions) and in one (a) third [situation] simply by (the) so-called common sense (die sich in der einen Situation durch magische, religiöse, „irrationale“ etc. Denkweisen, in einer anderen durch wissenschaftliche Begriffe und in einer dritten einfach durch den sogenannten gesunden Menschenverstand leiten lassen)\(^96\).

The expectation of the predominance (prevalence, imposition; Durchsetzung) of the “cognitive” element inside of (within) highly differentiated society is founded (established), moreover, through (by means of, with) the pointing out (indication) of the growing and increasingly quicker (faster) (all the more rapid) flow of information in it [the said (this) highly differentiated society], which [the said pointing out] incidentally seems to substantiate (corroborate, support, bear out; erhärten) the already (well-)known (familiar) to us thesis [that] communication constitutes the essence of the social (Kommunikation bilde das Wesen des Sozialen). The conviction, [that] whoever is in possession of more [loads (pieces) of] information thinks and acts more rationally too, underlies it [the said thesis], whereas “archaic” modes of behaviour preferably (mainly, chiefly) flourish in the intellectual(-spiritual) (i.e. mental) derangement of the lack of information (in der geistigen Umnachtung des Informationsmangels florieren). The first moment of silliness (fatuity, fatuousness) (Kurzschluß) in this syllogistic reasoning (Syllogistik) is obvious: not the mere use of information, but only the kind (manner) and the quality of the [its] use make (turn) it [information] (into) the cognitive basis of rational action (kognitiven Grundlage rationalen Handelns); the rationality of him (who) (is) (the

\(^96\) Jahoda, *Psychology*, p. 182.
person) acting (acts) must, that is, be presupposed (assumed) as aptitude (or predisposition) and as independent (self-sufficient, self-standing) magnitude (als Anlage und als selbständige Größe). The second mistake (error) is a pragmatic [one, mistake (error)]. The establishment (Die Herstellung) of a connection between [a] greater quantity (amount) of information (Informationsmenge) and [a] higher cognitive-rational potential implies the assumption [that] one actually makes use of that quantity (amount), one does not, that is, make a practical decision before one goes through (carefully examines) all available (existing; vorhan) [pieces of] information. But the use of information takes place in concrete situations (in konkreten Lagen), i.e. under the pressure of time and [pressure] of the [making of a] decision (unter Zeit- und Entscheidungsdruck), which [pressure] increases to the extent that the “information society” is [a] society “of the economy” and of competition (die „Informationsgesellschaft“ „Wirtschafts-“ und Konkurrenzgesellschaft ist). The quicker (faster) the transfer(ence) (transmission) of information [is], the more (the) temporal pressure of [to make] the decision. Accordingly (According to that), the main concern of him (who) (is) (the person) acting (acts) is not always and not necessarily the quantity (amount) of the available [pieces of] information, but the available period of time for the perusal, the sifting and the evaluation of (the) information (Kenntnisnahme, Sichtung und Auswertung von Information). In view of (Given) the limited [amount of] time, the abundance (plethora) of the theoretically available information offers (provides) only chance (or accidental) (coincidental, incidental) advantages of selection. That is why the supply of information saved (stored) in the [a] computer benefits him (who) (is) (the person) acting (acts) just as much or just as little as the knowledge hoarded in libraries and archives at that time (in those days (times), then) (has, had) supported
(was supportive of, stood by) him [(the person) (then) acting]. That equally applies (in the same way) to (is equally valid (in the same way) for) the politician as [well as] [and] to (for) the stockbroker. In the ever (always) higher lashing (striking) waves of information, one can drown. And against them [the said lashing waves of information], only the conscious or unconscious effect (impact) of (the) anthropologically determined (conditioned), stable and stabilising mechanisms of the relieving of the tension of existence (Und dagegen hilft nur die bewußte oder unbewußte Wirkung der anthropologisch bedingten, stabilen und stabilisierenden Entlastungsmechanismen) helps, regardless of at which level of complexity they [the said mechanisms of the relieving of the tension of existence] unfold (develop).

The quantity (amount) of the available [pieces of] information and the quickness (rapidity, swiftness) of their transfer(ence) (transmission) do not therefore guarantee in themselves the predominance (prevalence, imposition) of the cognitive element in modern social life as [a] whole. A further consideration (thought, reflection) shows that this element inside of (within) a highly complex society could even weaken (abate, drop off) in a certain (particular), yet perhaps decisive (deciding, crucial) respect. We mean here (the) knowledge of the long-term overall (total, entire) outcome of the right (just) now unfolding (taking place, happening) short-[term] and medium-term part (partial) processes, i.e. not so much (the) knowledge of (about, regarding) the – also sometimes opaque (obscure) – present, but above all (the) knowledge of the future (Wir meinen hier das Wissen um den langfristigen Gesamtausgang der sich gerade abspielenden kurz- und mittelfristigen Teilvorgänge, d.h. nicht so sehr das Wissen um die – ebenfalls manchmal undurchsichtige – Gegenwart, sondern vor allem das Wissen um die Zukunft). The general direction of
the overall (total) becoming (or of all events) can, and must possibly all the more, be lost from (get out of) sight (fail to be taken into account) as (the) knowledge of the individual (separate) interrelations (contexts, correlations) deepens, something which (the) considerable (important, relevant) content-related(filled) (substantive) differentiation or (the) merely occasional (episodic, intermittent) crossing (intersection) of perspectives engenders (produces, generates, gives rise to). In other words: the complexity of the social makes the unintended (unintentional) and unexpected (undreamt-of) overall (total) consequences of collective action more likely (probable), it [the said complexity of the social] intensifies the effect of the heterogony of ends (Die allgemeine Richtung des Gesamtgeschehens kann und muß möglicherweise um so mehr aus den Augen geraten, wie die Kenntnis über die einzelnen Zusammenhänge vertieft wird, was die erhebliche inhaltliche Differenzierung oder die bloß occasionelle Kreuzung der Perspektiven erzeugt. Mit anderen Worten: Die Komplexität des Sozialen macht die unbeabsichtigten und ungeahnten Gesamtfolgen kollektiven Handelns wahrscheinlicher, sie intensiviert den Effekt der Heterogonie der Zwecke)\(^{97}\). This effect (result; Effekt) was traditionally considered from the point of view (in terms) of the invisible hand, whereby (in accordance with which) (even) individual irrationalisms bring about (off), through their interweaving (intertwining, interconnection; Verflechtung), a rational collective outcome. The reverse of that, however, can (likewise) happen (too), i.e. the sum of (the) partial rationalities can bring forth (about) (produce) an irrational overall (total) result (Gesamtergebnis). (The) “Knowledgeable society” can only be constantly (continually) reproduced (then) when the subjective expectations (die subjektiven Erwartungen) on the whole are satisfied not

\(^{97}\) Cf. footnote 50 above.
only as (with regard) to the mode of behaviour of each and every respective partner in interaction (interaction partner) (der Verhaltensweise der jeweiligen Interaktionspartner), but also as (with regard) to the overall (total, entire) performance (achievement) of the “system”. If (When) there is a situation in which indeed mutual (reciprocal) expectations are fulfilled, but the expected overall (total) result of (the) collective action fails to materialise, (so, thus) this means (signifies) for a highly complex society the state of affairs (situation) of absolute bafflement (or helplessness) (den Zustand der absoluten Ratlosigkeit). Because the Archimedean point at (from) which one could be in a position (about) (in order) to reverse the trend is buried (submerged) sometime (or other) somewhere (or other) in the thicket (jungle, labyrinth) of complexity. Either, that is, highly complex society must forever secure (for itself) the material and other (further) preconditions (prerequisites) of its reproduction, or it must end in a historically unprecedented (unheard-of, unparalleled) catastrophe.

The thorny (tricky, touchy) implications of the heterogony of ends were hardly noted (noticed, registered, recorded) by the evolutionists of differentiation because their (historical-philosophical) optimism (in respect of the philosophy of history) (has) found expression in the belief in the immanent rationality of the highly differentiated social system as such (die immanente Rationalität des hochdifferenzierten Sozialsystems als solchem). This belief was indeed (in fact) articulated at its loudest by our contemporary system (systems) theoreticians, who thereby (through it, in this way) wanted to compensate for the putting (setting) aside (elimination, removal) of the normative [element] (die Beseitigung des Normativen) in [by means of] the function(ing) of the system-preserving factor (in der Funktion des systemerhaltenden Faktors), it [the said belief]
interrelates (connects) with the evolutionistic concept in the broader (wider) sense and hence (that is why) it [the belief in question] already meets us (we already come across it) in older social theoreticians, who assessed (judged, rated) the ethical-normative [element] differently. One may (is allowed to) comprehend (understand, grasp) Durkheim’s theoretical dilemma indeed as [the] results (consequences) of his attempt to connect (associate) the beneficial (agreeable) social effect of the ethical-normative [element] with an objective social rationality, which was supposed (meant) to correspond with (to) the growing differentiation of society as a result of an unstoppable (inexorable) evolution. Like (As) other evolutionists before and after him, Durkheim wishes for (desires) an agreement of his social preferences with the course of history and therefore is at pains to prove [that] a higher (greater) solidarity (eine höhere Solidarität) will go (goes) hand in hand with (is accompanied by) (the) advances (progress) in the social division of labour. Simultaneously, he rejects the utilitarian-economistic notion (idea) (die utilitaristisch-ökonomistische Vorstellung) of the attainment (achievement) of this solidarity (only) through the interweaving (intertwining, interconnection) of material interests (die Verflechtung materieller Interessen) (alone) and summons a solidarity[-based] social ethics as [a] force for (of) intergration (eine solidarische Sozialethik als Integrationskraft). Nowhere does he show, however, in detail (or in individual cases) how this level of social integration is crossed over (interwoven, connected) [is interwoven] (sich... verschränkt) with the level of the, in its own way, also integrative social division of labour (der Ebene der in ihrer Weise auch integrativen sozialen Arbeitsteilung); on the contrary, the former (first) [level (of social integration)] is brought from the outside into the ripe (i.e. fully developed) (mature) model (in das reife Modell), i.e. it is constructed in accordance with an ethnologically conceived notion (concept) of religion
(nach einem ethnologisch konzipierten Religionsbegriff), whereas the
tendencies (starting points, positionings, approaches) of the (in) [his]
early work (die Ansätze des Frühwerkes) in relation (as) to an
individualistically-personalistically oriented (aligned, adjusted) social
religion (einer individualistisch-personalistisch ausgerichteten
Sozialreligion) are tacitly (silently) given up (abandoned)98. The same
aporia (i.e. doubt, contradiction or paradox) or antinomy is (found)
(stands) at the centre (focus) of attention (core) of the theory of
communicative action, since it adopts (assumes, takes on) Durkheim’s
thought schema in both its aspects and seeks (strives, tries) to correlate in
[a] positive sense the fact of growing differentiation (rationalisation,
juridification (or legalisation) etc.) in the modern era (age, epoch) with
(the) ethically-normatively conceived possibilities of social integration.
Durkheim’s constradistinction (contrasting) of [between] [the, an]
individualistic economic basis and [the, an] integralistic(ally)-
collectivistic ideology (integralistisch-kollektivistischer Ideologie) finds
its pendant (i.e. counterpart) in the contrasting (opposition, conflict)
between system and lifeworld, in which, however, the (what is) in
principle insurmountable (impregnable, invincible) is not supposed
(meant) to (should not) be inherent (dem indes nichts prinzipiell
Unüberwindliches innewohnen soll). The contrasting (opposition,
conflict) is indeed vehemently (fiercely, violently, passionately, tensely)
lamented (bemoaned, bewailed) [by the theory of communicative action],
but how (the) reconciliation [between system and lifeworld] is to be
brought off (effected, managed) conceptually and socially remains just as
unclear as in Durkheim99.

99 See footnote 60 above.
The indirect, nonetheless drastic reverting (recourse) to (falling back on) tried and trusted (historical-philosophical) [constructs regarding the philosophy of history](,) and in fact eschatological constructs, helps here [in getting (escaping)] out of (from) difficulty. Because, (seen) logically (seen), nothing other than the end of time(s) can be meant, when – simultaneously with the announced (proclaimed), by system (systems) theoreticians and economistic theoreticians (Ökonomisten), predominance (prevailing, prevalence, imposition) of the cognitive element and a good one and a half centuries after Hegel’s death – [it is] solemnly (festively) declared [that] the present-day historical moment offers (provides, affords) a “privileged admittance (entrance, access)” to the grasping (apprehension) and (re)solving (solution) of ultimate social-theoretical questions (einen „privilegierten Zugang“ zur Erfassung und Lösung letzter sozialtheoretischer Fragen)\(^\text{100}\). This again is meant (supposed) to be the case because the course of history, in particular (especially) since the rise of the European modern era (age, epoch), releases (or sets free) [the] potential for rationality (i.e. possibilities of rationality)(,) while at the same time (in relation to which) the history of ideas (the intellect(-spirit)) (intellectual(-spiritual) history) did not proceed (happen) differently than (from) the history of the social (social history) (die Geistesgeschichte nicht anders vorging als die Sozialgeschichte): it [the history of ideas] differentiated (the, what was) previously (beforehand) undifferentiated and therefore (consequently) dissolved (broke up, disintegrated) (the) mythical thinking (thought) (Sie differenzierte zuvor Undifferenziertes und löste somit das mythische Denken auf). The rationalisation accompanying (going hand in hand with) (the) differentiation of course turned out “imbalanced

\(^{100}\) Thus, Habermas, *Theorie des komm. Handelns*, II, p. 593.
(unbalanced)” and caused (induced, gave rise to, provoked, brought about) conflicts between the cognitive (truth), practical (success), aesthetical and ethical (justice) spheres (Die mit der Differenzierung einhergehende Rationalisierung fiel freilich „ungleichgewichtig“ aus und rief Konflikte zwischen der kognitiven (Wahrheit), praktischen (Erfolg), ästhetischen und ethischen (Gerechtigkeit) Sphäre hervor)\textsuperscript{101}, nevertheless (it remained [the case] in) the diagnosis (remained) [that] under (in) modern[-era] circumstances (unter modernen Umständen) rationality was so far advanced that it itself can recognise and abolish (offset, cancel, lift) its own deficiencies and imbalances (Defizite und Ungleichgewichte); anyway, there is no other path (way) after the collapse (breakdown) of traditional metaphysics\textsuperscript{102}. This construction is obviously (evidently) far removed from a(n) extensive (broad, comprehensive) first-hand knowledge of (intellectual(-spiritual)-historical) development (in the history of ideas); it [the said construction] makes use of gross (coarse, crude) stereotypes or contrastings, and accordingly it suffers under (from) the same defect (deficiency, fault; Mangel) as the evolutionistic approach in general, i.e. under (from) the undifferentiated use (usage) of the concept of differentiation. Differentiation does not happen (go on, proceed) (recti)linearly (in a straight line) and uniformly also in the history of ideas, but it develops on each and every respective occasion otherwise (differently) according to the concrete constellation (i.e. conjuncture or correlation of forces) and the, on each and every respective occasion, underlying world-theoretical(view, graphic, representative, illustrational) paradigm (Auch in der Geistesgeschichte geht Differenzierung nicht geradlinig und gleichförmig vor sich, sondern sie entfaltet sich jeweils anders entsprechend der konkreten Konstellation

\textsuperscript{101} Loc. cit., I, p. 259.  
\textsuperscript{102} Loc. cit., II, p. 65.
underlying Weltanschauung). The contrast(ing) (opposition) between traditional or theological metaphysics
and new-times (modern(-era)) rationalism (Der Gegensatz zwischen
traditioneller bzw. theologischer Metaphysik und neuerzeitlichem
Rationalismus) raised (threw up) questions other than the dismemberment
(cutting up, breaking into pieces) of this latter [new-times rationalism]
into a number of (several) positions fighting (struggling against) one
another (contending positions) (mehrere gegeneinander kämpfende
Positionen). Mythical constructs or hypostases (mythische Konstrukte
oder Hypostasen), the most important of which were called: “Nature”,
“Man”, “History” („Natur“, „Mensch“, „Geschichte“), were opposed
(constrained, set against) (to) that metaphysics – always in the name of (a
[kind of]) “Reason” („Vernunft“), which constituted the polemically
meant and used epitome (embodiment, perfect example) of the anti-
theological stance (or positioning) (die den polemisch gemeinten und
verwendeten Inbegriff der antitheologischen Einstellung bildete). These
[mythical constructs or hypostases called “Nature”, “Man”, “History”]
were indeed [in respect] of content opposed to (set against) the
theological world theory (i.e. world view), however they [the said
mythical constructs or hypostases] structurally agreed with it [the
theological world theory (i.e. world view)] in the decisive (crucial,
deciding) respect that they likewise were based on the direct or indirect
interweaving (intertwining) of Is and Ought (direkten oder indirekten
Verflechtung von Sein und Sollen), that is, they wanted to safeguard
(protect, secure) the victory of the ethical notions (ideas) they had in
mind through (by means of) (the) reference to the constitution
(composition or texture) of an ontological or anthropological original
foundation (or first cause) (die Beschaffenheit eines ontologischen oder
anthropologischen Urgrundes). In the womb (bosom) ((From) Within)
(Im Schoße) of new-times (modern(-era)) rationalism, the process of
differentiation took a different course (proceeded differently). The
polemical necessity [of (for) new-times rationalists] of comprehending
(grasping, understanding, interpreting) man as [a] part of law-bound
(deterministic, law(rule)-based) Nature and at the same time as lord (i.e.
ruler or master) over this same Nature (den Menschen als Teil der
gesetzmäßigen Natur und zugleich als Herren über diese selbe Natur
aufzufassen), led to a logically irreconcilable (unforgiving) conflict
between the causal [element] and the normative [element] or between Is
and Ought (einem logisch unversöhnlichen Konflikt zwischen Kausalem
und Normativem oder zwischen Sein und Sollen), which, consistently
thought through, had to flow into (lead (in)to) an ethical nihilism – this
product of the modern era (age, epoch) par excellence¹⁰³. The mythical
constructs of new-times (modern(-era)) rationalism mentioned above
turned henceforth not only against theological metaphysics, but also
against every radical eradication (weeding out, elimination, obliteration,
culling) of (the) Ought from (the) Is (radikale Ausmerzung des Sollens
aus dem Sein), which ended in the complete (outright, full) dissolution
(disintegration) of (the) Ought and, in parallel with that, in the abrupt
(sharp) separation of instrumental and ethical rationality from one another
(bei der schroffen Trennung von instrumenteller und ethischer
Rationalität voneinander). If one keeps in mind this development, then
(so, thus) one may not define modern rationality as the possibility of the
separation of validity claims (claims to validity; Geltungsansprüchen) and
references to the world (world interrelations) (Weltbezügen) (in contrast

¹⁰³ This most highly (extremely) contradictory development is described (portrayed) in Kondylis, Aufklärung, Habermas (loc. cit., II, p. 486) though cites the book as a further confirmation of the topos of the “utopia of Reason of (in) the a(A)ge of (the) Enlightenment” („Vernunftutopie des Aufklärungszeitalters”), i.e. without having perceived (discerned) (about) what in it [Kondylis’s book] is after all (generally) talked about.
to the interweaving (intertwining) of Is and Ought in primitive thinking (thought))\(^{104} \),) and at the same moment exactly by invoking (with reference to) this rationality, demand (call for) the harmonisation of instrumental and ethical rationality or [the harmonisation] of the technical and cultural aspect of the modern era (age, epoch) (die Harmonisierung von instrumenteller und ethischer Rationlität bzw. von technischem und kulturellem Aspekt der Moderne)\(^{105} \). The decisive (deciding, crucial) differentiation between Is and Ought logically means (signifies) the definitive (conclusive, final) renunciation (relinquishment, abandonment) of the unification (or standardisation) of rationality (die Vereinheitlichung der Rationalität) – and the other way around (conversely, vice versa): the attempts at unification (or standardisation) must revoke (take back, retract) precisely this differentiation and return (go back, revert) to the mythical fusion (mythischen Verschmelzung) (blending, merging) of validity claims (claims to validity) and references to the world (world interrelations), no matter with which sign (i.e. symbolism). In fact the theory of communicative action, in its concept (notion) of communication, does exactly this while it connects (in (by) connecting) a social-ontological magnitude (eine sozialontologische Größe) and a normative claim with each other, and furthermore (besides) lets (allows) in the content of communication, normative correctness (rightness) and truth to flow into one [another].

It [The theory of communicative action] does of course the same too when it looks (searches) for (seeks) (the) indications (signs) of (evidence (clues) for) the possibility of the realisation of ethical-normative hopes in the development of history itself, and consequently (therefore) pursues

\(^{104}\) Habermas, loc. cit., I, p. 80.
\(^{105}\) Loc. cit., I, p. 485; cf. Phil. Diskurs, p. 11ff..
anew the very often and always in vain (vainly) trodden (walked on) paths of the philosophy of history. The Zeitgeist (i.e. spirit or general outlook of the time), which is characterised by ((stands) under the influence (sign) of) the mass-democratic-functionalistic dissolution (disintegration) of the bourgeois substances of “Man” and “History” (der im Zeichen der massendemokratisch-funktionalistischen Auflösung der bürgerlichen Substanzen „Mensch“ und „Geschichte“ steht), forbids (prohibits), in the process (course of this) (into the bargain), (the) open and programmatic recourse (reverting) to (historical-philosophical) eschatology (in respect of the philosophy of history) (die geschichtsphilosophische Eschatologie), as it demands (calls for), by the way, the distancing of “every metaphysics”. Thus (So), it is actually (indeed, in fact) affirmed (declared, asserted, protested) [that] in history there is no teleology, but only “unfinished (unconcluded), broken (off) (uncompleted, aborted), misguided (misdirected) (educational) processes (of education)” („unabgeschlossene, abgebrochene, fehlgeleitete Bildungsprozesse“)¹⁰⁶, but [it is] not explained in more (greater) detail from where the benchmarks (yardsticks, criteria) come on the basis of which [such educational] processes are allowed to (may) be described (referred to) as broken and misguided. Only he who has a clear representation (view, notion, perception) (eine klare Vorstellung) of (in regard to, about) the successful conclusion (completion, end(ing), culmination) of historical processes (processes of history; Geschichtsprozessen) may (can) a contrario dare (venture, risk) [to make] such descriptions (expressions), but this representation (view, notion, perception) must ultimately (in the end (final analysis)) be founded (based) on (historical-philosophical) premises (regarding the philosophy

¹⁰⁶ See e.g. Phil. Diskurs, p. 69, footnote 4.
of history). The in principle (fundamental) ambivalence is here unavoidable (inevitable, imperative), and it manifests (shows, expresses) itself not least of all in an equivocal (ambiguous) evaluation (assessment) of the modern era (age, epoch) (in einer zweideutigen Bewertung der Moderne). Where the eschatological(-historical-philosophical) impulse (impetus) (pertaining to the philosophy of history) (der eschatologisch-geschichtsphilosophische Impuls) predominates (is predominant, prevails), there the new-times (modern(-era)) course of History is reconstructed with really (absolutely, virtually) Hegelian confidence (or optimism) (mit geradezu Hegelscher Zuversicht), the (cultural-critical) reminiscences or backgrounds (backdrops), as regards cultural critique (criticism), of the theory of communicative action find expression (is reflected), on the contrary, in reserved (cautious, guarded) statements (opinions) (in zurückhaltenden Aussagen); correspondingly (commensurately, accordingly), the interpretation of Weber (Weber-interpretation) vacillates (wavers, fluctuates) between an instrumentalistic and an ethically-culturally loaded (or charged) version of the concept (notion) of rationalisation (zwischen einer instrumentalistischen und einer ethisch-kulturell aufgeladenen Version des Rationalisierungs begriffs)\textsuperscript{107}. These approaches exist of course side by side (next to each other, concurrently) without mediation (suddenly, abruptly, immediately) and diffusely; neither is [it] explained (elucidated, explicated) in which sense and [to what] extent (degree) the modern era’s good side or (the) progressive (or advancing) (progressing) differentiation (die fortschreitende Differenzierung) was of benefit to (for) normatively understood (comprehended) communication, nor is the question dealt with (gone into) [as] to what extent (how much) (in what way (respect))

the hitherto “misguided (misdirected)” developments could endanger (jeopardise) (put) the overall (total) course (or order of events) (Gesamtablauf) (at risk) and then what would be expected. For a consistent renunciation (relinquishment, forgoing, abandonment) of the philosophy of history the will is lacking, for an open acknowledgement of (or commitment to) it [the philosophy of history], (the) strength is lacking. But (the) good intentions are apparently a consolation for [a] lack of (lacking) will and [a] lack of (lacking) strength.

4. Community and society: a legend rich in consequences (a consequential legend) (Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft: eine folgenreiche Legende)

The evolutionism of differentiation cannot only be inspired by the philosophy of history of the 18th and the 19th century. While it [the evolutionism of differentiation] accepts (assumes) (In (By) adopting) a qualitative turn within (inside of) the historical process of differentiation and [while it] connects (in (by) connecting) the hastening (speeding up) or widening (extension, broadening, expansion) of the same [historical process of differentiation] with the transition from the agrarian “pre-modern age” to the industrial “modern era”, it (the evolutionism of differentiation) draws (derives) from a construction or fiction which has influenced (affected) (the) sociological thinking (thought) of the last hundred years in very different respects and forms (Indem er eine qualitative Wende innerhalb des geschichtlichen Differenzierungsvorgangs annimmt und die Beschleunigung oder Erweiterung desselben mit dem Übergang von der agrarischen „Vormoderne“ zur industriellen „Moderne“ verbindet, schöpft er aus
einer Konstruktion oder Fiktion, die das soziologische Denken der letzten hundert Jahre in sehr unterschiedlichen Hinsichten und Formen beeinflußt hat). (We mean) The, as it were, legendary antithetical pair of concepts (conceptual pair) of community and society (is meant) (Gemeint ist das gleichsam legendäre antithetische Begriffspaar von Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft). Its suggestive force (power, strength) arises (springs) not least of all from the possibility of transferring a plastic (malleable) and easy-to-remember (catchy, easily remembered, memorable) basic (fundamental) dichotomy (eine plastische und einprägsame Grunddichotomie) to several fields (areas, sectors), while at the same time (in relation to which) the disarming vividness (or clarity) (die entwaffnende Anschaulichkeit) seems like a(n) captivating (tempting, irresistible) interpretation. Thus, (So) the contrast(ing) (opposition) between community and society can be grasped (apprehended, understood) in various (different) categories: in economic (agriculture vs. industry), political (domination (dominance, ruling [over others]) vs. contract or consensus), sociostructural ((the) [what is] simple vs. (the) [what is] complex or differentiated), historical-theoretical (i.e. as regards the theory of history) ((the) [what is] stationary vs. (the) [what is] dynamic), psychical-mental ((the) [what is] affectual (affective, emotional) vs. (the) [what is] rational) and even ethical (self-realisation vs. self-alienation) (in wirtschaftlichen (Agrikultur vs. Industrie), politischen (Herrschaft vs. Vertrag oder Konsens), soziostrukturellen (Einfaches vs. Komplexes oder Differenziertes), geschichtstheoretischen (Stationäres vs. Dynamisches), psychisch-mentalen (Affektuelles vs. Rationales) und sogar ethischen (Selbstverwirklichung vs. Selbstentfremdung)\textsuperscript{108}. These ample (plentiful, numerous) existing

\textsuperscript{108}Cf. the detailed (comprehensive) table in Berreman, “Scale”, pp. 46-48; here though (there is talk of) the contrast(ing) (opposition) of “small scale” and “large scale societies” (is spoken of (about)).
possibilities of transfer(ence) and of polarisation (polarising) permit (allow) again the establishment of a connection between this or that version of the pair of concepts with the most different (miscellaneous, various, dissimilar) (cultural-Philosophical and) social-political preferences (pertaining to the philosophy of culture) (Kulturphilosophisch und Sozialpolitischen Präferenzen). The “community” as source of inspiration for utopian blueprints (or drafts) of social solidarity lives on (survives, endures) in (during) our time (days) (nowadays)¹⁰⁹, and it feeds both the “left” as well as “right” critique of culture (cultural critique), which turns against modern society’s confusing (unclear), human initiatives of paralysing (crippling) complexity (die unübersichtliche, menschliche Initiativen lähmende Komplexität der modernen Gesellschaft). In the process (course of this) (. . .) [it] is wrongly (erroneously, falsely) assumed [that] greater comprehensibility (or manageability) (Überschaubarkeit) and [a] smaller scale (extent, magnitude, size; Ausmaß) would mean (signify) in themselves greater possibilities of shaping (forming, formation, moulding) (Gestaltungsmöglichkeiten) for the individual or the group – as if the “primitive [person]” or the Greek could, as they liked, shape (form, mould) and reshape (remould) his own society or even (also) only the course of his own life [more (so)] than the [a] member of today’s mass democracy is capable (in a position) of [doing (so)] (able to [do]) [it]; if (when) a particular and particularly strongly felt (experienced) need in accordance with such possibilities of shaping (forming, formation, moulding) comes into being at all, (then, so, thus) the reason for that does not lie in a longing (yearning) for formerly (previously) existing and in the meantime (now) lost free space(s) [for individual action] (so liegt der

Grund dafür nicht an einer Sehnsucht nach ehemals vorhandenen und inzwischen verlorenen Freiräumen), but in the fact that modern belief (faith) in progress and modern individualism suggest the idea (notion, thought; Gedanken) [that] something must constantly (continually) change and (the) change is ultimately (in the end) reduced (traced back, due) to individual initiative. The evolutionists of differentiation take, on the contrary, “society’s” side, while they hold (consider, regard, take) the “community” to be (as, for) a(n) essentially (basically) historical, that is, “pre-modern” and hence conclusively (definitively) overcome (outgrown) stage (level, phase, grade) of development; the admission (confession, acknowledgement) [that (the)] “community” could embody constitutive and permanent components of every social life would obviously (evidently) shake (rock) central assumptions (suppositions) of evolutionism, (thus, so) e.g. the interrelation (connection, correlation) between advances (progress) in differentiation (Differenzierungsfortschritten) and [the] predominance (prevalence, imposition) of the “cognitive” element. Finally, there are attempts at keeping the best of both [“community” and “society”], e.g. a “lifeworld” conceived in accordance with community-related notions (ideas, perceptions) (eine nach gemeinschaftlichen Vorstellungen konzipierte „Lebenswelt“) left (allowed) to exist next to the system of a highly differentiated “society”. Behind such precarious (awkward) combinations, however, the pure types in their opposition (contrast(ing) [with each other]) always emerge (loom).

In fact (Actually), the contradistinction (contrasting) of [between] community and society had (has, was) – under whatever name – (been) connected from the beginning (outset) both with sceptical as well as with optimistic assessments of the new industrially-differentiated (industriell-
differenzierten) society. Tönnies could be (was) admittedly influenced by Maine’s fundamental distinction (differentiation) between status and contract, but amongst his sources one must without fail (necessarily) also mention an evolutionist like Spencer, who saw in the replacement of (the) “military” („militärischen“) (homogenous) with (the) “industrial” (differentiated) societies a pleasant (welcome) turn in (of) world history (the history of the world)\textsuperscript{110}. Such confidence (or optimism) remains, as is (well) known, foreign (alien) to the critic of capitalism Tönnies, who first of all turned his attention to the epochal event of the rupture in (breaking of) culture (cultural rupture) taking place (happening, occurring) (das epochale Ereignis des vor sich gehenden Kulturbruchs), that is, he comprehended (understood) the contrast(ing) (opposition) between community and society as a “theorem of the philosophy of culture” and only later did he want to convert (transform, change) it [the said contrasting] into the conceptual or ideal-typical basis (foundation) of pure (formal) sociology (in die begriffliche bzw. idealtypische Grundlage der reinen (formalen) Soziologie)\textsuperscript{111}. The tensions (stresses, strains) between both (the two) stances (positionings, attitudes, views) and the ambiguities could not nevertheless be remedied (rectified, removed, redressed) any longer: sometimes the concept (notion) of (the) community was placed (put) not only in terms of history [historical sequence] (historically) before [the concept of] (the) society, but [it] was also superordinated (set above [it (the concept of society)]) systematically and socially-ethically, i.e. with [an] anti-capitalistic intent(ion); at times, it was here a matter of [the] successive (consecutive) historical concepts of structure (structural concepts), at other times, of two possibilities of human living together (i.e. co-existence) which prehistorically can (are able to, could) occur

\textsuperscript{110} König, „Begriffe“, pp. 381, 385ff..
\textsuperscript{111} Loc. cit., pp. 351-353.
appear, crop up) in [a] mixed form; occasionally the definitive (conclusive, final) fall (or decline) (decay, ruin) of (the) community was diagnosed and then again its [(the) community’s] preservation was asserted, and indeed from two completely (entirely) different points of view: as historical remnant (leftover) or else as indispensable component of the social in general (als geschichtliches Überbleibsel oder aber als unentbehrliche Komponente des Sozialen überhaupt); and finally (in the end) the concept (notion) of community functioned (served) now and then (from time to time) as [a, the] model for the construction (building) of a new, solidarity[-based]-anti-capitalistic future112.

Tönnies’s ambivalences (equivocations) are of lasting (permanent, enduring) systematic interest. They [The said ambivalences] came (emanated, stemmed) from the fact that the formal-sociological approach was connected a limine with a pair of concepts (conceptual pair) whose (historical-philosophical and cultural-philosophical) perception (view) (as regards the philosophy of history and of culture) (dessen geschichts- und kulturphilosophischen Auffassung) had to interfere with (impede) the actual (real) matter of concern (or purpose) (intention, aim, objective) of a formal sociology (einer formalen Soziologie). If this matter of concern (or purpose) consisted of the object (or matter) (thing) in it (by its very nature [had]) [did what it was supposed to do], to establish (set up, propose, put forward) a conceptuality, which would encompass (embrace, include) at one blow (stroke) (all at once) the distinctions (differentiations, differences) or classifications of the philosophy of history of the 18th and 19th century and consequently would sociologically neutralise [them] or even put [them] aside (eliminate (do away with, get rid of) [them]), then (so, thus) Tönnies, conversely, (has) connected

(joined) the formal-sociological (das Formalsoziologische) exactly to (with) the [a] (historical-philosophical) handing down (i.e. tradition) (pertaining to the philosophy of history) (die geschichtsphilosophische Überlieferung); concepts of structure (structural concepts) were formalised (i.e. rendered into forms), which within (inside of) the earlier philosophy of history held (occupied) the position (status) of the stages (levels, phases, grades) of development, and could furthermore be taken as (constitute) the basis of a periodisation of history. But the great common denominator was still missing (lacking), that is, a uniform (standardised, unified) conceptuality bearing “community” and “society” simultaneously and equally (in the same way) was missing (lacking).

Since the contrast(ing) (opposition) of both ideal types dominated (the) question formulation (putting (formulation) of the [a] question, problem examination, examination of the [a] problem, central theme), (then, so, thus) analogous (corresponding) types of the social relation and of (the) social action were carved (brought) out (formed, shaped, moulded) or simply suggested, but the social relation and (the) social action (social action) as such were not thematised (i.e. made a subject of discussion), to say nothing of anthropological questions (because these too were only touched upon from the point of view of the aforementioned (stated) contrast(ing) (opposition), for instance in [the] form of the contradistinction (contrasting) of [between] [the] will [in respect] of essence (substance) (or essential will (volition)) and will (volition) as regards [free] choice (or selective will (volition)) (Da der Gegenstaz der beiden Idealtypen die Fragestellung beherrschte, so wurden entsprechende Typen der sozialen Beziehung und des sozialen Handelns herausgearbeitet oder einfach suggeriert, es wurden aber nicht die soziale Beziehung und das soziale Handeln als solche thematisiert, von anthropologischen Fragen ganz zu schweigen (denn auch diese wurden
nur aus der Sicht des genannten Gegensatzes gestreift, etwa in Form der Gegenüberstellung von Wesens- und Kürwillen)). And even when soon (there)after, [it] was recognised (realised, seen) that the thorough (exhaustive, complete) overcoming of the philosophy of history or of eschatology (die gründliche Überwindung der Geschichtsphilosophie oder -eschatologie) took a necessary [had to necessarily take a] step beyond Tönnies’s typologies and categories, the conceptual means of this overcoming remained more or less captive of (rooted in) the Tönniesian thoughts world (or ideological universe). This can be seen (recognised) in Weber’s classification of the types of acting (i.e. action) in connection with (the examination of) the problem of rationality (an Webers Klassifizierung der Handlungstypen in Verbindung mit der Rationalitätsproblematik)\textsuperscript{113} as well as in the manner (way) in which Simmel thinks of “society” and “money” or “function” jointly (together) – however he [Simmel] also (functionally) presents (imagines, envisages, puts forward) (in terms of function) the formal-sociological approach in general. The reduction of Tönnies’s social theory to the contrasting (opposition) of “community vs. society” favoured, at any rate, its being absorbed (absorption) into (coming undone by) an evolutionistic perspective, which for its part principally (first and foremost) saw (paid attention) to (cared about) the proof (proving) of the increasing differentiation in history, that is, to (about) the contrast [of, in] “pre-modern age-modern era”. This evolutionism of differentiation was integrated into social theories of varied (varying, variable, different) (cybernetic, economistic, ethical) inspiration, that is why its theorems were made out to be (the) confirmation or (the) result of more general premises. Nonetheless, (Yet) things (the situation) were (was) in reality

\textsuperscript{113} See Chap. IV, Sec. 2A; Chap. V, Sec. 1C.
the other way around: (the) theoretical premises were conceived and formulated on the whole from the standpoint of differentiation and of “society”, while at the same time (in relation to which), as already remarked (noted, noticed), anthropological constants were attributed (ascribed) to the processes of differentiation in the modern era (age, epoch) or modern specific features (characteristics) (differentiae specificae) (moderne Spezifika) were elevated (raised, lifted, proclaimed, exalted) (to, as) social-ontological constants (sozialontologischen Konstanten). Because of that, the contrast(ing) (opposition) [of] “community vs. society” was adopted (taken on, accepted) despite all dutiful rhetorical repudiations (refusals or renunciations) of the philosophy of history, and the normative force (strength, power) of the actual (or factual element) (und die normative Kraft des Faktischen) became apparent (noticeable, evident, clear) (made itself felt) in the happy (joyful, glad) or grudging (half-hearted, reluctant) partisanship (taking sides) in favour of (for) “society”.

The critique of the historically hypostatised contrast(ing) (opposition) of (between) “community” and “society” or “(the) pre-modern age” and “(the) modern era” touches therefore upon fundamental social-theoretical questions (Die Kritik am historisch hypostasierten Gegensatz von „Gemeinschaft“ und „Gesellschaft“ bzw. „Vormoderne“ und „Moderne“ rührt also an fundamentale sozialtheoretische Fragen). It [The said critique] can appear then (only) as obsolete pedantry (only) if one unreflectedly passes by (overlooks) the disguises and the aftereffects (consequences) of this thought schema without suspecting (foreseeing, knowing) the reasons why the (dissenting) voices (objections) [which were] raised (against [it, the said thought schema]) could not reverse the trend [of this thought schema (in respect of the hypostatised contrasting
of “community” and “society” or “pre-modern age” and “modern era”]. Geiger had in fact already described in an early (written) work (writing, treatise, publication) Tönnies’s essential mistake as follows: he [Tönnies] considered (looked at, regarded, viewed) community and society as the designations (appellations, names, descriptions, expressions) of [a, the] genus of real construct(ion)s (creations, shapes, formations) [constructs] with (cultural-philosophical and developmental-historical) connotations (pertaining to the philosophy of culture and the history of development) instead of [considering, looking at] them [to be, as] principles of shaping (forming, moulding) of the only genus of social shapings (mouldings, formations, arrangements), i.e. [in (respect of)] constituting (making up) the [a] group (als Gattungsbezeichnungen von realen Gebilden mit kulturphilosophischen und entwicklungsgeschichtlichen Konnotationen anstatt in ihnen Gestaltungsprinzipien der einzigen Gattung sozialer Gestalten, d. h. der Gruppe auszumachen)\textsuperscript{114}. Gurvitch rejected both the separation (isolation; Absonderung) of the various forms of sociability (Soziabilitätsformen) from one another as well as their hierarchisation either in accordance with (developmental-historical (Tönnies, Durkheim), or in accordance with ultimately ethical) criteria (pertaining to the history of development (Tönnies, Durkheim) or in accordance with ultimately ethical criteria) (Sorokin’s preference for the solidarity[-based] over the antagonistic forms of sociability). He [Gurvitch] stressed (emphasised) [that] these [various forms of sociability] co-exist(ed) and were (are) interwoven (entangled, crossed over) with one another, they would by no means develop (unfold) (recti)linearly (in a straight line) or unilaterally (one-sidedly) in history\textsuperscript{115}. Obviously (Evidently), these theses, thought through to their ultimate logical conclusion ((the) end (finish)), ruin

\textsuperscript{114} \textit{Gestalten}, esp. p. 22ff..
\textsuperscript{115} \textit{Vocation}, I, p.116ff.
(destroy) the concept of the evolutionism of differentiation. Because they exclude (preclude) that total predominance (imposition, pushing (carrying) through, prevailing) of unadulterated (pure, unmixed, unwatered-down) “society”, with which this concept [of the evolutionism of differentiation] lets (allows) history (to) end. As [the] recurrence (return) and (the) dissemination (spread(ing)) of the idea (notion, thought) of (the) contract (des Vertragsgedankens) in contemporary social theory indicates, the (afore)mentioned predominance (imposition, pushing (carrying) through, prevailing) of “society” should (is supposed (meant) to) be total because its principles determine, apart from (except for) the ongoing (continuous, routine) way (manner, moder) of functioning, also the way (manner, mode) of (the) constitution (i.e. composition or make-up), of the collective [entity, group] (der laufenden Funktions- auch die Konstitutionsweise des Kollektivs). A collective [entity, group], which functions as [a] “society” is therefore constituted as [a] “society”. Here a mistake (error) was made ((in respect) of) which Tönnies and Durkheim were already rightly (justifiably) accused (reproached): the kind (way or nature) of coming into being of the group is confused with its social character, that is, the possibility of the emerging of [a] “community” from original (initial) coerced (forced) or contractual relations (relations of coercion (compulsion) and of contract) (aus ursprünglichen Zwangs- bzw. Vertragsbeziehungen) as well as [the possibility of the emerging] of [a] “society” from [an] originally (initially) normative motivation (but also out of coercion (compulsion, necessity)) is overlooked; [just] as (like) every kind (sort) of social relation can be formed (developed) differently, so too can the same origin (beginnings, provenance, derivation) lead to different kinds (sorts) of relations (wie sich jede Art
von sozialer Beziehung unterschiedlich herausbilden kann, so kann auch derselbe Ursprung zu unterschiedlichen Beziehungsarten führen)\textsuperscript{116}.

Regarding (Concerning, As (With regard) to) the genetic question, it is of course one thing whether individuals found (set up, establish) the collective [entity, group] through (by means of) [a] contract or consensus, inside of which they intend (propose) to live (think of living), and one entirely (completely) different [thing], whether the collective, inside of which they must live anyway is organised “socially”, that is, the relations between its members principally (first and foremost, mainly) or for the most part (mostly, largely) are able (allowed) to (can) be regulated through contracts or consensus (Hinsichtlich der genetischen Frage ist es freilich eine Sache, ob Individuen durch Vertrag oder Konsens das Kollektiv gründen, innerhalb dessen sie zu leben gedenken, und eine ganz andere, ob das Kollektiv, innerhalb dessen sie ohnehin leben müssen, „gesellschaftlich“ organisiert ist, also die Beziehungen zwischen seinen Mitgliedern vornehmlich oder großenteils durch Verträge oder Konsens regeln läßt); the fundamental difference becomes noticeable in the (theoretical) possibility that the pactus societatis could provide for (intend, have in mind, plan) a “community-based(related)” organisation of the collective [entity, group] (eine „gemeinschaftliche“ Organisation des Kollektivs). But the question according to the kind (or way) and intensity of (the) interweaving (intertwining, interconnection) of the “social [element]” and the “community-related(based) [element]” (Verflechtungsart und -intensität von „Gesellschaftlichem“ und „Gemeinschaftlichem“) is not posed merely at the genetic level. In addition, it [the question] is posed, first (of all), with regard to the cohesion of the collective [entity, group] (den Zusammenhalt des

\textsuperscript{116} Sorokin, \textit{Society}, p. 114ff.
Kollektivs), and not least (of all) [with regard] to the ideologies contributing to it [that cohesion], irrespective of (no matter) whether these [ideologies] are understood in the narrower (strict) sense of norms and values or in the broader (wider) world-theoretical (view, graphic, representative, illustrational) sense; it is [should be] (incidentally) noted (remarked, noticed) (in passing) that (the) belief [that] contracts constitute(d) (the) society and vouch(ed) for (guarantee(d)) its cohesion can be exactly one such ideology. It [The question] is posed, secondly, at the level of social organisations, and indeed in a different respect on each and every respective occasion: in an army or in a school, which is organised “socially”, i.e. according to [an] impersonal bureaucratic pattern (or model) (unpersönlichem bürokratischem Muster) and exists before (pre-exist) the (unwanted (or unintented) (unintentional)) entry of individuals into it (und vor dem (ungewolten) Beitritt von Individuen zu ihnen bestehen), at the same time however, they [the said social organisations] absolutely need “community-related(based)” elements for the fulfilment of their ends (goals, purposes) (Zwecks), [the] “social” [element] and [the] “community-related(based)” [element] are mixed differently with each other than for instance in a [political] party, which is founded (established) by the free deed (i.e. act or action) of individuals, in whose motivation already [the] calculus (i.e. calculation) of interests and [a] sense (feeling) of togetherness (feeling of solidarity, team spirit) directed against third parties interlace (entwine, go into one another, merge), and for its development uses (employs) both rational-organisational as well as charismatic and emotional means (in deren Motivation bereits Interessenkalkül und gegen Dritte gerichtetes Zusammengehörigkeitsgefühl ineinandergehen, und für ihre Entfaltung sowohl rational-organisatorische als auch charismatische und emotionale Mittel einsetzt). And thirdly, the aforementioned question is posed in the
field (area, sector) of the non-institutionalised interaction or the concrete exercising (execution) of social influence (auf dem Gebiet der nicht institutionalisierten Interaktion bzw. der konkreten Ausübung sozialen Einflusses). As [an] example, the formation of narrower milieus (environments, surroundings, settings) (die Herausbildung von engeren Milieus) may be mentioned here, which in the womb (bosom) ((from) within) of societies enable (make) a continuation of the “community-based(related)” modes of behaviour, e.g. [modes of behaviour] stemming (coming, originating, emanating, being derived) from village life (, possible)\textsuperscript{117}; incidentally, the magnitude of the collective [entity, group] or the transition from [a] small to [a] large collective [entity, group] does not in the least interfere with (impede, diminish) the possibilities of having an effect (efficacy) of (by) (relatively) closed social circles, which attain (achieve) their aims (goals) principally (first and foremost, mainly) through (the) personal (exertion of) influence (die Wirkungsmöglichkeiten von (relativ) geschlossenen sozialen Kreisen, die ihre Ziele vornehmlich durch persönliche Einflußnahme erreichen)\textsuperscript{118}.

The existence of “community-related” elements inside of “society” does not necessarily constitute and not always [does it constitute] a remnant (leftover, relic) of past (, only psychologically still living on (i.e. surviving) (enduring)) social structures (still living on (i.e. surviving) (enduring) only psychologically) (vergangener, nur noch psychologisch weiterlebender Sozialstrukturen). Such elements are constantly (continually, continuously) generated (produced, engendered) on [a] new interactional and symbolic basis (auf neuer interaktioneller und symbolischer Basis) inside of (within) society itself (we remind ourselves

\textsuperscript{117} In relation to that: Schwartz, “Size”, p. 245.
(recollect, recall) e.g. (of) the different logics (Logiken) of mass production and of mass consumption and can cause (induce, bring about, give rise to) tensions (stresses, strains) in its [society’s] structure (make-up) (Spannungen in ihrem Gefüge). But also the other way around (conversely), “social” elements inside of [the, a] “community” do not constitute (a) merely [a] heterogeneous and propulsive (or aggravating) (forward-driving) element (or factor) (heterogenes und vorwärtstreibendes Moment), which work towards the forcing (breaking) open (putting (setting) aside) of the boundaries of (the) “community”, but rather [constitute] original and functionally indispensible constituent (integral) elements (parts) (components) of the same [community].

This ascertainment refutes (disproves) first of all the theses or rather the hypotheses of the evolutionism of differentiation regarding (on) the lack (absence) of a reflected individuality (einer reflektierten Individualität) in the “pre-modern age (era, epoch)” in general and in (the) “primitive” or “archaic” societies in particular. Geiger had already seen (appreciated, recognised) this [the] interrelation (connection, correlation) between [the] sociological and anthropological question formulation (putting (formulation) of the [a] question, problem examination, examination of the [a] problem, central theme) and in his aforementioned critique of Tönnies stressed (emphasised) that no “community” abolishes (does away with, cancels, annuls, revokes) (the) individuality, that the way (manner) of participation (involvement) in the collective [entity, group] varies from individual to individual and that the objective sociological meaning (significance) of the group does not have to coincide with the subjective meaning (significance), which it [the (said) group] has for every one of its members (member of it) (und daß die objektive soziologische Bedeutung

der Gruppe nicht mit der subjektiven Bedeutung zusammenfallen muß, die sie für jedes ihrer Mitglieder hat)\textsuperscript{120}. Newer studies (or investigations) (examinations, inquiries, research), which can look back at the, in the meanwhile (meantime), available (at hand, published) results (findings) of ethnological research, clearly confirm the finding that personality comes into existence neither suddenly on the basis of the specialisation of status inside of (within) complex societies, nor does the increase in (multiplication (proliferation, augmentation) of) existing individuals amount to a widening (broadening, expansion, extension) of the spectrum of the personality types (types of personality) (daß Persönlichkeit weder plötzlich auf der Basis der Statusspezialisierung innerhalb komplexer Gesellschaften ins Dasein trete, noch die Vermehrung der vorhandenen Individuen einer Erweiterung des Spektrums der Persönlichkeitstypen gleichkomme); the differentiated I (Ego) does not so much as (even) disintegrate (break up, dissolve) inside of the seemingly absolute group solidarity of the religious cult (collective or group) (Gruppensolidarität des religiösen Kults), which, on the contrary, offers [the, an] opportunity for the development of individual styles (Stile)\textsuperscript{121}. Individual rational calculus (i.e. calculation) as well as “free-rider” strategies develop (unfold) inside of (within) traditionalistic (traditionalistischer) “communities” no(t) less and not otherwise (differently) than anywhere else; the same applies to (is valid for) the formal-sociological and psychological aspects of power relations and power games (desselbe gilt für die formalsoziologischen und psychologischen Aspekte der Machtverhältnisse und -spiele), whose since long ago (always, age-old) attested refinement (finesse, ingenuity, cunning, craftiness) and intensity can hardly be reconciled with idyllic representations (notions) of the

\textsuperscript{120} Gestalten, p. 24ff..
\textsuperscript{121} Schwartz, “Size”, pp. 251, 250.
allegedly (supposedly, ostensibly) unanimous-peaceable “community” (deren von alters her bezeugte Raffinesse und Intensität sich mit idyllischen Vorstellungen von der angeblich einmütig-einträchtigen „Gemeinschaft“ kaum vereinbaren lassen)\(^{122}\). The, in this way (through (because of) that, thereby), determined (caused, conditioned) internal (inner) variety of form (multiformity) of (the) “community” makes its boundaries or differences in respect of (vis-à-vis, in relation to) [compared to] “society” (just as) fluid as it (likewise) creates boundaries and differences between (the) individual (separate) “communities”, so that a historically and sociologically meaningful use (usage) of the term appears [to be] impossible. It [The said term (“community”)] spans (stretches across (over)) all “pre-modern” or pre-industrial (vorindustriellen) collectives [collective entities (groups)], so it is called on to (must) conceptually and structurally be of use (cover, serve) for social formations which differ fundamentally from one another – from (the) primitive tribes and (the) ancient slave societies to West European feudalism and “oriental despotism” (von den primitiven Stämmen und der antiken Sklavengesellschaft bis zum westeuropäischen Feudalismus und der „orientalischen Despotie“)\(^{123}\). Amongst all these formations on the one hand, and “industrial society” on the other hand, a dividing line (line of separation) can be drawn, but this can only happen (occur, take place, be done) on the basis of a single criterion, which by no means concerns (affects, has to do with) the core of the social or the social in itself and in general (welches keineswegs den Kern des Sozialen oder das Soziale an sich und überhaupt betrifft), as the evolutionists of differentiation directly or indirectly believe (want to make [us believe]). Accordingly (Therefore, Thus), “community” and “society” are equally incapable of (unable to)

constituting (providing) an objective model for the social-theoretical structuring of human relations or a steady (stable, solid, firm, fixed) yardstick (benchmark, measure, criterion) of (for the) periodisation [in respect] of (for) history (ein objektives Modell für die sozialtheoretische Strukturierung der menschlichen Beziehungen oder einen festen Periodisierungsmaßstab der Geschichte).

In view of (Given) the renewed impact (influence, effect) of Durkheimian thought(s) (notions, ideas) on contemporary social theory, the [a(n)] pointing out (indication, reference, remark, allusion, reminder) does not appear [to be] superfluous that the Frenchman’s basic sociological concept is [found] (stands) through and through under the influence (sign) of Tönnies’s dualism, despite the attempt at neutralising the (ultimately economically-(based on the (in terms of the)) division of labour(-related) determined (conditioned)) (ultimately economically determined) tensions (stresses, strains) (pertaining to the division of labour) (die letztlich ökonomisch-arbeitsteilig bedingten Spannungen) inside of (within) “society” through (the) imposing of a “community-related(based)” ethical-religious element. It remained [the case] nevertheless, in the course of this, that Durkheim essentially (basically) assessed “society” optimistically and propped (shored) up (supported) this assessment with (on) a contradistinction (contrasting) of the same [society] with a perfectly (completely) unhistorical image (picture) of (the) “community”. As is (well) known, the contrast(ing) (opposition, antithesis; Gegensatz) of “community-society” appeared to him as [the] contrast (Kontrast) of [between] “mechanical” and “organic solidarity” („mechanischer“ und „organischer Solidarität“) (as between each other), in relation to which (the) [an] undifferentiality (i.e. an undifferentiated property (quality or nature)) (“similarity”) or differentiality (i.e. a differentiated property
(quality or nature)) (“dissimilarity”) (die Undifferenziertheit („Ähnlichkeit“) bzw. Differenziertheit („Unähnlichkeit“)) serves (is of use) as [a] central distinctive (i.e. distinguishing) feature (or characteristic) (Unterscheidungsmerkmal). The concept (notion) of differentiation is however also used here undifferentiatedly and polysemy (i.e. ambiguously). Because it is not explained whether “similarity” inside of (within) mechanical solidarity means (signifies) regular (proper or real) identity (regelrechte Identität), whether it [the said “similarity” within mechanical solidarity] refers to man as [a] whole or merely to certain (particular) values and acts (action), whether it comes about (materialises, is achieved) through (by means of) external (outer) coercion (compulsion, constraint) (äußeren Zwang) or spontaneously. Likewise, with regard to organic solidarity, [it] is overlooked (misunderstood, unrecognised) that for instance in the contractual relation(ship) (im Vertragsverhältnis) both similarity (the parties (partners) to the contract (contracting parties) (die Vertragspartner) are in principle ( basically, fundamentally) put (placed) at (on) the same level) as well as dissimilarity ( every party (partner) to the contract (contracting party) keeps in mind his own (self-)interest) must exist side by side (next to each other) (co-exist). The existing side by side (co-existence) or existing inside of each other (Das Neben- oder Ineinander) of similarity and dissimilarity can be ascertained in all social groups known to us, whereas the “horde” (die „Horde“), which according to Durkheim embodied mechanical solidarity in pure form (in reiner Form), constitutes a pure abstraction; had it [Durkheim’s notion of the “horde”], by the way, been able to function so [as] mechanically as Durkheim wanted to suggest (it), (then, thus, so) it would have to have been classified within (assigned to) (the) biological rather than social phenomena whose collective consciousness cannot be imagined without individual
[consciousness] (bei denen kollektives Bewußtsein sich ohne individuelles nicht denken läßt)\textsuperscript{124}. Durkheim (has) admitted in passing that the unisegmental horde eludes (evades, is beyond (not within)) (the) direct historical observation and only can be described structurally by means of the study of polysegmental social groups (Durkheim hat beiläufig zugegeben, daß sich die unisegmentäre Horde der direkten historischen Beobachtung entzieht und nur vermittels des Studiums polysegmentärer Sozialgruppen strukturell beschrieben werden kann)\textsuperscript{125}. Yet he [Durkheim] did not want (has not wanted) to noticeably (perceptibly) water down (weaken, undermine, soften) the fundamental contrast(ing) (opposition) between both forms of solidarity, and the reason for that becomes (is) apparent (obvious, evident) if (when) we bring to mind (contemplate, reflect (up)on, visualise) his overall (total) concept. The acceptance [of the fact that] (assumption that) mechanical and organic solidarity were (would have been) always interwoven with each other in the (hitherto) history of social groups (until now), would have taken the edge off (blunted, weakened, broken the tip of) an evolutionism which revolves around the idea of the transition from one to the other (i.e. from mechanical to organic solidarity) (hätte einem Evolutionismus die Spitze abgebrochen, der sich um die Idee des Übergangs von der einen zur anderen dreht). And (with) this transition [it] is again all the more (ardently) expected (anticipated) (fervently), the higher [the] ethical-normative expectations connected with organic solidarity, which on the quiet (clandestinely, secretly) is transformed (converted) from a social fact to a moral demand (call) for justice[, are] (die unter der Hand aus einem sozialen Faktum in eine moralische

\textsuperscript{124} Gurvitch, \textit{Vocation}, I, p. 215ff..
\textsuperscript{125} \textit{Règles}, p. 82ff..
Consequently, in Durkheim’s example, the interrelation (connection, correlation) having an effect until today of the antithetical pair of concepts (conceptual pair) “community-society”, with a (historical-philosophical) perception (view) (pertaining to the philosophy of history), and at the same time with an ethical-normative matter of concern (or purpose) (intention, aim, objective), becomes (is) particularly graphic (vivid, clear).

5. Mass-democratic social theory and anthropology (Massendemokratische Sozialtheorie und Anthropologie)

The deeper reason for the often also (even) programmatically declared (professed) (bidding) farewell (saying goodbye) (parting) of mass-democratic social theory to (from) the classic(al) anthropological question formulations (formulations of the [a] question, problem examinations, examinations of (a [the]) problem(s), central themes) lies in the paradigm shift, which took place (came to pass, was carried out) in essence (essentially) around (about) 1900 and brought about (effected, caused, resulted in) the replacement of the synthetic-harmonising thought figure (schema) with the analytical-combinatory [thought figure (schema)] (die Ablösung der synthetisch-harmonisierenden Denkfigur durch die analytisch-kombinatorische bewirkte)\textsuperscript{127}. In terms of content, this [paradigm shift] primarily meant (signified) the smashing (wrecking, destroying) of the substantially (i.e. in terms of (as regards) substances) comprehended (grasped, understood, perceived, interpreted) hypostases

\textsuperscript{126} The logical leap (leap in logic) was noticed early on, see e.g. G. Richards’s objections cited (quoted) by St. Lukes, Durkheim, p. 500.
\textsuperscript{127} Kondylis, Niedergang, on (regarding) the anthropological question in this context see esp. pp. 30ff., 80ff., 135ff., 289ff.
of the bourgeois world theory (i.e. world view), namely of Nature, of History and of Man; hypostases, which since the Renaissance were set against (contrasted (opposed) to) the theological world image (picture) (Inhaltlich bedeutete dies in erster Linie die Zertrümmerung der substantiell aufgefaßten Hypostasen der bürgerlichen Weltanschauung, nämlich der Natur, der Geschichte und des Menschen; Hypostasen, die seit der Renaissance dem theologischen Weltbild entgegengestellt wurden). To the extent that the bourgeois image (picture) of man (human image, image of Man (men, people)) and bourgeois anthropocentrism (das bürgerliche Menschenbild und der bürgerliche Anthropozentrismus), together (along) with their ethical-normative connotations, faded, (the) interest in the(,) connected with that [bourgeois image of man and bourgeois anthropocentrism together with their ethical-normative connotations])(,) anthropological (examination (study) of) (the) problem(s) atrophied (withered (wasted) away, became stunted, languished) too, although this [anthropological examination of problems] did not in the least disappear from the scene (do a vanishing trick) and even (in fact) could be continued (taken forward) in a (no longer bourgeois) framework and sense ([which was] no longer bourgeois); because the mass-democratic thought figure (schema) has, as [we] noted (remarked, observed) at the outset (start, beginning), been able to monopolise (for itself) the (intellectual(-spiritual)-historical) spectrum (in the history of ideas) just as little as every other predominant (prevailing) ideology of (in) the past (for itself) (denn die massendemokratische Denkfigur hat, wie eingangs bemerkt, das geistesgeschichtliche Spektrum ebensowenig wie jede andere vorherrschende Ideologie der Vergangenheit für sich monopolisieren können). Moreover, the concept (notion) of anthropology was used in some (a number of) cases indistinctly (in a blurred manner, unclearly) and in content-related(filled)
(substantive) contexts (interrelations, correlations) (in inhaltlichen Zusammenhängen) which (really) stood (were) (right) at the antipodes of the old [contexts]. Thus (In this way), (So) (the) so-called cultural anthropology (Kulturanthropologie), as it was popularised for instance by Ruth Benedict or Margaret Mead, aimed originally (initially) at (that) breaking up (disintegrating, dissolving) all (everything) which gave (created) the impression of an anthropologically inherited constant, into cultural influences (alles, was den Eindruck einer anthropologisch ererbten Konstante erweckte, in kulturelle Einflüsse aufzulösen). In this way (Thereby), many unilateralities (or one-sidednesses) or coarsenesses (grossnesses, crudenesses) of [the] conventional (or traditional) anthropology of drives (urges), of Reason and of race(s) (racial (race-based) anthropology) [of races] (viele Einseitigkeiten oder Grobheiten herkömmlicher Trieb-, Vernunft- und Rassenanthropologie) were of course shown in their true light. Yet in the process (in the course of this), the mark was widely ((by) far) overshot ([cultural anthropology] widely overshot the mark), and that which was now called anthropology was hardly (barely, scarcely) (to be) distinguished anymore from vulgar sociologism (war kaum mehr vom Vulgärsoziologismus zu unterscheiden), which by the way is also a genuinely mass-democratic ideological phenomenon: [just] as the old notion (concept) of social hierarchy (der alte soziale Hierachiegedanke) was frequently (in many cases ((and) ways)) justified (substantiated, accounted for) by means of (through) anthropological fictions, so [too] mass-democratic egalitarianism sought backing (support) in [respect of] [for] the assumption (supposition) [that] humans (men, people) (would) constitute(d) the resultants of their social conditions, that is, equality amongst humans (men, people) could already be guaranteed (ensured) through (by (means of)) the equality of (the) conditions.
A second, more specific (particular, special) reason for the suppression of classical anthropological question formulations (formulations of the [a] question, problem examinations, examinations of (a [the]) problem(s), central themes) in the mass-democratic context has already been hinted at (intimated, indicated)\(^{128}\). In the endeavour (effort) to instal (insert, incorporate) guarantees of ponderability (calculability) and stability in social-theoretical constructs (Beim Bestreben, Berechenbarkeits- und Stabilitätsgarantien in die sozialtheoretischen Konstrukte einzubauen), which are supposed (meant) to (should) describe, or legitimise in terms of the philosophy of history (historically-philosophically), modern complex societies, where possible (to extent of their powers)(,) disturbances (disruptions or disorders) (die Störungen) are excluded (shut out), which all along (always, all the time) were blamed on (imputed to) man’s dark and uncontrollable “drives (urges)” and “passions” (die seit eh und je den dunkeln und unkontrollierbaren „Trieben“ und „Leidenschaften“ des Menschen angelastet wurden). And since one, on the other hand, cannot build on an unadulterated (pure, unmixed, unwatered-down) and all-embracing anthropology of Reason (Vernunftanthropologie) without completely turning one’s back on the realities of this world, (so, then, thus) the solution is sought in the putting aside (abolition, elimination) of (doing away with) anthropology as such and in general; where anthropological factors continue to be (carry on being) brought into theoretical play, we are dealing with (it is a matter of) economistic or behaviouristic narrowings (shortenings, curtailments or reductions) (see below). Now, as soon as (When now) the exclusion of anthropological question formulations (formulations of the [a] question, problem examinations, examinations of (a [the]) problem(s), central themes) at the

\(^{128}\) See footnote 8 above and the corresponding passage (point, place, spot) in the text.
level of the social-theoretical construct has seen to (ensured, taken care of) the dispelling (removing, purging, eliminating) of the imponderabilities (imponderables, incalculabilities) of human behaviour (das Ausräumen der Unwägbarkeiten menschlichen Verhaltens), only a single (one) step remains to be taken for the safeguarding (protection) of ponderability (calculability) at the level of complex society (bleibt zur Absicherung der Berechenbarkeit auf der Ebene der komplexen Gesellschaft ein einziger Schritt zu tun): the (direct or expected) identification of the construct with (the) social reality. Where humans (people, men) behave for instance in the sense of (the) “system (systemic) rationality (rationality of the system)” or according to the communicative logic of language, as these are described in the social-theoretical construct, (there) a particular knowledge about (regarding, of) man (humans) (ein besonderes Wissen um den Menschen) is actually (in reality) unnecessary (or superfluous).

In relation to both these complementary reasons for the decline of anthropology in the framework of mass-democratic social theory, the following considerations appear (to be) (seem) appropriate (relevant). First of all, it is obvious that the aforementioned paradigm shift, which put an end to bourgeois anthropocentrism, is of (has) an ideological character; it therefore may not (cannot, is not allowed to) serve (be of use) as [the] starting point of [for] a scientific argumentation. That means: an argumentation, which, with reference to the end of anthropocentrism, would demand the putting (setting) aside (abolition, removal, sidelining) of anthropology, would a limine be false (wrong, incorrect). Because anthropocentrism, anthropology and man as [a] (historically-socially acting) being (acting historically-socially) (Anthropozentrismus, Anthropologie und Mensch als geschichtlich-sozial handelndes Wesen)
constitute three different magnitudes; the elimination of the first
[anthropocentrism] does not have to signify (mean) the elimination of the
second [anthropology], and the elimination of the first two (at the level of
ideology or of social theory) can in no case mean that man in actual fact
ceases to exist (stops existing). Formulated (Put, Phrased, Expressed)
differently: [the] beginning and [the] end of anthropocentrism do not
coincide with [the] beginning and [the] end of anthropology, and the end
of anthropology, i.e. talk of man, cannot be the end of man just as man
has not taken his beginning from anthropology (genauso wie der Mensch
nicht von der Anthropologie seinen Anfang genommen hat). There were
and in fact are always only humans (people, men), who pursue (or are
involved in) (conduct, take part in, do) or abolish anthropocentrism or
anthropology – and a scientific theory, which wants to take into account
this fundamental fact, must argue anthropologically in a comprehensive (or
broad) (extensive) sense, that is, thematise man (i.e. make man a subject
of discussion) in [respect of] his action and his motivation (also in his
quality (i.e. characteristic) as author (or originator) (creator) of theories
about (on, regarding) [the] value (or merit) and anti-value (or demerit) of
anthropocentrism and anthropology). The necessary social-ontological
depth is therefore reached (attained, achieved, arrived at) (then) when the
perceptions (views) of humans (people, men) on (about, regarding) the
value (and status (importance)) of man and his objective doing (i.e. acts)
(actions, conduct, activities, behaviour) (den Stellenwert des Menschen
und ihrem objektiven Tun) are (clearly, cleanly) distinguished (very
thoroughly, carefully) and [it is] ascertained that the latter [objective
doing (i.e. acts) of man] are more stable and more homogenous than those
convictions are; the base (or terrain) of practical or theoretical doing (i.e.
acts) accordingly (correspondingly) constitutes the base (or terrain) of
(the) scientifically indispensable talk of man, that is, the base (or terrain)
of an anthropology which can also account for all the respective represented (supported or justified) anthropologies or negations of anthropology (der Boden des praktischen oder theoretischen Tuns bildet dementsprechend den Boden der wissenschaftlich unentbehrlichen Rede vom Menschen, also den Boden einer Anthropologie, die auch über die jeweils vertretenen Anthropologien bzw. Negationen der Anthropologie Rechenschaft ablegen kann).

This position can, with regard to (in view of) the great trends (or outlines) or phases of the European history of ideas, be concretised as follows. If (When) in a society a theocentric ideology predominates (prevails), (then) this does not mean that God Himself reigns (rules) here, but that humans (people, men), who legitimise their deeds (or acts) by invoking (appealing to) (with reference to) God, prevail (rule); anthropocentrism, for its part, does not take the place of (replace, supersede) theocentrism because humans (men, people) now for the first time (commandingly, masterfully) walk (unperturbed, with the greatest of ease) onto the stage of history (in complete control of the situation) (Herrscht in einer Gesellschaft eine theozentrische Ideologie vor, so heißt dies nicht, daß Gott höchstpersönlich hier regiert, sondern daß Menschen walten, die ihre Taten unter Berufung auf Gott legitimieren; der Anthropozentrismus löst seinerseits den Theozentrismus nicht deswegen ab, weil Menschen nun zum ersten Mal die Bühne der Geschichte souverän betreten) (on that [stage] stand (there are) always only humans (men, people) and nothing else), but because certain humans (men, people), by (in) invoking (appealing (referring) to) “man”, drive out (dispel, displace) those who until then laid claim to God; and the decline of anthropocentrism does not mean that there are no humans (in the (hitherto) sense [of the word] (until now)) anymore, but that the world-theoretical(view, graphic,
representative, illustrational) stance (positioning, attitude) of those humans (men, people) who act decisively in the ideological field (area, domain, sector), is no longer anthropocentric (anthropozentrische), that, therefore, the champions (advocates, defenders) of anthropocentrism have lost the decisive (deciding) battle. Scientific anthropology draws its legitimacy from the ascertainment that irrespective of the, on each and every respective occasion, dominant (ruling) perceptions (views, ideas, notions, opinions) on (regarding, of) man’s position (standing or place) in the cosmos (or universe) (die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos) and on (regarding) anthropology’s theoretical usefulness (usability), the constitution (or nature) (die Beschaffenheit) and the behaviour of the creators (authors or originators) and representatives of all these different (varying, varied) perceptions (views, ideas) exhibit (display, show) certain (particular) uniformities (Gleichförmigkeiten), that, therefore, the forms of their [the said creators’] thinking (thought) and action diverge (deviate, differ) from one another far (much) less than the content(s) and the concrete practical aims (goals) (die Formen ihres Denkens und Handelns viel weniger voneinander abweichen als die Inhalte und die konkreten praktischen Ziele). That is why it does not constitute a paradox if (when) one considers (regards, looks at) social theories, which want to not [know] or (know) little (know) of anthropological question formulations (formulations of the [a] question, problem examinations, examinations of (a [the]) problem(s), central themes), (as, to be) symptomatic stances (positionings, attitudes) of humans (people, men) in a concrete (intellectual(-spiritual)-historical) situation (pertaining to (in) the history of ideas), whose ideological character manifests itself in the performative contradiction (sich im performativen Widerspruch kundtut) of summoning (using, mobilising), for the putting aside (abolition, doing away with, elimination) of anthropology, forms of (theoretical) action
which in other situations are able to (can) serve (be of use for) even opposing (opposed, contrary, conflicting) aims (goals)\textsuperscript{ii}.

(The) Aversion to (Dislike (Abhorrence) of) the insight [that] humans (men, people) and their acts lie (are (found)) at a deeper level than their anthropological or anti-anthropological perceptions (views), is actually (really) much (far) more frequent and much (far) more widespread (diffuse) than the postmodern uprising (or rebellion) (revolt, insurrection, revolution) (der postmoderne Aufstand) against anthropocentrism and against anthropology as science. It takes root (is rooted) in the ideological-polemical need to anchor (establish, ground, found) normative positions, which in the final analysis (end) (ultimately) can have meaning (sense) only in relation (regard, respect) to humans (men, people), in (on) higher (superior) and more comprehensive (extensive) (broader) authorities (tiers (grades, levels, stages) of jurisdiction), whose objective constitution (composition) sets as narrow (tight) as possible boundaries (limits) on (around) human imponderability (incalculability), while the ponderability (calculability) of the world and of society correspondingly (accordingly) rises (increases) (Sie wurzelt im ideologisch-polemischen Bedürfnis, normative Positionen, die letztlich nur in bezug auf Menschen Sinn haben können, in höheren und umfassenderen Instanzen zu verankern, deren objektive Beschaffenheit menschlicher Unberechenbarkeit möglichst enge Grenzen setzt, während die Berechenbarkeit der Welt und der Gesellschaft entsprechend steigt). The polemical component consists in [the fact] that these normative positions and the “objective” authorities (tiers (grades, levels, stages) of jurisdiction) bearing (supporting, sustaining) them [these normative positions] come into being (are created (produced)) as counter concepts (notions) (Gegenbegriffe) and often as downright (real) conceptual
notional) reversals (inversions) of earlier (previous, former) [ones, concepts (notions)] (und oft als regelrechte begriffliche Umkehrungen von früheren). The age (era, epoch, time) of theocentrism defined God as the authority (Instanz) before which the imponderability (incalculability) of concrete man had to (make a) stop (halt) – either through his conscious subjection (subjugation, submission) to (under) divine commandments (sein bewußte Unterwerfung unter die göttlichen Gebote) or, by contrast, through the absolute prospectlessness (or futility) (hopelessness) (Aussichtslosigkeit) of [an] uprising (or rebellion). But also the epoch of bourgeois anthropocentrism (it) (has) typically (enough) avoided (evaded, shunned) as far as possible (at all costs) leaving (the) concrete man to his own uncontrollable preferences (or predilections) (eigenen unkontrollierbaren Vorlieben); it [bourgeois anthropocentrism] therefore demanded (required) him to live in accordance with the commands of superhuman (hyper(supra)-human) hypostases, namely Nature or History (gemäß den Geboten von übermenschlichen Hypostasen, nämlich der Natur oder der Geschichte). (The) (Bidding) Farewell (Saying goodbye) to (Parting from) anthropocentrism and at the same time to (from) anthropology gave rise to new authorities (tiers (grades, levels, stages) of jurisdiction) inside of (within) mass-democratic social theory. They [The said new authorities] functioned, as it were (somehow), as stream (or river) beds (Strombetten), they [that] could channel human action (die menschliches Handeln) all the more easily (the easier) as (since) this time they did not have to go into [the] reasons and depths (Gründe und Abgründe) of the same [human action]; (the) “system (systemic) rationality (rationality of the system)”, (the) frictionless (unhindered, smooth, trouble-free) communication laid out (based, positioned, leaning, resting) on the structure of language, (the) reasonable (or prudent) (understandable) economic calculus (i.e. calculation) or (the)
behaviouristic symmetry of stimulus and response (reaction) were now supposed (meant) to ensure (see to, take care of) ponderability (calculability) in the same sense as formerly (once) (the) god-willed or (the) nature-conforming behaviour [did, ensured ponderability] (die in der Struktur der Sprache angelegte reibungslose Kommunikation, das einsichtige ökonomische Kalkül oder die behavioristische Symmetrie von Stimulus und Reaktion sollten nun in ähnlichem Sinne für Berechenbarkeit sorgen wie ehemals das gottgewollte oder das naturkonforme Verhalten).

Behind the facade of all these past and present constructions, however, concrete humans stir (move) in their endless variety of form (multiformity, polymorphism), in the imponderability (or incalculability) of their action and the uncertainty of its [the, their action’s] consequences (in der Unwägbarkeit ihres Handelns und der Ungewißheit von dessen Folgen). These irreducible facts (of the matter) (This irreducible state of affairs (truth of the matter)) (Dieser irreduzierbare Tatbestand) can of course (indeed) be (largely) discarded (done away with) (to a great extent, for the most part) through rationalisation (i.e. as explanation or justification) (läßt sich weitgehend wegrationalisieren), but every social theory some time or other has to stumble over their [these irreducible facts’] (its) effects, and then the question is directly or indirectly posed [as to] what (then) might these beings be, which (have) persistently (stubbornly, obstinately, doggedly) disregarded (ignored, overlooked) the numerous representations (notions) of, and proposals (offers, propositions) of (for), harmony (Harmonievorstellungen und -angebote), in history until now. Anthropologising (Engaging in anthropology, Talking about man) (Das Anthropologisieren) remains inevitable (unavoidable), even if (when) anthropology is forced (obliged, impelled)
into abdicating (relinquishing, renouncing) (to abdicate) [its power and pre-eminence in (social-scientific) theory] (selbst wenn die Anthropologie zum Abdanken gezwungen wird). The age (era, epoch) of anthropocentrism, when Pope opined (thought, said, meant), “the proper study of mankind is man”\textsuperscript{129}, understandably provided (afforded, gave, offered, presented) anthropology as [a] discipline (with) certain (particular) opportunities. Though (Certainly) an anthropology had already developed in the womb (bosom) of (from within) ancient ontology (we remind ourselves [our readers] (recollect) for instance (of) the Platonic parallel between the strata (layers) of being (Is) and the strata (layers) of the soul (zwischen den Schichten des Seins und den Schichten der Seele)), whereas the (later, subsequent) theology [which came later] had to likewise (also) acquire (get) an anthropology with the intention of making understandable (intelligible) what (then) drives humans (men, people) to the violation (breach(ing)) of (offending against) the harmony of the [what is] Good (zum Verstoß gegen die Harmonie des Guten). But (also) mass-democratic social theory (too) does not in actual fact make do (manage, get by), despite its in principle repudiation (refusal, renunciation) of anthropology, without (tacit (silent)) anthropological premises and assumptions. Between the inevitability (indispensability) of these latter [(tacit) anthropological premises and assumptions] and the adhering (adherence) to (persistence (perseverance) with) that repudiation [of anthropology] an internal guerilla war (ein interner Guerillakrieg) takes place, which can never end in peace (settle (quieten) down). One often believes [in] having already disposed (got rid) of anthropology because one can, without major (great, extensive) losses and complications, do without (forgo, renounce) the old anthropology of

drives (urges) and of Reason (die alte Trieb- und Vernunftanthropologie); already in regard to calculating or ethical rationality (bei der kalkulierenden oder ethischen Rationalität), however, the matter (things) become(s) much more difficult, since this [calculating or ethical rationality], without sufficient anthropological underpinning (propping up), hovers (hangs, floats) (is up) in the air (in space).

Cybernetic system (systems) theory already offers a good example for [regarding] the use of positions of [an] anthropological origin (derivation) in [relation to] (on) key theoretical points, despite the simultaneous rejection (or repudiation) of anthropological matters of concern (concerns) of [in] social theory. (The) Contradiction characterises (typifies) of course the cybernetic approach overall (on the whole), because the striven for (or pursued) (aimed at, sought after) unification of the ontological and cognitive levels occurs (takes place, happens) here with the use of a conceptuality which came into being in relation to the human social world and is stricto sensu suitable only for this world (denn die angestrebte Vereinheitlichung der ontologischen und kognitiven Ebenen erfolgt hier unter Verwendung einer Begrifflichkeit, die in bezug auf die menschliche soziale Welt entstand und sich stricto senzu nur für diese Welt eignet). Already in connection (interrelation) with “biological systems” (let alone (then) [in connection] with physical [systems]) the use of concepts (notions) like [such] (as) “information”, “communication” or “selection” gives rise to (causes) disconcertment (astonishment) and of necessity (necessarily, unavoidably) gives (suggests) the impression [that] (the) overall (total) reality will be (is) apprehended (grasped, understood) anthropomorphically, although (the) ontological pre-eminence (or paramountcy) was (has been) withdrawn (taken away) from man (die gesamte Wirklichkeit werde anthropomorphisch erfaßt, obwohl dem
Menschen die ontologische Vorrangstellung entzogen wurde). This may also be (so) expressed (thus, [as follows]): anthropocentrism (has been able to) (could) be dispelled (removed, eliminated, purged) only with the help of a(n) comprehensive (extensive) anthropomorphism (Der Anthropozentrismus hat erst mit Hilfe eines umfassenden Anthropomorphismus ausgeräumt werden können).

As we know, cybernetic system (systems) theory persistently makes use of an argumentative artifice (trick, sleight of hand): it appropriates content(s), which originally arose from other intellectual (thought) approaches,(,) in order to then translate them [the said other intellectual approaches] into its own vocabulary, and it makes them out to be a gain in knowledge which is due to its own intellectual (thought) approach (Denkansatz). That applies (is valied) just as much to (for) anthropological content(s) and not least (of all) to (for) the central thesis [that] system is [a, the] reduction of (in) complexity. In Germany, the proximity (nearness, closeness) of this thesis to Gehlen’s anthropology and ideology of the relieving of (or relief from) the tension of existence (or (undirected) instinctual drives) (Gehlens Anthropologie und Entlastungstheorie) was noted (registered, taken in, recorded) yet (all the same, nevertheless) a German system (systems) theoretician in the 1960s did not have to have recourse directly to Gehlen, since he could draw from the American versions of cybernetic system (systems) theory. Nonetheless, the as far as possible structural similarity of both perceptions (views) is not at all accidental (coincidental). Because the founders of cybernetics themselves started from a question formulation (putting (formulation) of the [a] question, problem examination, examination of the [a] problem, central theme) which readily (without a

130 Schelsky, „Rechtssoziologie“, pp. 41, 57ff.
second thought (any difficulty)) may be described (characterised, referred to) (as) epistemological (pertaining to the theory of knowledge) and anthropological (epistemologically and anthropologically) (die ohne weiteres als erkenntnistheoretisch und anthropologisch bezeichnet werden darf) – hence also the aforementioned anthropomorphic features (traits, characteristics) of their constructions (die erwähnten anthropomorphen Züge ihrer Konstruktionen). In search of analogies between (the) systems transmitting (or transferring) and processing information in (human) organisms, and, in machines (den Information übertragenden und verarbeitenden Systemen in (menschlichen) Organismen und in Maschinen), they formulated, on the basis of observations about (regarding, on, of) the central nervous system (Beobachtungen über das zentrale Nervensystem), the principle called “the hypothesis of cybernetics”. This [principle] has to do with (concerns) the mechanism of “negative Feedback” as the capacity (or ability) to use “inputs” in such a way that “outputs” are delimited and regulated with regard to the attaining (achieving, attainment, achievement) of certain (particular) aims (goals, targets) (das Erreichen bestimmter Ziele eingegrenzt und reguliert werden)131. Here original feats (capacities, performances or achievements) of selection and of orientation, of processes of information and of knowledge, (ursprüngliche Selektions- und Orientierungsleistungen von Informations- und Erkenntnisprozessen) are mentioned (touched upon, addressed) and consequently (as a result) the threads of an epistemological (knowledge-theoretical; erkenntnistheoretischen) and anthropological tradition are taken (picked)

131 See Ashby’s pioneering (pathbreaking) articles (essays), “Adaptiveness” (1940) and Rosenblueth-Wiener-Biegelow, “Behavior” (1943). At the same time Lorenz worked (carved) out (processed), on the basis of partly Kantian, partly pragmatistic presuppositions, the ratiomorphic feats (capacities, performances or achievements) of selection and of orientation of the central nervous system (die ratiomorphen Selektions- und Orientierungsleistungen des Zentralnervensystems), see „Die angeborenen Formen“ (1943). Cf. footnote 38 above.
up, which [such tradition] with regard to the here relevant period of time was founded (established) by (the) early neo-Kantianism (Lange) and thereafter by Nietzsche, in order to then, partly via pragmatism (meaning (sense) as plan of action (Sinn als Handlungsentwurf) in James) and Bergson, partly irrespective (regardless, independent) of them [pragmatism and Bergson], lead (flow) into the anthropologies of Scheler, of Plessner and of Gehlen. This tradition (has) developed in variations, at times complementary, at other times diverging (differing, deviating) from one another, the general theory [that] man must, as [a] not instinct-bound(tied) (non-instinct-bound) and [as an] open-to-the-world (or cosmopolitan) being, convert (transform) the objectively chaotic variety of form (or multiformity) (polymorphism) of the world into subjectively ordered and controllable complexity (der Mensch müsse als nicht instinktgebundenes und weltoffenes Wesen die objektiv chaotische Vielfalt der Welt in subjektiv geordnete und kontrollierbare Komplexität verwandeln), in order to thereby (in this way) gain (obtain, attain, win) that ability at orientation which he [man] as [an] acting being needs and cannot take (or gather) from his biological equipment (um dadurch jene Orientierungsfähigkeit zu gewinnen, die er als handelndes Wesen benötige und seiner biologischen Ausrüstung nicht entnehmen könne). The necessary (required, requisite) process of selection and of [the] endowment (or provision) (giving) of meaning is supposed (meant) to (should) take place at several levels, from the primary sifting (or examination) of the (what is) perceptible (discernable or cognisable) (e.g. (said) in the language (terms) of Kant (in Kantian terms), through (by means of) the forms of perception (or viewing) and the categories of understanding (the intellect or mind)) (up) to (until) (the) organised world images (pictures), social institutions, ethics etc. (Der dazu erforderliche Selektions- und Sinnstiftungsvorgang soll auf mehreren Ebenen
stattfinden, von der primären Sichtung des Erkennbaren (z. B. kantisch gesprochen, durch die Anschauungsformen und die Verstandeskategorien) bis zu den organisierten Weltbildern, den sozialen Institutionen, den Ethiken etc.). The core (central) theses (positions) of cybernetic system (systems) theory, whatever the mediations, take root here: systems are clippings (i.e. parts or sectors) of a complex world and as such are constructed for the purpose of the preservation of their own continued existence, meaning (sense) constitutes the strategy of selective behaviour (choice from the wealth (abundance or plethora) of the (what is) possible) offered for the construction of the system, experiencing (or going through [life]) and action merely represent (are, constitute) the various kinds (sorts) of [the] meaning-like reduction of (in) complexity (Systeme seien Ausschnitte aus einer komplexen Welt und als solche zum Zwecke der eigenen Bestandserhaltung konstruiert, Sinn bilde die zur Systemkonstruktion gebotene Strategie selektiven Verhaltens (Auswahl aus der Fülle des Möglichen), Erleben und Handeln stellten bloß verschiedene Arten sinnhafter Reduktion von Komplexität dar).

The particular stressing (emphasis(ing)) of the psychical functions of stabilisation and of the relieving of (or relief from) the tension of existence (or (undirected) instinctual drives) (psychischen Stabilisierungs- und Entlastungsfunktionen) in the German version of system (systems) theory of course directly reminds [one] of (recalls) Gehlen and his teaching(s) (or theory) [in respect] of institutions (seine Institutionenlehre), (so, thus) when (if) e.g. [it] is postulated [that] in the social system “for the normal case, an unquestioned (unquestionable, undisputed), in fact almost motiveless accepting of binding decisions
[must] be secured (ensured, guaranteed)". However, the extent (magnitude) of the intellectual(-spiritual) loan does not interest us here, but a basic (fundamental, in principle) aporia (i.e. doubt, contradiction or paradox), which is inherent in (clings (sticks) to) both system (systems) theory as well as Gehlen’s teaching(s) (or theory) [in respect] of institutions exactly because of their common background [which was] outlined (described) above. Two forms and strata (layers) of stabilisation relieving the tension of existence (or (undirected) instinctual drives) (zwei Formen und Schichten der entlastenden Stabilisierung) are confused [as between] (with) each other or not distinguished (differentiated) from each other through (by means of) selection and the endowment (or provision) (giving) of meaning, namely the anthropological, and, the sociological or historical [forms and strata]. The complexity reductions (reductions of (in) complexity) (Die Komplexitätsreduktionen) at [the] anthropological level concern (have to do with) e.g. the constitution of the mechanisms of sense (sensory) perception (die Konstitution von Wahrnehmungsmechanismen) and (indeed) have (of course) very much to do with the fact that man lives in society since time immemorial (der Mensch seit eh und je in Gesellschaft lebt), but depends little, if at all, on each and every respective form of society (social form; Gesellschaftsform). The same applies to (is valid for) the interactional routine in everyday (daily) relations (Dasselbe gilt für die interaktionelle Routine in den Alltagsbeziehungen), whose substance, despite all historically determined (or dependent) (conditioned) modification of the outer (external) form (e.g. forms of greeting and of sociability) (deren Substanz bei aller geschichtlich bedingten Modifaktion der äußeren Form (z. B. Begrüßungs- oder

Geselligkeitsformen etc.), remains more or less stable. Institutional, political, economic, world-theoretical (view, graphic, representative, illustrational) etc. complexity reductions (reductions of (in) complexity) and stabilisations relieving the tension of existence (or (undirected) instinctual drives) are, however, subject to comparatively much faster (quicker) change (Wandel), which is due to the incessant (unceasing, unremitting, continual) displacements (or shifts) in the spectrum of the social relation and moreover (besides) [such change] knows (is acquainted (familiar) with, experiences) radical changes (alterations or modifications) and even downright (real) reversals (der sich den unablässigen Verschiebungen im Spektrum der sozialen Beziehung verdankt und zudem radikale Änderungen und sogar regelrechte Umkehrungen kennt). Mechanisms of sense (sensory) perception and interactional routine cannot, in other words, (suddenly) change into their opposite, but exactly this was often the case at the last-mentioned level – the level of history in the broadest (widest) sense. In history there are therefore no anthropological guarantees of stability (stability guarantees; Stabilitätsgarantien). The lack of distinguishing between (of) these levels makes Gehlen’s anthropological schema historically or sociologically largely unusable (useless), and precisely for the same reason cybernetic system (systems) theory too cannot advance to (press on as far as) [illuminating, elucidating] historical-sociological specific features (characteristics) (differentiae specificae), but it uses [the] most general, ultimately anthropological categories, in order to describe a certain (particular) social system (the present-day Western [one, social system]) whose self-description it wants to be.

133 See above Sec. 2. Cf. Giddens’s apt (or well-aimed) (telling, striking) remark (observation): “a theory of routine is not to be equated with a theory of social stability” (Constitution, p. 87). This important question will have to (pre)occupy (engage) us again, see our discussion [in respect] of [regarding] (the) teaching(s) (or theory) [in respect] of institutions in volume 3 of this work.
The unwanted (or unintented) (unintentional) proximity (nearness, closeness) of system (systems) theory to anthropological question formulations (formulations of the [a] question, problem examinations, examinations of (a [the]) problem(s), central themes) is not exhausted though in the central theme of the reduction of (in) complexity and of the creation of mechanisms of the relieving of the tension of existence. Despite all wishes (every wish) and (all) endeavours (efforts)(,) to be permanently prepared for (or geared to) the world of control (or steering) mechanisms (informatively) giving (information) feedback (informativ rückgekoppelten Steuerungsmechanism), and to drive (cast) out the “subject” (und das „Subjekt“ auszutreiben), one cannot get around (away from) the indirect admission (confession) that concepts like (as) e.g. “meaning (sense)” can (are able (allowed) to) be pithily (succinctly, concisely) used only in conjunction (combination, connection) with the “peculiar(ly)(strange(ly), odd(ly))-human capacity for (or ability at) negation” („eigentümlich-menschlichen Fähigkeit zur Negation“) and more generally with those “anthropologica (i.e. anthropological features)” („Anthropologica“) (“consciousness or Reason”), which are “common to psychical and social systems”\textsuperscript{134}. Likewise (Also), the anthropological question emerges in the background when (if) for instance (the) social order is put down (or reduced) (attributed) to the following principle: I do not let (allow) myself (to) be determined (defined) by you, if you do not let (allow) yourself (to) be determined (defined) by me (I do not let you determine me if you do not let me determine you)\textsuperscript{135}. It remains in itself extremely doubtful (dubious, questionable) that [if, as to whether] balanced mutuality (or reciprocity) (i.e. mutuality in a state of equilibrium) (gleichgewichtete Gegenseitigkeit) brings about (causes,


\textsuperscript{135} Luhmann, \textit{Soziale Systeme}, p. 167.
creates) and supports (or bears) (carries) (the) social order, as a theory, which a limine postulates equal constituent (integral) elements (parts) (components) of an open system, must assert (maintain). But apart from that, an explanation must be given as to (about, regarding) what (which) is the being (creature, entity; Wesen) which elevates (raises, lifts, proclaims) mutuality (or reciprocity) to a principle: if it is not unconditionally left (up) to the other, (then, so, thus) something for itself obviously (evidently) has (is) to be feared and (to be) expected, in relation to which (while) in the spectrum of its fears (apprehensions, misgivings) and expectations the spectrum of its possibilities is found again in the being with (i.e. co-existence with) others (wobei sich im Spektrum seiner Befürchtungen und Erwartungen das Spektrum seiner Möglichkeiten im Mitsein mit den Anderen wiederfindet). As reflected self-reference (Als reflektierte Selbstreferenz) in the relation with others, the (demand for) mutuality (or reciprocity) is specifically human, that is, it is to be apprehended (grasped, understood) anthropologically. For (With) good reason(s) [For good reason], therefore, the structure of self-reference was thematised (or made a subject of discussion) and explained (illustrated) first of all [with]in the framework of (the) “philosophy of the subject (subject philosophy)” („Subjektphilosophie“). System (systems) theory of necessity follows in [the] (subject-philosophical and anthropological) tracks (of the philosophy of the subject and of anthropology) (wandelt notgedrungen in subjektphilosophischen und anthropologischen Spuren), when (if) it makes use of the concept (notion) of self-reference, it of course falls (lapses) into anthropomorphism when it (cor)relates the same [concept] with the social “system”. If societies seem to have self-reference at their disposal, then [this occurs] only because (the) concrete humans (people), with regard to other acting humans, connect their action with meaning (sense) and justify (give
reasons for) (or found) [this action] through (and in) meaning, which quite often (repeatedly) takes (assumes) the form of a description, a critique (criticism) or a legitimation of “society” (“of the” society [in question]) (Wenn Gesellschaften über Selbstressen zu verfügen scheinen, dann nur deshalb, weil die im Hinblick auf andere handelnden konkreten Menschen ihr Handeln mit Sinn verbinden und durch Sinn begründen, des des öfteren die Form einer Schilderung, einer Kritik oder einer Legitimation „der“ Gesellschaft annimmt). That is why society’s self-reference never turns out uniformly (or in a unified manner) and clearly (or unambiguously) (unequivocally). There are a number of (several) self-references (i.e. kinds of self-reference) (Selbstreferenzen) simultaneously, and the correlation (or constellation) of forces (die Kräftekonstellation) decides (determines) which of them will prevail (or assert itself) (sich durchsetzen wird), while at the same time (in relation to which), as already stressed (emphasised), the prevailing (predominance) may never be understood as [an] absolute ideological monopoly, not even under a “totalitarian dictatorship” („totalitären Diktatur“). If the [a] social theoretician speaks of “the” self-reference of society, then he has picked (chosen) one amongst several such self-references (i.e. kinds of self-reference) or he himself has devised (designed, outlined, sketched, planned) one. Thus (So), the system (systems) theoretician defines as self-reference of society that which fits in (suits, matches, goes with) his (differentiation-related-evolutionistic) thought schema (regarding the evolutionism of differentiation) (differenzierungsevolutionistisches Denkschema).

Cybernetic system (systems) theory can therefore imagine itself as assuming [holding the assumption] [that] it has (had) left anthropology behind, because it forms (has) a simplistic picture (idea, notion) of this
latter [anthropology]. It namely reduces anthropology to long outdated (outmoded, antiquated) substantialistic teachings (doctrine, theories) of drives (urges) and of Reason, and then regards (considers, looks at) its own functionalistic stance (or positioning) (attitude) as (to be) [an] automatic execution (processing, carrying out or dealing with) (handling, completion) of anthropology (Sie reduziert nämlich Anthropologie auf längst überholte substantialistische Trieb- oder Vernunftlehren und betrachtet dann die eigene funktionalistische Einstellung als automatische Erledigung der Anthropologie) – as if there were (are, would be) no theoretical alternatives and no (intellectual(-spiritual)-historical) precedents [in respect] of (to, for) these alternatives (in the history of ideas). Because, apart from the pioneering achievements, and from the implications, of (the) Humean philosophy of the subject (subject philosophy), the programmatic eradication (weeding out, obliteration) of the notion (concept, idea) of substance (die programmmatische Ausmerzung des Substanzgedankens) from the anthropological realm (area, sector, field, domain) took place (happened, occurred) through (by means of) the paradigm shift around 1900(,) [already] mentioned several times; it suffices here to once more recall (recollect, remind [ourselves] of) Nietzsche and to refer to the psychology of Mach and of the Pragmatists. In [an] objective respect (objective (substantive, material) terms) (Objectively (speaking)), it moreover (besides) is (has) not (been) proved, but merely asserted, that only a complete (total) dissolution (disintegration, breaking up) of subjects in the functions of intersubjective interaction can free (release) [one, us] from the dilemma of having to choose between the primacy of the individual and [the primacy] of culture (nur eine restlose Auflösung der Subjekte in die Funktionen intersubjektiver Interaktion von Dilemma befreien könne, zwischen dem
Primat des Individuums und dem der Kultur wählen zu müssen). The announced (proclaimed, heralded) theoretical reorientation was not borne out (substantiated, confirmed, corroborated) by any individual (separate, particular) interpretations of concrete phenomena (Einzelinterpretationen konkreter Phänomene), which go (would have gone) beyond what also an undogmatic multi-dimensional way of looking at things (consideration, observation, contemplation) (eine undogmatische multidimensionale Betrachtung) could have produced (yielded). And the suspicion (supposition, presumption) [that] banalities are (would be) garnished (embellished, trimmed, disguised, decorated) here with pompous meaningless (cliché) phrases (empty words, clichés) is (would be) reinforced (amplified) when (if) e.g. the “substantialistic” perception (view) of the subjects of action (or acting subjects) (die „substantialistische“ Auffassung von den Handlungssubjekten) (its representatives are not named) is supposed (meant) to (should) be refuted (disproved) by (means of) (through) the thesis [that] these subjects did not precede the system, but were formed only in it [the system]. Yet no-one has ever proposed (advanced, put forward, formulated) the theory that humans are formed first in isolation as individuals and then take part (participate) in social interaction (an der sozialen Interaktion). Already the ancient topos of man as social being implied the anthropologically constitutive significance (importance, meaning) of intersubjectivity and of interaction (Schon der antike Topos vom Menschen als sozialem Wesen implizierte die anthropologisch konstitutive Bedeutung der Intersubjektivität und der Interaktion). However, the ascertainment of this significance is not identical to the reduction of man to the sum (total) of interactionally determined (conditioned) functions (interaktionell

136 Thus, Warriner, Emergence, p. 97ff.. Cf. Ch. II, Sec. 3c in this volume.
137 Thus, Luhmann, Soziale Systeme, pp. 151, 155.
bedingten Funktionen). Because one invariably (inevitably) comes across (runs (bumps) into, stumbles on, comes up against, encounters) the biological constitution (composition, texture or nature) of man and across a (great) variety of psychical and other (further) factors interrelating (connecting, interrelated, connected) with it [man’s said biological constitution] (auf die biologische Beschaffenheit des Menschen und auf eine Vielfalt damit zusammenhängender psychischer und sonstiger Faktoren), which must indeed develop (unfold) through interaction (durch Interaktion), but are by no means functions of interaction. What lies beyond (on the other side of) interaction can of course itself be interpreted (explained) “substantialistically” or “functionalistically”, (but, yet) it [that which lies beyond interaction], because of that, does not stop (cease) indicating (signaling, pointing to) the boundary (limit(s)) [limits (or boundary)] of the functional [element] as interactive (die Grenze des Funktionalen als Interaktivem).

Cybernetic system (systems) theory undertakes this anthropological narrowing (shortening, curtailment or reduction) in order to underpin (support, back (shore) up) the concept [that] the social system accordingly (therefore) constitutes in general a functional network (web, net) of interactions (ein funktionales Netz von Interaktionen) and nothing more than that. A second narrowing (shortening, curtailment or reduction) is now necessary in order to ensure (guarantee) the smooth processing (completion) (die glatte Abwicklung) of the functions of this system. As [we (have already)] remarked (observed)\(^\text{138}\), the theory of the “open” system had to again limit (restrict, reduce, cut) those free spaces (jene Freiräume), which the putting (setting) aside (elimination, doing away with, abolition) of Parsonian normativism gave (provided) (to) the

\(^{138}\) See footnote 51 above and the preceding text.
individual, through (by means of, with) the [an] increase (heightening) in (of) (the) system (systemic) rationality (rationality of the system) and [through] an individual rationality corresponding to (commensurate with) it [such system rationality], in order to not let (allow) the openness of the system degenerate into imponderability (incalculability). (The) Theory and model of the system are accordingly (therefore) unified (united) by (through) the common assumption (supposition) “that human behaviour must be explicated and understood [in respect] of its [the system’s] possibilities for (of, with regard to) rationality, and indeed also and precisely (then) when he [man, human behaviour] does not consciously take hold of (seize, grab) this possibility for his [its] own orientation”\textsuperscript{139}. Now (the) “system (systemic) rationality (rationality of the system)” does not absorb and use the whole (all) of man, but that (rational) aspect of him [man] which can bear (carry, take on) a “social role”. The [A] unit of the [a] system is not therefore the [a] human individual, but the role as the “part” of the person which is active in an organisation or situation (Die Einheit des Systems ist also nicht das menschliche Individuum, sondern die Rolle als der „Teil“ der Person, der sich in einer Organisation oder Situation betätigt)\textsuperscript{140}. In more complicated terminology, this same thesis is then summarised [as] man does not belong to the system, but to its [the system’s] environment (Umwelt), i.e. he takes part (participates) in the system only partially\textsuperscript{141}. This is actually (really, in fact) so [the case] if one exclusively keeps in mind the theoretical necessities of the construct “system”. However, it poses (begs) the question [the question is posed] as (in relation) to the sociological and historical productiveness (fertility) and soundness (viability) of this construct, if precisely that which does

\textsuperscript{139} Thus, Luhmann, \textit{Soziol. Aufklärung}, I, p. 45.
\textsuperscript{140} Boulding, “General Systems Theory”, p. 205..
The aspect or part of the person, which may not appear (arise, occur) in the sovereign territory (i.e. independent or autonomous field or sphere) of the role (im Hoheitsgebiet der Rolle) is indeed outside of the system as [a] construct, however it [the said aspect or part of the person] continues to participate in the shaping (forming, formation, moulding) of social reality (an der Gestaltung der sozialen Wirklichkeit), be it while exerting (it exerts) from the outside pressure on the role, be it while changing (it changes) from the inside the function of the role, and making (makes) it [the said role] (the) representative (or delegate) of not (non-)system-conforming needs (requirements) and goals (ends, purposes) (sei es, indem er von außen Druck auf die Rolle ausübt, sei es, indem er von innen her die Rolle umfunktioniert und sie zum Beauftragten nicht systemkonformer Bedürfnisse und Zwecke macht). This in fact happens very often, since the component of the person situated (found, contained) outside of the role is no less social or socially related than the roll-determined(conditioned, dependent, necessitated) [one, component] (da die außerhalb der Rolle befindliche Komponente der Person nicht weniger sozial oder sozialbezogen als die rollenbedingte ist); identifying the role and the social with each other, in order to then supposedly (ostensibly) contrast (contradistinguish) them to (with) the purely individual, is sociologically and psychologically absolutely (purely and simply, quite) wrong (false, incorrect) (Rolle und Soziales miteinander zu identifizieren, um sie dann dem angeblich rein Individuellen gegenüberzustellen, ist soziologisch und psychologisch schlichtweg falsch). If one accepts this fact (these facts (of the matter)), talk of the
“system” loses every succinct (or real) (concise) meaning (sense) (which is to the point). Certainly (No doubt), one can continue to argue and assert (maintain, contend, claim) in terms of system(s) theory (system(s)theoretically) [that] in the course of this (process) it is a matter of nothing other than a refixing (redetermination, redetermining, resetting) of the boundaries (limits) between the system and the environment (eine Neubestimmung der Grenzen zwischen System und Umwelt). However, precisely the arbitrariness (or randomness) (Beleibigkeit) or the permanent necessity of this refixing transforms (changes, converts) (the[ir]) theoretical labour (work, task, job) into an intellectual (thought) game and brings to light the infertile (sterile, unfruitful, unproductive) fictivity (i.e. fictiveness or fictitiousness) (die unfruchtbare Fiktivität) of the construct. The mistake (error, fault) does not lie in the (incidentally age-old (ancient, immemorial)) distinction (differentiation) between role and person, but in the inability at incorporating (integrating, including) the tension (stress, strain) resulting (arising, emerging) from them [role and person] in the theoretical construction without fatal consequences for it [system (systems) theory(‘s said theoretical construction)].

In view of (Given) this structure and this importance (or status) (value) of the concept (notion) of the role inside of (within) system (systems) theory, it must be disconcerting when (if) a system (systems) theoretician, of all theoreticians, reminds [us] (recalls, recollects), against the theory of communicative action and against the possibility of communicative transparency (kommunikativer Transparenz) asserted (maintained, claimed, contended) by it [the said theory of communicative action], (of) the mechanisms of self-love and of (the) passions having an effect (acting, working, effective) in every communication (die bei jeder
Kommunikation wirkenden Mechanismen der Selbstliebe und der Leidenschaften), in order to conclude from it (that) [that] such a theory cannot do justice to man as [a] whole, but only to “the already (in [respect of] (for, at, on) communication,) doctored (falsified, altered)(, in [respect of] (for) communication,) general [element] in man” (dem „schon auf Kommunikation hin frisierten Allgemeinen im Menschen“), out of (from) which an “artifact of communication” comes into being (results, arises, ensues), “with which no man [can] identify (identifies)”\(^\text{142}\). The objection is correct (right, valid) (stands), but it comes from the wrong (false, incorrect) side. Because communication [theory] (the theory of communication) and system (systems) theory (Kommunikations- und Systemtheorie) resemble each other also on this point much more than they would like to admit (believe, accept) (it) [that resemblance]. (So, Just, Thus) like (as) system (systems) theory, which safeguards (protects) (the) system (systemic) rationality (rationality of the system) because of the fact that it drives out (away) (ousts, dispels) man into the system’s environment, so too communication theory (the theory of communication): (this) drives out (away) (ousts, dispels) man into communication’s environment, while (whereas) in the communication system (system of communication) only that part or aspect of man takes part (participates) which might (could, would, should) best (most of all (easily)) satisfy (fulfil) (be sufficient (enough) for) communication’s mental, or above all, ethical-normative demands. Both perceptions (views, conceptions, opinions) therefore carry out a division of (bisect, divide) concrete man in order to theoretically privilege that part which enables (makes) the [his, man’s] inclusion (incorporation) in a smoothly functioning social whole (possible) (die Einordnung in ein glatt

\(^{142}\) Thus, Luhmann, „Autopoiesis“, p. 374.
funktionierendes soziales Ganzes). The old anthropology of Reason basically (essentially) did not do (act) anything different [other than that]: it isolated Reason in man as the [his] sole (only) capacity (or ability) which could ensure (secure, guarantee) the socially interesting general [sphere or element] against merely personal taste. It is structurally indifferent (or unimportant) [as to] whether the rational(reasonable)-general [sphere or element] (das Vernünftig-Allgemeine), in which man is supposed (meant) to (should) be assimilated (absorbed, taken up) through (by means of) the [his] related ((in relation to) (it) [that assimilation (absorption)]) suitable reduction, is the system and its rationality(,) or that communication(,) which is supposed (meant) to (should) ensue (arise, appear) when (if) language develops in accordance with its [language’s] supposed (assumed, presumed, adopted) genuine (authentic, real) essence (angenommenen echten Wesen). Such a language must absorb the individual (separate) subject in the same sense as (the) system (systemic) rationality (rationality of the system) does it; because a subject, which communicates ideally, is nothing other than the mouthpiece of language (so, thus) defined (in this way).

Like system (systems) theory, so too the theory of communicative action leaves behind (puts aside) anthropology, [in respect] of which it makes [having made of it (anthropology)] a conveniently (handily, comfortably) simplified image (picture), while it [the theory of communicative action] at the same time takes as [its] basis (bases itself [on]) an unacknowledged anthropological postulate. (Said) More precisely: it [the theory of communicative action] renounces (foregoes, does (goes) without) anthropological concreteness in order to theoretically underpin (support, back (shore) up) ideals which can only have (continued) existence in connection with an abstract image (picture) of man. It is a contradiction
in terms (in itself) (self-contradictory) (ein Widerspruch in sich) to speak out in favour of (stand up for, support) man’s “self-realisation” as [a] social-ethical ideal (als sozialethisches Ideal)\textsuperscript{143}, without having an idea (notion, representation, perception, vision, image) of that self which is meant (supposed) to (should) realise itself, i.e. without implying that the true nature of this self is, or at least can be, good, rational (reasonable) etc. (ohne eine Vorstellung von jenem Selbst zu haben, das sich verwirklichen soll, d. h. ohne zu implizieren, daß die wahre Natur von diesen Selbst gut, vernünftig etc. ist oder mindestens sein kann). Because otherwise self-realisation would possibly (perhaps) lead (flow) (in) to crime, and the first social-ethical concern (care, worry) (die erste sozialethische Sorge) would then not be self-realisation, but the disciplining of the individual (die Disziplinierung des Individuums). Whoever supports (defends, advocates) a view (or perception) (Auffassung) [in respect] of (on) what is “good” for the individual and social living together (i.e. coexistence) (regardless (irrespective) of (no matter) whether “good” is regarded as self-realisation or disciplining), and puts forward (submits) corresponding (analogous) proposals (suggestions), must simultaneously support (defend, advocate) a certain view (or perception) of man, because the definition of “good” of necessity occurs [is given] with regard to the assumed (supposed) constitution (composition, texture or nature) of man; something is good for someone only insofar as this [someone] appears to have such and not another constitution (or composition) (have been so (thus) (and not differently) constituted (or composed) (and not otherwise)), (;) [in regard] to rational humans (people, men) as (like) [in regard] to society, self-realisation therefore does good, however [in regard] to irrational [humans, ones] disciplining does good. The banality

\textsuperscript{143} Habermas, \textit{Theorie des komm. Handelns}, II, pp. 150, 153, 162ff..
(triteness) of the anthropological assumptions (suppositions), on which the theory of communicative action tacitly (silently) is based (rests), can, incidentally, (hardly) be hidden behind the asserted primacy of (the) speech structures and [speech] acts (Sprachstrukturen und -akte) ([only] with difficulty). These [speech structures and speech acts] are in fact divided [by the theory of communicative action] in accordance with (according to) specifically human modes of behaviour (strategic etc. action), and (indeed) are (even) expressly loaded (saddled, lumbered, charged) with good or bad intentions. This is e.g. the case when (if) amongst the features (characteristics), which are supposed (meant) to (should) distinguish (single out [for attention]) the speech acts of communicative action), truthfulness (veracity, honesty; Wahrhaftigkeit) is mentioned (named)\textsuperscript{144}. Truthfulness is, however, the conscious moral quality (i.e. characteristic) of a subject, [, whereas] a speech act, which has formed as a sentence (clause, proposition; Satz) and now exists independent (irrespective) of the [a] subject, is neither truthful (veracious, honest) nor untruthful (insincere), but simply true or false (wrong).

Like (As [in]) system (systems) theory, so too the theory of communicative action bases its renunciation (refusal, rejection) of anthropology i.a. on a very (incomplete, deficient) (and) confused (muddled) perception of the history of ideas (which is full of holes (gaps)) (auf eine sehr lückenhafte und verworrene Wahrnehmung der Geistesgeschichte). It [The theory of communicative action] polemicises directly against (the) “philosophy of the subject (subject philosophy)” (Es wird direkt gegen die „Subjektphilosophie“ polemisier). yet simultaneously it gives the impression [that] the elimination (removal, expulsion, exclusion) of (the) philosophy of the subject (subject

\textsuperscript{144} Loc. cit., I, p.412.
philosophy) would eo ipso amount to an elimination of every anthropology. However precisely (especially, right, just) (then) when (if) one finds fault with (criticises) (the) philosophy of the subject (subject philosophy) [(in) that] it [the philosophy of the subject] starts (sets) (out) from the [an] isolated subject as bearer of ready (cognitive and ethical) aptitudes (or predispositions) (vom isolierten Subjekt als Träger von fertigen (kognitiven und ethischen) Anlagen), which only stands opposite (faces) objects and is not first (only) constituted (formed, made up) in the interaction with subjects (in der Interaktion mit Subjekten) – precisely then one must (take) note (notice) that philosophical anthropology at the (very) latest (not later than) since Feuerbach and Marx had taken steps (acted) with much (strong, all) emphasis against (opposed, countered) this idealistic view (or perception); (the) pragmatistic, but also (the) German anthropology of the 1920s and of (the) (following, subsequent) years (after that) have (had) continued in various (different, differing, miscellaneous, distinct) variations and under all respective various influences the same (intellectual(-spiritual)-historical) trend (course or line) (in the history of ideas) (geistesgeschichtliche Linie). Instead of making (carrying out) the necessary distinctions (differentiations), the theory of communicative action conceals (hides) these achievements (accomplishments, performances) of anthropology, and accordingly inflates the fiction of (the) philosophy of the subject (subject philosophy) in order to accommodate (house) (with)in it the most heterogeneous positions (Kant, Hegel, Marx etc.) and consequently to be able to attribute (ascrube, impute) mainly (chiefly) to itself [the theory of communicative action] the dual (double, twin) service of the overcoming of (the) philosophy of the subject (subject philosophy) and anthropology. This

\[145\] Habermas, Phil. Diskurs, p. 160ff. and passim. Where the author registers (records) a step beyond the “monological approach of (the) philosophy of consciousness (consciousness philosophy)”, as for
abstract schematisation of that which has to be regarded as (the) philosophy of the subject (subject philosophy) must (necessarily) however entail(s) essential (substantial, fundamental, important) theoretical mistakes (errors, shortcomings). If the necessary and decisive (deciding) assumption (supposition) of (the) philosophy of the subject (subject philosophy) consists in the primacy of the instrumental relation of a solitary (isolated) subject towards (with) something in the objective world (im Primat der instrumentellen Beziehung eines einsamen Subjekts zu etwas in der objektiven Welt)\textsuperscript{146}, (so, then) it seems as though (if) for the putting (setting) aside (elimination, doing away with, abolition, removal) of (subject-philosophical) evil (in the philosophy of the subject) (zur Beseitigung der subjektphilosophischen Übel) the turn(ing) (about-turn) of the subject from the object to (another) subject would be sufficient (enough) (suffice). However with that (as a result), the core (central) issue (question, problem) remains unexplained (unsolved): will the subjects meet as friends or as foes (enemies), that is, will peace or conflict result (arise) from the[ir] interaction (Werden sich die Subjekte als Freunde oder als Feinde begegnen, wird sich also aus der Interaktion Friede oder Konflikt ergeben)? If again the meaning (sense) of the (about-)turn(ing) of the subject to (another) subject is exactly that the latter [other subject] is not looked at (regarded) as (considered to be) [an] object and mere means, but as [a(n)] end (goal) in itself and bearer of human dignity (nicht als Objekt und bloßes Mittel, sondern als Selbstzweck und Träger menschlicher Würde), then one can arrive at (come to, reach) the same result with (subject-philosophical) means

(pertaining to the philosophy of the subject), as Kant had (has) done (did) it.\(^{147}\) Even Reason’s change of direction (turn) to(wards) history’s events (or processes) (historical events) (Geschichtsvorgängen) which reach (go) beyond the subjective consciousness of the individual ([a] particular (single) person) (die über das subjektive Bewußtsein des Einzelnen hinausgreifen)\(^{148}\), by no means guarantees the overcoming of their [history’s events’] subjectivity. Because the subjectivity of Reason does not lie in [the fact] that it remains captive of (or trapped in) the head (or mind) of an individual and does not perceive anything of the (subjective) outside world – this assumption (supposition, hypothesis) is absolutely (per se, as such) nonsensical (unreasonable, absurd) and can only crop (come) up (arise) inside of (within) the outlined (described) caricature of (the) philosophy of the subject (subject philosophy) –, but in [the fact] that Reason apprehends (grasps, understands) the world of objects and of subjects from the perspective of a subject and its [the said subject’s] concrete situation (Vernunft die Welt der Objekte und der Subjekte in der Perspektive eines Subjekts und seiner konkreten Lage erfaßt).

The general (intellectual(-spiritual)-historical) incompetence of the theory of communicative action (in [respect of] the history of ideas) is reflected (expressed) in its inability to determine (decide) its own (intellectual(-spiritual)-historical) position (or place) (in the history of ideas). It [The theory of communicative action] knows of the original (initial) “internal interrelation (correlation, connection)” („internen Zusammenhang“) between (the) philosophy of the subject (subject philosophy) and the concept (notion) of Reason or of rationality\(^{149}\), but it does not want to know that (the) detachment (breaking away) from the former [philosophy

\(^{147}\) On (Regarding) the theoretical leaps and dilemmas of (the) ethically inspired communication theory (theory of communication) in general see in detail Ch. IV, Sec. 1Ebc in this volume.
\(^{148}\) *Phil. Diskurs*, p. 69 footnote 4.
\(^{149}\) Loc. cit., p. 95.
of the subject] makes (gives) a defence of the Enlightenment modern era (age, epoch) against the postmodern attack (assault) on (of) Reason and rationality hopeless (pointless, futile, no chance). The (bourgeois) modern era (age, epoch) was per definitionem (subject-philosophically and anthropologically) oriented (aligned, adjusted) (in terms of the philosophy of the subject and (as well as) anthropologically) (subjektphilosophisch und anthropologisch ausgerichtet), and whoever deserts (leaves, abandons) this terrain (territory, base, ground) has already sided with the (mass-democratic) postmodern era (age, epoch), even if he thinks [that] the averting (turning away, abandonment) of (the) philosophy of the subject (subject philosophy) and anthropology is advisable (recommends (suggests) itself) exactly for the more effective (effectual, efficacious) founding (establishment) of the modern era’s ideals of Reason (zur wirksameren Begründung der Vernunftideale der Moderne). The manner (way, method) of (the [said]) founding (establishment) [of the modern era’s ideals of Reason] (intellectually(-spiritually)-historically) carries more weight (is more serious) (in the history of ideas) than the content of that which (what) is being founded (established), (;) (namely,) in it [the (manner of) (the) founding] (namely) the ideologically predominant (prevailing) thought figure (schema) manifests itself (is made known) (Die Art und Weise der Begründung wiegt geistesgeschichtlich schwerer als der Inhalt des zu Begründenden, in ihr tut sich nämlich die ideologisch vorherrschende Denkfigur kund). The theory of communicative action thus (consequently, therefore, as a result) provides (supplies, produces), irrespective of its conscious intentions and aims (goals), (an) additional objective (piece of) evidence (proof, indication) [in respect] of (regarding, for) the fact that the culture

150 Cf. Sec. 2 in this chapter.
of the European New Times (Modern Era) is irrevocably (irreversibly, definitely, positively) at [its] (the) end (die Kultur der europäischen Neuzeit unwiderruflich zu Ende ist). (The) Praise for a postmodern [thinker] (postmodernist; Postmodernen) like Foucault because of his combating (fighting) (of) (the) philosophy of the subject (subject philosophy)\(^{151}\) remains more eloquent than (the) criticism (critique; Kritik) of him. Yet it [the said praise] is given (conferred, dispensed) in vain ((all) for nothing). Because Foucault’s thinking (thought) is based (rests) on anthropological premises, although (even though) he is conscious of it just as little as Habermas (is). Some remarks (observations) about (on, regarding) it [this] are appropriate (advisable), because here the confusion (confusing, mixing up) of anthropocentrism and anthropology, of which there was talk at the beginning of this section, is seen (shown) (appears) particularly graphically (clearly).

In Foucault this confusion is connected with the demand for a new epistemological order which, through the driving out (ousting, dispelling) of man from the position of “souverain au royaume du monde”, appears [to be] imperative (necessary, called for): after the end of anthropocentrism, anthropology and in general that which one calls sciences humaines, can no longer be the basis (or foundation) of knowledge, that is, the fate (or destiny) of anthropology is tied up (connected) with (tied (connected) to) that [the fate (or destiny)] of anthropocentrism\(^{152}\). Now everyone, who strives for (endeavours (tries hard) [to achieve], is concerned with, seeks) the clarification of the bases (or foundations) of knowledge and of science, must not least of all [must above all] pose the question about (in respect of, regarding) whose

---

\(^{151}\) *Phil. Diskurs*, p. 306ff.

\(^{152}\) *Les Mots*, p. 359.
knowledge and science we are dealing with (is it a matter of [concern]) here. Are there other subjects of knowledge (Erkenntnissubjekte) than humans (men, people), and, does knowledge stop (cease) being human knowledge when (if) it is pursued after the decline of anthropocentrism and when (if) it no longer revolves around anthropological question formulations (formulations of the [a] question, problem examinations, examinations of (a [the]) problem(s), central themes) (Nun muß jeder, der sich um die Klärung der Grundlagen der Erkenntnis und der Wissenschaft bemüht, nicht zuletzt die Frage stellen, um wessen Erkenntnis und Wissenschaft es sich hier handelt. Gibt es andere Erkenntnissubjekte als Menschen und hört die Erkenntnis auf, menschliche Erkenntnis zu sein, wenn sie nach dem Untergang des Anthropozentrismus betrieben wird und wenn sie sich nicht mehr um anthropologische Fragestellungen dreht)? Foucault’s methodically (i.e. methodologically) and, in terms of content, highly (extremely, most) dubious (questionable) dealing with the history of ideas forbids (prohibits) him from asking such questions, or rather, (it) permits (allows) him not to ask such questions. In his (intellectual(-spiritual)-historical) analyses (regarding the history of ideas) one closed thought structure (structure of thought) (eine geschlossene Denkstruktur) abruptly (suddenly) follows another [closed thought structure], without the mechanisms of the transitions (transition mechanisms) (die Mechanismen der Übergänge) being made clear (understandable). A more detailed (closer) treatment (consideration, study, preoccupation) [in respect] of them [the said mechanisms of the transitions of closed thought structures] must nevertheless show (demonstrate) that the replacement of a (one) thought structure (structure of thought) with another always happens (takes place) in a concrete human and historical situation [–] and irrespective of the validity of the truth claims (Wahrheitansprüche) on each and every respective
occasion(,) [−] [which, it] springs (arises) from and complies with (accommodates, makes concessions to) [(such a concrete human and historical situation) springing (arising) from and complying with (accommodating, making concessions to)] the polemical needs and intentions of certain (particular) subjects which reinterpret (i.e. meta-interpret), modify or simply reverse (turn upside down, invert) an already predominant (prevailing) thought structure (structure of thought) (den polemischen Bedürfnissen und Absichten bestimmter Subjekte entspringt und entgegenkommt, die eine bereits vorherrschende Denkstruktur unminterpretieren, modifizieren oder einfach umkehren). The subjects are not absorbed by the thought structures (structures of thought), but they use (employ) them [the thought structures] as intellectual(-spiritual) weapons (als geistige Waffen) and follow their (actually (really) existing) inner logic only as long as an unbridgeable gulf (or gap) between the logic of logic and the logic of polemics does not come into being (is not created (produced)) (und folgen ihrer (tatsächlich vorhandenen) inneren Logik nur, solange keine unüberbrückbare Kluft zwischen der Logik der Logik und der Logik der Polemik entsteht). The incessant (unremitting, continual, ceaseless) effect (impact, influence) of the polemical component in its intrinsic (essential) binding (bond or relationship) (connection) with concrete subjects explains, in addition, the inner (internal) variety (diversity) of form (multiformity) and tension (stress, strain) in the (intellectual(-spiritual)-historical) picture (or image) of all epochs (with regard to the history of ideas) (Die unablässige Wirkung der polemischen Komponente in ihrer wesenhaften Bindung mit konkreten Subjekten erklärt außerdem die innere Vielfalt und Spannung im geistesgeschichtlichen Bild aller Epochen). While (As) Foucault overlooks or suppresses the latter [said inner variety of form and tension in the history of ideas as it pertains to the polemical component bound to
concrete subjects], he attains (or gains) (reaches, obtains, gets, extracts) those (intellectual(-spiritual)-historical) simplifications (pertaining to (regarding) the history of ideas) (Vereinfachungen) which he needs (requires) in order to cover (hush) up the permanence of anthropological motifs (motives) in the history of ideas as a whole (die Permanenz anthropologischer Motive in der Geistesgeschichte als ganzer), and to narrow (abridge or reduce) (shorten, curtail) anthropology to the triumphant anthropological discipline of the 19th century, which (was supposed (meant) to have) had its systematic start (commenced systematically) with Kant (!) and (was supposed (meant)) (to have) ended the intellectual(-spiritual) dominance (domination, rule) of taxonomy and language in the 18th century153. The symptomatic significance (importance, meaning) of anthropology already at the threshold of the New Times (Pico, Machiavelli, Montaigne etc.) does not come up at all, and the purity (pureness) of the thought structures (structures of thought), which allegedly (supposedly, ostensibly) had (held, put) the 17th and 18th century spellbound (under its spell), is safeguarded (protected) through (by means of) a double (dual, twin) mishandling (maltreatment, ill-treatment, abuse) of the material: the dismemberment (cutting up, breaking into pieces) of the work of individual thinkers and scientists, which is presented only from the point of view (angle) (in terms (accordance with the aspect)) of what can (is allowed to) fit in (adapt to) each and every (respectious) overarching thought structure (structure of thought) in question, joins the (above-)mentioned erasure (wiping out) of (the) (intellectual(-spiritual)) variety (diversity) of form (multiformity) (in the history of ideas). A few (well-)chosen (or choice) (select) passages are, in the process (course of this), cobbled together with (through, by

---

means of) great art (skill(s)) in combining and improvising (in respect of combination and improvisation) in (relation to) (vis-à-vis, towards) [making, concocting, order to constitute] epochal thought constructs (or systems of ideas) (Wenige ausgesuchte Stellen werden dabei durch große Kombinations- und Improvisationskünste zu epochalen Denkgebilden zusammengeflickt).

One basic component of the mass-democratic thought figure (schema) in Foucault consists therefore in the declaration of war against (challenge to) bourgeois anthropocentrism and its anthropology. The other [basic component] appears (comes to light) above all in his later work and consists in the demand for self-realisation (Forderung nach Selbstverwirklichung), which, as we know, even formulated in code (cryptically, encryptedly, indirectly), ends up in (amounts to) a certain (particular) image (picture) of man or presupposes the same [such an image of man]. In declared (professed, avowed) agreement with “present-day (current) struggles” against the ruling (dominant, prevailing) forms of power (or power forms) (In erklärter Übereinstimmung mit den „gegenwärtigen Kämpfen“ gegen die herrschenden Machtformen), Foucault typically enough (characteristically) wants to raise the same question as the supposed (alleged, putative) originator (creator, author) of anthropology, Kant: “who are we?”; with it (that) [question], he connects the aim (goal) [of] “bringing about new forms of subjectivity, while (we) reject(ing) the kind (sort) of subjectivity which was imposed on us for centuries (hundreds of years)”\textsuperscript{154}. Foucault of course does not pose that question as a diachronically thinking anthropologist, rather he wants to know (how) it relates (refers) to the present-day (current) historical moment. All the same (Nevertheless): (there is (exists)) no reason and

\textsuperscript{154} „Das Subjekt“, pp. 246, 250.
also no possibility (exist) [in respect] of shaking (throwing) off a centuries-long ruling – and obviously harmful (detrimental, injurious) and dispensable (non-essential) – subjectivity, if no, until now, suppressed forces in man as genus (i.e. species or race) (Menschen als Gattung) ("we") conflict with (stand in the way of) it [the said harmful and dispensable subjectivity]. What is, therefore, in man treated like a child (or led by the nose) and held down (or oppressed) (gegängelt und niedergehalten), what justifies the highly (intensely, very) evaluative (value-bearing or judgemental) statement (proposition, opinion) (stark wertenden Aussage) [that] we have become "captives (or prisoners) of our own history"? Foucault would have to go into (or take on) this aporia (i.e. doubt, contradiction or paradox) because he requires (demands, wants) a new subjectivity not simply as [a] functionalistic sociologist and social engineer (als funktionalistischer Soziologe und Sozialingenieur), who ascertains a gulf (gap) between conventional (traditional) modes of behaviour and new social conditions (relations or circumstances) (herkömmlichen Verhaltensweisen und neuen sozialen Verhältnissen), that is, between "psychical" and "social systems", and [who] wants to remove (bridge, remedy) this gulf (gap), no matter with what signs (i.e. symbolism) (under what auspices). On the contrary, he thinks in normative categories, and from the new subjectivity (he) expects emancipatory effects (consequences or results).

The individualist, who through consumption or in any other form strives after (for) (pursues) his self-realisation, is a characteristic type of mass democracy (Der Individualist, der durch Konsum oder in irgendeiner anderen Form seine Selbstverwirklichung anstrebt, ist ein charakteristischer Typ der Massendemokratie). Another, just as

155 Loc. cit., p. 245.
indispensable [mass-democratic type] is (the) homo oeconomicus, who likewise (also) appears (crops up, occurs, arises) in varying shapes (or forms) and suggests (intimates) anthropological considerations (thoughts) too. That means: the (national) economists and sociologists, who see in him [homo oeconomicus] the ultimate (last, final) social unit (die letzte soziale Einheit), interpret his acts on the basis of anthropological premises. New discoveries are of course not made in the course of this (into the bargain). One continues [They continue] to move (with) in the framework of the elementary anthropology of early economic liberalism (ökonomistischen Frühliberalismus), which however only made up (constituted) one side of bourgeois anthropology as a whole; the other [side] was concerned with (pertained to) the ethical theory(,) and with (to) the ethical action(,) of relevant anthropological factors. The anthropology of today’s economistic social theory is therefore already from its (intellectual(-spiritual)-historical) origin (beginnings, provenance, derivation) (as regards the history of ideas) a narrowed (abridged or reduced) (shortened, curtailed) and one-dimensional [one, anthropology] (eine verkürzte und eindimensionale); it is not a matter here, that is, of a systematic perception (view) of man, in (the) light of which (then) economic phenomena are understood (grasped, comprehended), but of partial anthropological ad hoc assumptions (suppositions) (partielle anthropologische Ad-hoc-Annahmen), which are meant (supposed) to (should) support (bear, carry) the postulates of economic theory and economistic social theory. The indispensability of the anthropological [element] accompanies the necessity of its narrowing (abridgement or reduction) (shortening, curtailment) (Verkürzung). The extent of the shifting (transfer(ing)) back (in)(to) the thoughts world (or ideological universe) of early liberalism is discernible (recognisable) from two further points of view (Das Ausmaß der Rückversetzung in die
Gedankenwelt des Frühliberalismus ist unter zwei weiteren Gesichtspunkten erkennbar). First, homo oeconomicus is of course meant (supposed) to (should) be egotistical (i.e. selfish) (egoistisch), but simultaneously rational (rational). That means (signifies) that egotism (i.e. selfishness) (Egoismus) is not expressed in outbursts (outbreaks, eruptions) of passion, which fight it out blindly (Ausbrüchen von Leidenschaft, die blind um sich schlägt), but on the contrary, that it [egotism] is capable of (in a position to) being (be) articulated as end(goal)-rational (purposeful(expedient)-rational) behaviour (als zweckrationales Verhalten), i.e. of seeking (to seek) the suitable (appropriate) means for the [attainment, achievement of an] end (goal) (die geeigneten Mittel zum Zweck), and, in the process, for the sake of exactly this (egotistical) end (goal), of (to) do(ing) (go(ing)) without (forgo, abstain (refrain) from, renounce) short-term pleasure (or enjoyment) (auf kurzfristigen Genuß zu verzichten). In its combination with rationality and the concept of long-term interest, egotism (i.e. selfishness) really serves the disciplining of the passions (In seiner Verbindung mit der Rationalität und dem Begriff des langfristigen Interesses dient der Egoismus geradezu der Disziplinierung der Leidenschaften); interests are contrasted (contradistinguished) to (with) the passions, and the social world becomes ponderable (calculable) because the interests of egotists (i.e. selfish people), who constitute it [the social world], put an end to the imponderability (incalculability) of the passions. That, however, was a typical thought figure (schema) of the 18th century. Secondly, the anthropological arguments (themselves), which are summoned (mobilised, highlighted) against the economistic interweaving (intersecting, entanglement, crossing over) of egotism (i.e.

---

156 Hirschman, Passions and the Interests.
selfishness) and rationality, (themselves) refer to much older debates; the similarity of [in] the argumentation of course results (arises) from the logic of the matter (thing), not from the accurate (precise) knowledge of the (intellectual(-spiritual)-historical) precedents (in the history of ideas). Against (the) egotistical (i.e. selfish) man one can in fact anthropologically,( anyway (anyhow)), in principle set nothing other than (the) unselfish [man], and (the) competitive society (society of competition) interwoven (knitted, grown together) with homo oeconomicus (die mit dem homo oeconomicus verwachsene Konkurrenzgesellschaft) can be accordingly exorcised (cast out, averted, warded off, banished) only through (by means of) the notion (idea) of a new solidarity. In the course of this, the room to move (leeway, latitude, scope) for (of) various combinations and dosages (doses) of fundamental anthropological factors remains quite large, so that attempts at [replacing] (putting in the place of) unilateral rational egotism (i.e. selfishness) [with] more complex motivation structures (structures of motivation; Motivationstrukturen) cannot fail to materialise. All of this reminds [us] (is reminiscent), down to the last detail (up to and including (in) great detail), of the debates of the Enlightenment over (on, regarding) the (moral-philosophical) value (and status (importance)) of self-love (in moral philosophy) (die Debatten der Aufklärung über den moralphilosophischen Stellenwert der Selbstliebe).

But (However,) regardless (irrespective) of the (intellectual(-spiritual)-historical) background(s) (backdrop(s)) (in the history of ideas) and also regardless of [the fact of, as] to what extent (in what way) and in what (which) form the hard utilitarian rationality of homo oeconomicus must

---

157 Thus, e.g. Etzioni, Moral Dimension.
158 See e.g. Elster, Cement, p. 250ff..
159 In relation to (Regarding) that: Kondylis, Aufklärung, pp. 381ff., 407ff.
(has to) be watered down (undermined, weakened) in view of the realities of action in psychical and socially complex situations (im Hinblick auf die Realitäten des Handelns in psychisch und sozial komplexen Lagen), such investigations (examinations) or statements (opinions) bear witness (attest) to a waking (vigilant) consciousness (einem wachen Bewußtsein) of (as regards) the relevance and the topicality of the anthropological [element] (die Relevanz und die Aktualität des Anthropologischen)\textsuperscript{160}. Much endeavour (Many an (Some) effort) to bring down (trip up, cause the downfall of, thwart) or at least to shake (rock) (cause) homo oeconomicus (to totter) came (emanated, stemmed) directly or indirectly though from the ethically motivated wish (desire) for the defence of the goodness and of the dignity of man or of the significance (meaning, importance) of the value-like(axiological)-normative for the constitution of the social [sphere] (dem ethisch motivierten Wunsch nach Verteidigung der Güte und der Würde des Menschen oder der Bedeutung des Werthaft-Normativen für die Konstitution des Sozialen). That cannot be our concern (care, worry) here. On the contrary, it is to (must, should) be ascertained that economistic anthropology (die ökonomistische Anthropologie), in comparison for instance to (with) Parson’s normativism, exhibits (shows, demonstrates) the theoretical advantage (merit) of putting off (i.e. postponing) (delaying, pushing out) as much (far) as possible the appeal to the effect (impact, influence) of internalised norms (den Appell an die Wirkung internalisierter Normen)\textsuperscript{161}. What it [economistic anthropology] in principal (basically) asserts (contends, maintains) is neither completely (entirely) nor in all cases wrong (false), nevertheless (all the same), its pragmatic(al) and theoretical gaps (i.e. deficiencies or failings) (ihre pragmatischen und theoretischen Lücken)

\textsuperscript{160} See e.g. Lindenberg, “Homo Socio-oeconomicus”, esp. pp. 728-733.
remain so great (large) that it cannot support (bear) even a theory of the economy, let alone a general social theory (eine allgemeine Sozialtheorie). To the extent that its starting (or basic) theses are correct (true, right) and analytically useful (usable), this is not due to (because of) the use (usage) of the economic categories of rational calculus (i.e. calculation) and of utility (profit or use) maximisation (und der Nutzenmaximierung), but conversely [it is due] to the fact that these categories represent (constitute) an economistic disguise (disguising), though [they] also [represent] [a] narrowing (shortening, curtailment or reduction) and [a] banalisation (i.e. trivialisation) (Banalisierung) of anthropological factors of far greater range (scope). The distance between the inferable (deducible, derivable, decipherable, perceivable) real content (substance) (erschließbaren realen Gehalt) of anthropology and social theory, and, the theoretical range (extent or scope) of economistic anthropological and social-theoretical constructions is seen (appears, is shown), by the way, in [respect of] the pressure under which the economistic theoreticians are (stand) to keep on taking hold of (grasping or expressing) (to more and more take hold of (grasp or express)) the concepts (notions) of rational calculus (i.e. calculation) and utility (profit or use) maximisation. As the main (chief) representatives of the school formulate (express) [it] (put it in words), only a “broad” “rational choice theory” is capable of doing justice to the totality (entirety) of human behaviour; the admission (confession) [that] the bearers of the rational decision (die rationalen Entscheidungsträger) are not necessarily conscious of their own maximising behaviour (maximierenden Verhaltens), and are also not always in the position to account for it [the said maximising behaviour], belongs (appertains) to it [that rational choice theory] 162.

162 Becker, Economic Approach, pp. 8, 7.
That is, however, dynamite ([an] explosive) under (in) the foundations of economistic anthropology. Because it cannot be precisely determined (fixed) how far (wide) the broadening (expansion, widening, extension) of its [economistic anthropology’s] original (initial) concepts (notions) may go, without it raising the question [as to] why (then) (exactly) such concepts (notions) (, of all concepts (notions),) should serve as [the, a] theoretical starting point, and not for instance concepts(,) which could be taken (gathered, inferred) from the areas (fields, realms, sectors) in which the broadening took place (occurred, happened), if (should) these have proven (turned out) to be just as capable of broadening (of being expanded) (able to be broadened) (expandable) (erweiterungsfähig) in the reverse direction. Were the behaviour of the members of society in which Wall Street’s stockbroker lives, and that [the behaviour] of the members of society in which for instance La Rochefoucauld (had, has) lived, to [could] be explained on the basis of one and the same egotistical (i.e. selfish) anthropology, then (so, thus) it is incomprehensible (there is no reason) [as to] why the conceptuality of the former [society in which Wall Street’s stockbroker lives] has to (must) be preferred to (favoured in respect of) that of the latter [society in which La Rochefoucauld lived] – unless one presupposes that which one should prove. The inclusion (incorporation) of the dimension of unconscious motivation (unbewußten Motivationsdimension) in (the) anthropological way of looking at things (consideration, observation, contemplation) bears out (corroborates, substantiates, confirms) this suspicion and in addition lessens (diminishes, reduces) the declarative (declaratory, expressive) force (meaningfulness, validity; Aussagekraft) of “rational choice theory”, which can draw (get) its character of (as) a model and its clarity as interpretation of acting (i.e. action) (Handlungsinterpretation) only from [the fact] that in it [“rational choice theory”] the level of motivation and
of calculus (i.e. calculation), and the level of the course (or sequence) of acting (i.e. action) (die Ebene des Handlungsablaufs), are hardly (allowed to be) distinguished (differentiated) from each other. That means: the texture (or composition) of motivation and the rationality of calculus (i.e. calculation) accompanied (convoyed, escorted) by (with) (self-)interest become visible (obvious, evident, clear, noticeable) in ([due] to, at) (the) end (goal) rationality (purposeful (expedient) rationality) of the external (outer, outward) course (or sequence) of acting (i.e. action) (An der Zweckrationalität des äußeren Handlungsablaufs wird die Beschaffenheit der Motivation und die Rationalität des interessegeleiteten Kalküls sichtbar); between both [(of the) said levels] no gap yawns which would suggest (point to) anthropologically determined (conditioned) ambivalences (anthropologisch bedingte Ambivalenzen). From this perspective, the possibility of end(goal)-rational (purposeful(expedient)-rational) action, with “irrational”, i.e. non-economic motivation, and in instrumental dependence (reliance) on this [“irrational”, i.e. non-economic motivation] (die Möglichkeit zweckrationalen Handelns bei „irrationaler“, d. h. nicht ökonomischer Motivation und in instrumenteller Abhängigkeit von dieser), is out of the question; “(self-)interest” disciplines a limine, through (by means of) its rationality, the “passions”, which (do not) make their presence felt (become evident (manifest)) nowhere (anywhere) in the [economistic anthropology’s] theoretical model (das „Interesse“ diszipliniert a limine durch seine Rationalität die „Leidenschaften“, die sich nirgendwo im theoretischen Modell melden). The paradoxical constellation (i.e. situation) (Konstellation) is now this (one): since the transparency of the model is based on the (erroneously (mistakenly, wrongly) assumed (supposed, adopted, accepted)) symmetry of [between] end(goal)-rational (purposeful-rational) action and rational motivation, (so, then, thus) it [the said transparency] must be(come)
clouded (blurred, dulled) by the (rightly intended (desired)) consideration of motivational interests (interests pertaining to motivation) (Motivationsinteressen), which go beyond (defy, evade, elude) conscious calculus (i.e. calculation). Yet if (should, since) [the] “passions” have their say in the determination (definition) of “(self-)interest”, (so, then, thus) the concept of (self-)interest must be correspondingly (accordingly) broadened (expanded, extended, widened) in order to include (cover, capture), in terms of content, very different components (,) if one wants to carry on (continue) using (availing oneself of) it [the said concept of (self-)interest] as [the] key of (to, for) [an, the] anthropological construction. Because [the] “passions” – understood as the epitome (or embodiment) of all (everything) which may not be stricto sensu described as (called) *economic*, i.e. utility (profit or use) maximisation oriented towards (or aimed at) [acquiring, obtaining, gaining] material goods – have their own rationality and their own rational calculus (i.e. calculation), as in fact their frequent conflicts with “interests” attest (vouch for, testify) (to).

In the next section we shall see how economistic anthropology, in (on, from) the roundabout way (detour) of a selective and in advance cleansed (purged) definition of (self-)interest, wants to get to grips with (the root of) the question of political order (wie die ökonomistische Anthropologie auf dem Umwege einer selektiven und im voraus gesäuberten Definition des Interesses der Frage der politischen Ordnung beikommen will). We shall turn now to behaviouristically inspired anthropology (behavioristisch inspirierten Anthropologie), which must be looked upon (regarded) (partly) as (considered (to be)) (partly) [the] basis (or foundation), partly as [the] supplement (complement), partly as [the, a]
variation of (the) economistic [anthropology]. The main (chief) exponent of this direction has placed (put, set) the demand for a new anthropological consciousness (or contemplation) on a programmatic (fundamental or in principle) basis (auf eine grundsätzliche Basis), while he reminded (reminding) [us] (recalled, recollected) that (the) general propositions in social theory before the rise of modern sociology were exactly propositions on (regarding, in relation to) human nature (die allgemeinen Propositionen in der Sozialtheorie vor dem Aufstieg der modernen Soziologie eben Propositionen über die menschliche Natur waren). What matters now [to Homans] is to have recourse to this tradition, and against the ignoring of the kinds of law bindedness (determinisms or law-based necessities) of human behaviour (e.g. on the part of system (systems) functionalism) (das Ignorieren der Gesetzmäßigkeiten menschlichen Verhaltens (seitens des Systemfunktionalismus z. B.)), to re-introduce (the) anthropological way of looking at things (consideration, observation, contemplation) in the form of basic (fundamental) psychological hypotheses (psychologischen Grundhypothesen), which are supposed (meant) to (should) explain man’s behaviour as man, i.e. as [a] being (or creature) of the genus (or species) (i.e. (a) human being) (als Gattungswesen) and not merely as [a] member of a certain (particular) society. In the course of this, two things apply as settled (certain) [are taken for granted (presupposed)]: that the rejoining (or reconnection) with the anthropological-psychological orientation of social theory must (has to) take place under the direction of modern psychology, and that this latter [modern psychology] can be

---

163 “The two are in fact largely the same” writes Homans with regard to behaviouristic psychology and “rational choice theory”; even though he holds (considers) the former to be fundamental (or basic) (elementary) (Nature, p. 39; “Commentary”, p. 226).
164 Homans, Nature, p. 35.
165 Homans, “Commentary”, esp. p. 231; Sentiments, p. 252.
nothing other than the behaviouristic psychology of the individual (die
behavioristische Individualpsychologie)\textsuperscript{166}. The particular emphasis on
the individualistic starting point is legitimised as [a] consistent
declaration of war on the homo sociologicus of [a] [in] (the) Parsonian
mould (type), who is supposed (meant) to (should) be no less impersonal
than the social institutions and systems supported (borne) by him\textsuperscript{167}.
Nonetheless, a much deeper relationship (or affinity) (eine viel tiefere
Verwandtschaft) exists between methodological individualism and
behaviourism which is probably hardly (may hardly be) known to the
behaviourist (dem Behavioristen) (the behaviourist is probably hardly
(may hardly be) conscious (aware) of), because it [the said deeper
relationship (or affinity)] springs (stems, comes) from (is due to) the, for
him, invisible disadvantages (drawbacks, shortcomings) of his
psychological method. One can describe them [these invisible
disadvantages] as follows: the more man is looked at (regarded) as
(considered) [an] isolated individual (isoliertes Individuum), the deeper
can those factors which are cited (stated, quoted) for the explanation of
his behaviour be put (placed) in his constitution (composition, texture or
nature), the more (higher), in other words, is the biological dimension
overrated (estimated). Inasmuch (Insofar) as behaviouristic psychology
(die behavioristische Psychologie) is based, during (as regards) the
explanation of human behaviour, on the basic (fundamental) schema
“stimulus-response” (das Grundschema „Stimulus-Reaktion“) in this or
that version, it [behaviouristic psychology] actually (in reality) refers to
an existential stratum (layer) (eine existentielle Schicht), which because
of its depth(,) is found everywhere (all over (the place)); hence

\textsuperscript{166} Homans, \textit{Nature}, p. 36.
\textsuperscript{167} Homans, “Bringing Men Back In”; “Commentary”, esp. p. 229ff..
behaviouristic explanations’ claim (Anspruch) to general validity (universality) (auf Allgemeingültigkeit).

The only question is whether the explanations at this deep[er] level (auf dieser Tiefebene) [deep level] are social-theoretically usable and fertile (fruitful) or whether the level of explanation must be raised (lifted) considerably (quite a bit), so that the explainer (person explaining) may set foot (step, walk) on the terrain of social theory and of history too.

Homans, of course, (has) rightly stressed (emphasised) [that] the universality of human nature (die Universalität menschlicher Natur) lies (is found, is) not in the assumption (or acceptance) of identical values on the part of all humans (people, men), but in the similarity of the effect (impact, influence) of (different) values on human behaviour; the historian and not the behaviouristic sociologist is qualified (or competent) for the explanation of (to explain) the particular (specific) and changeable (variable) content of values (zur Erläuterung des besonderen und wandelbaren Inhalts der Werte sei der Historiker, nicht der behavioristische Soziologe berufen)\textsuperscript{168}. But through (by means of) the separation of the level of behaviouristic sociology from the level of history (Aber durch die Trennung der Ebene behavioristischer Soziologie von der Ebene der Geschichte), and through (by means of) the acknowledgement (recognition) of the autonomy (or independence) (Selbständigkeit) and at the same time of the indispensability of the latter [level of history,] our question (problem) is not answered (solved); a gulf still yawns between both levels, which [and such gulf] came into being (arose, resulted, ensued) from [out (on the basis) of] the fact that the former [level of behaviouristic sociology] was set (put, placed) too low (or deep) and consequently cannot be connected anymore with the latter

\textsuperscript{168} Nature, p. 41; Grundlagen, p. 112.
With (the) full (complete) acknowledgement (recognition) of the sole (exclusive) responsibility (or competence) of historical research in [respect of] accounting (to account) for each and every respective content of values through [the, an] analysis of concrete situations, an anthropologically underpinned social theory must go one step further than (the) [a] behaviouristic [social theory] and name (or identify) the factors which, beyond the uniformity of the behavioural effect (or impact) (influence) of values, determine (or cause) (necessitate, condition) the change in (of) (the) content of values as such. The real coefficients (or factors) of this change must, in other words, be described and be sufficiently (adequately) formalised (i.e. sufficiently rendered into forms), first of all irrespective of the historically ascertainable (or apprehensible) content of all respective values, but against the anthropological (and) or (rather) social-ontological background (backdrop), in order to be included (incorporated, integrated) in(to) a comprehensive social theory. Behaviouristic social theory, because of its of necessity (unavoidably) individualistic stance (or positioning), cannot grasp (i.e. understand) this theoretically decisive (deciding, crucial) connecting (or intermediate) link (joint) between the level of (the) behavioural uniformity (uniformity of behaviour) and the level of history or of the concrete-unique(singular) [element] (Dieses theoretisch entscheidende Mittelglied zwischen der Ebene der Verhaltensgleichförmigkeit und der Ebene der Geschichte oder des Konkret-Einmaligen kann die behavioristische Sozialtheorie wegen ihrer notgedrungen individualistischen Einstellung nicht fassen). It [Behaviouristic social theory] confuses (muddles (mixes) (up)) the (correct (right)) demand for [the] return of social theory to concrete man with the (wrong (false, incorrect)) assumption (or acceptance) (supposition, adoption) of the possibility of an adequate description

218
(account) of man as [an] isolated individual, that is, it erroneously (mistakenly, wrongly) lumps anthropology or psychology and (methodological) individualism together. No doubt (Certainly, Of course), concrete humans (people, men) are individuals, but the individual must not constitute the counter concept of (vis-à-vis, towards) the social, if (when) by (with) that the social relation in its entire (whole, complete) spectrum and in its intersubjective mechanism is meant. Especially (Precisely, Exactly), however, [the] spectrum and mechanism of the social relation illuminate central social phenomena like (the) changes in (of) values (Gerade Spektrum und Mechanismus der sozialen Beziehung beleuchten aber zentrale soziale Phänomene wie den Wertewandel), before which consistently carried out (undertaken, implemented, realised, enforced) behaviourism stalls (fails or breaks down) while it must postulate ((in) having to postulate) a(n) (unambiguous (unequivocal) and) permanent relation between stimulus and response (reaction) (which only has one meaning (or interpretation)).

[The] Character, [the] fluctuations (or variations) or [the] radical changes (or upheavals) in (of) the social relation between (amongst) concrete humans (people, men) explain why now something causes (gives rise to, induces, brings about) unease (discomfort) which earlier (in the past, previously, formerly) was perceived as (felt to be) pleasant (agreeable, enjoyable), why, that is, the aforementioned relation and the value perceptions (or notions of value) connected with it (that [relation]) (die damit verbundene Wertvorstellung) changed. The same [character, fluctuations or radical changes] explain how representations (notions) [in respect] of value and anti-value (or merit and demerit), what is worth striving after (or is desirable) and what is to be rejected, come into being (are created (produced), arise, ensue) at all (in general), whereas behaviouristic psychology can make only the repetition of an already
rewarded (recompensed), or the non-repetition of an already punished (penalised), response (reaction), not the first carrying out (execution, performance, implementation) of an act (or action), clear, [in respect] of [about] which the actor cannot yet know whether it [the said first carrying out of an act] will entail (result in, bring in its wake, have) reward (recompense) or punishment (penalty) (as a consequence) (Bei voller Anerkennung der ausschließlichen Zuständigkeit historischer Forschung, über den jeweiligen Inhalt der Werte durch Analyse konkreter Lagen Rechenschaft abzulegen, muß eine anthropologisch untermauerte Sozialtheorie einen Schritt weiter als die behavioristische gehen und die Faktoren namhaft machen, die, über die Gleichförmigkeit der verhaltensmäßigen Wirkung von Werten hinaus, den Wandel des Inhalts von Werten als solchen bedingen. Die realen Koeffizienten dieses Wandels müssen m. a. W. zunächst unabhängig vom historisch erfaßbaren Inhalt der jeweiligen Werte, aber vor dem anthropologischen bzw. sozialontologischen Hintergrund beschrieben und ausreichend formalisiert sein, um in eine umfassende Sozialtheorie einbezogen zu werden. Dieses theoretisch entscheidende Mittelglied zwischen der Ebene der Verhaltensgleichförmigkeit und der Ebene der Geschichte oder des Konkret-Einmaligen kann die behavioristische Sozialtheorie wegen ihrer notgedrungen individualistischen Einstellung nicht fassen. Sie verwechselt die (richtige) Forderung nach Rückkehr der Sozialtheorie zum konkreten Menschen mit der (falschen) Annahme von der Möglichkeit einer adäquaten Schilderung des Menschen als isoliertem Einzelnen, sie wirft also irräumlich Anthropologie bzw. Psychologie und (methodologischen) Individualismus in einen Topf. Gewiß, die konkreten Menschen sind Individuen, aber das Individuelle muß nicht den Gegenbegriff zum Sozialen bilden, wenn damit die soziale Beziehung in ihrem ganzen Spektrum und in ihrem intersubjektiven Mechanismus
gemeint ist. Gerade Spektrum und Mechanismus der sozialen Beziehung beleuchten aber zentrale soziale Phänomene wie den Wertewandel, vor denen der konsequent durchgeführte Behaviorismus versagt, indem er eine eindeutige und permanente Beziehung zwischen Stimulus und Reaktion postulieren muß. Charakter, Schwankungen oder Umwälzungen der sozialen Beziehung zwischen konkreten Menschen erklären, warum nun etwas Unbehangen hervorruft, was früher als angenehm empfunden wurde, warum sich also die gennante Beziehung und die damit verbundene Wertvorstellung wandelte. Dieselben erklären, wie Vorstellungen über Wert und Unwert, Erstrebenswertes und Abzulehnendes überhaupt entstehen, während die behavioristische Psychologie nur die Wiederholung einer schon belohnten bzw. die Nicht-Wiederholung einer schon bestraften Reaktion, nicht den ersten Vollzug einer Handlung begreiflich machen kann, von der der Akteur noch nicht wissen kann, ob sie Belohnung oder Strafe nach sich zieht169. And the same [character, fluctuations or radical changes] explain, finally, why the (fundamental, basic) principle of (the theory of) marginal utility (theory) (warum der Grundsatz der Grenznutzentheorie), according to which every new unit of utility or of pleasure (jede neue Einheit eines Nutzens oder Genusses) appears [to be] less desirable than the immediately preceding [one, unit of utility or of pleasure], applies (is valid) only partially, if at all, in (to, for) the realm (domain, area, sector, field, sphere) of specifically human values (im Bereich spezifisch menschlicher Werte); what is called (means) satiety (repleteness, repletion, satiation, saturation) in the biological sense, usually (most of the time) (readily) makes sense (is understood (clear)) (without a second thought (any difficulty)), yet satiety with regard to glory (or fame), power, knowledge (die Sättigung

im Hinblick auf Ruhm, Macht, Wissen) etc. can hardly be grasped (i.e. understood) in biological categories, particularly as (since) here every new unit very often seems more desirable than all the previous (earlier, former, preceding) [ones, units].

The neglecting (disregarding, ignoring) of the social relation in its anthropologically constitutive dimension by individualistic behaviourism (Die Vernachlässigung der sozialen Beziehung in ihrer anthropologisch konstitutiven Dimension durch den individualistischen Behaviorismus) makes this [individualistic behaviourism], moreover, incapable of (unable to) theoretically distinguish(ing) (differentiating) satisfactorily, on the basis of the schema “stimulus-response” or “reward-punishment” („Belohnung-Strafe“), the relation between subject and object, and the relation between subject and subject, from one another (die Beziehung zwischen Subjekt und Objekt und die Beziehung zwischen Subjekt und Subjekt). This shortcoming, which even prevents (hinders) a differentiated understanding of the mechanism of rewards and punishments, is by no means abolished (canceled (out), removed, annulled) because (of) (due to) [the fact] that the schema “stimulus-response” is handled (or dealt with) flexibly (in a flexible manner), that is, the individual constitution (composition or texture) and the interpretive activity (interpretatorische Tätigkeit) of the subject are inserted (i.e. interposed) between stimulus and response. Because this flexibilisation of the schema can take place (happen, occur) both with regard to the relation between subject and object as well as to that [the relation] between subject and subject, and that is why [it] in itself contributes nothing to the distinction (or differentiation) between (of) the two relations (with regard to each other). Be that as it may, it [the said schema “stimulus-response”] attests (bears witness) to the theoretical narrowness of pure behaviourism
and to its endeavour (effort) at overcoming it [the (this) theoretical
narrowness] without open capitulation (openly capitulating). The tacit
(silent) capitulation is, however, conspicuous (obvious, easy to notice).
When Homans e.g., despite the in principle use of the schema “stimulus-
response”, holds (considers, regards) each and every respective outcome
of the comparison between rewards and punishments to be (as) open,
since it [the said outcome] depends on subjective ratings (i.e. evaluations)
(Wertungen), and when he, over and above that, frequently discerns
(perceives, detects, recognises) during exchange a precedence (priority,
pre-eminence) of fairness (or justice) points of view (angles)
(Gerechtigkeitgeschichtspunkten) vis-à-vis the stimulus of material gain (or
profit)\textsuperscript{170}, then he in actual fact puts (places) the behaviouristic principle
at the disposal of a subject not necessarily (unconditionally) bound (tied)
to it [the said behaviouristic principle] (nicht unbedingt gebundenen
Subjekts); at the same time he puts paid to (ruins, destorys) the theoretical
possibility of a unification of behaviouristic, and, economistic
anthropology, or the analysis of motivation, inasmuch as this
[economistic anthropology or analysis of motivation] is based (rests) on
the assumption [that] rewards and punishments can be measured (in
money)\textsuperscript{171}. One can, undoubtedly, constantly (continually) twist and turn
that principle at will in order to prove its validity in (for) all concrete
cases; if it [the behaviouristic principle in question], nevertheless, loses
the unambiguous and direct (straight or rectilinear) reference which it
possessed during its first (initial) formulation, then there is no compelling
(cogent) reason anymore to use it as [the] basis (or foundation) of
anthropological and social-theoretical conceptuality, unless – as in the
case of the economistic version of egotistical (i.e. selfish) anthropology –,

\textsuperscript{170} Social Behaviour, p. 76 and passim.
\textsuperscript{171} Cf. Chadwick-Jones, Social Exchange Theory, esp. pp. 170, 175, 168.
one postulates what one should (ought (is supposed (meant)) to) prove. A behaviouristically inspired social theory cannot, in any case (at any rate), attain (reach, achieve) a fairly (reasonably, rather, somewhat) reasonable (or passable) degree of complexity (einigermaßen passablen Komplexitätsgrad), if it does not smuggle at every turn (every step of the way) into the behaviouristic schema of behaviour (behavioural schema) mechanisms of symbolic behaviour (in das behavioristische Verhaltensschema Mechanismen des symbolischen Verhaltens einschmuggelt). The relation between both perceptions (views) [i.e. of behaviouristic and economistic anthropology] [in respect] of (on) the course of behaviour is, however, not simply complementary, as the nonchalant eclecticism of behaviouristic social theoreticians wants to suggest. Whoever ascertains empirically that precisely (exactly, the very) the same things or acts (or actions) are used (employed) or perceived (seen), one time, as rewards, and another time, as punishments, must also heed (take to heart) the theoretical insight [that] symbolic rewards or punishments are very often the reversal (reverse) of the behaviouristically ascertainable (or apprehensible) [ones, rewards or punishments]\(^{172}\).

Conditioned and symbolic behaviour (Konditioniertes und symbolisches Verhalten) indeed exist closely together (side by side, next to each other) in the same subject, structurally, however, they are far apart (are (found) (lie) far from each other), and their difference ultimately (is) lies in (due to) the fact that man creates (makes) tools and symbols, as it were (so to speak), out of nothing, whereas other animals can use(,) at the most (at best, no more than)(,) already existing [ones, tools and symbols] (und ihr Unterschied liegt letztlich an der Tatsache, daß der Mensch Werkzeuge

\(^{172}\) Abrahamsson, “Homans on Exchange”, esp. pp. 281, 283, 284, 279ff..
und Symbole gleichsam aus dem Nichts schafft, während andere Tiere höchstens bereits vorhandene gebrauchen können).\textsuperscript{173}

The questions, which the economistic and behaviouristic approach have raised, will occupy us (keep us busy) several times in this work\textsuperscript{174}. Here it was a matter of (the point (concern) was to) track(ing) down (get(ting) onto) the persistent (lasting, continuous) effect (impact, influence) of anthropological motives in this thought framework (framework of thought) and at the same time to clarify the reasons (grounds) for the enormous (immense, huge) anthropological narrowings (shortenings, curtailments or reductions). Economistic anthropology’s recourse (reverting) to early liberal ideas (or thoughts) is determined (conditioned) by the strong economistic orientation of mass democracy and the status of homo oeconomicus in the “society of the economy (economy society)”, on the other hand, the invasion (or break-in) of behaviourism into this terrain points to the mass-democratic elimination of bourgeois anthropocentrism; because behaviourism (has) endeavoured programmatically to keep (hold) as small (short) as possible (minimise (decrease (lessen) as far as possible)) and or abolish (do away with, get rid of) the distance between human and generally animal behaviour. Under these circumstances (conditions), a social theory underpinned sufficiently (adequately) anthropologically could hardly flourish (prosper, thrive), although (even though) the objective indispensability of the anthropological [element] was articulated (enunciated, expressed, pronounced) here much (far) more clearly than in the forced admissions (confessions) or dogged refusals of system (systems) (and communication) theory (and the theory of communication) (Der

\textsuperscript{173} Ekeh, \textit{Social Exchange Theory}, p. 106ff..
\textsuperscript{174} See Ch. IV, Sec. 2D, and, Ch. V, Sec. 1D.

Another source of anthropological consciousness (or contemplation) in social theory is the still living (alive), but represented rather through (by (means of)) strong reminiscences, sociological tradition, which put (placed) in the foreground (gave priority to, special emphasis on, emphasised) the concept (notion) of social action – though without (hitherto) having drawn (until now) all [the] important theoretical conclusions. It does not have to be specifically (especially, expressly) explained (illustrated) [as to] why the concept (notion) of acting (i.e. action), as it were, (spontaneously) invites [us] (of its own accord) (is(, of its own accord, an) (a spontaneous) invitation) to an anthropology, [and] at any rate, [why such concept of acting (i.e. action)] must be connected to an anthropology: the constitutive features (characteristics) of (social) acting (i.e. action) point (allude, refer) to just as many constitutive features (characteristics) of man as man (Die konstitutiven Merkmale der (sozialen) Handlung weisen auf ebensoviele konstitutive Merkmale des Menschen als Menschen hin). Weber’s very deficient (incomplete,
patchy, sketchy) social-ontological reflection(, which was full of gaps (holes),) (Webers sehr lückenhafte sozialontologische Reflexion) as well as his personal interests drove (pushed), nevertheless, the theory of acting (i.e. action) in the opposite direction, i.e. in [the direction of] the investigation (research), having effective priority, of (into) ideal-typically ascertainable (or apprehensible) institutional and other crystallisations of social action as well as of (long-term) processes of acting (i.e. action), which were supposed (meant) to be (should have been) illuminated by a certain (particular) typology of action (d.h. in die vorrangige Erforschung von idealtypisch erfaßbaren institutionellen und anderen Kristallisierungen sozialen Handelns sowie von (langfristigen) Handlungsprozessen, die durch eine bestimmte Handelnstypologie beleuchtet werden sollten). Recently (Lately, As of late), and under the influence partly of phenomenological and symbolic interactionism, [as well as] partly through reformulations of psychoanalysis, an attempt was made to free (release, liberate) the theory of acting (i.e. action) from its individualistic or intentionalistic unilateralities (or one-sidednesses), to enrich it [the theory of acting (i.e. action)] through (by means of) the analysis of processes of motivation and of rationalisation (motivation(al) and rationalisation processes), and in this form to use [it, the theory of acting (i.e. action)] as the starting point or basis (foundation) of an exacting (or sophisticated) (demanding, discriminating) social theory.\footnote{I am thinking, e.g., of Giddens, \textit{Constitution}, chap. 1-2.}

In the course of this, a rather rhapsodic juxtaposition of materials and theses emerged (was the result (outcome)), which however, despite the ignoring of the especially anthropological question formulation (putting (formulation) of the [a] question, problem examination, examination of the [a] problem, central theme), at least indirectly articulates the enduring
6. The political in mass-democratic social theory and in the constitution of the social (Das Politische in der massendemokratischen Sozialtheorie und in der Konstitution des Sozialen)

Since the formation of the modern European state, the far-reaching identification of politics and [the] state became common (familiar), and it accompanied the contradistinction between (contrasting of) the state and (in itself (basically) unpolitical, i.e. economising (or economic) etc.) society (Seit der Herausbildung des modernen europäischen Staates wurde die weitgehende Identifizierung von Politik und Staat geläufig, und sie ging mit der Gegenüberstellung von Staat und (an sich unpolitischer, d. h. wirtschaftender etc.) Gesellschaft einher). The mass-democratic
blurring (or effacement) (obliteration) of the boundaries between state and society had to therefore, against this background, amount (come) to (end up in) a theoretical weakening (attenuation, toning down) or even belittlement (disparagement, downgrading) of politics and the political [sphere] (Die massendemokratische Verwischung der Grenzen zwischen Staat und Gesellschaft mußte deshalb vor diesem Hintergrund auf eine theoretische Abschwächung oder gar Herabsetzung der Politik und des Politischen hinauslaufen). The bourgeois-liberal contradistinction between (contrasting of) state and society was, according to all [the] indications (clues, signs, (circumstantial) evidence), just like their [the (state and society’s)] mass-democratic interweaving (intertwining) [of state and society] with each other, a politically-polemically useful (beneficial, expedient) fiction (Die bürgerlich-liberale Gegenüberstellung von Staat und Gesellschaft war allen Indizien nach ebenso wie deren massendemokratische Verflechtung miteinander eine politisch-polemisch nützliche Fiktion). Yet in the contrasting (opposition, conflict) between both thought figures (schemata), the real transition to the (20th century) social welfare state (or state providing social welfare) (of the 20th century) is reflected (Dennoch spiegelt sich im Gegensatz der beiden Denkfiguren der reale Übergang zum Versorgungs- und Sozialstaat des 20. Jahrhunderts wider). Now the state seems to be (stand) in principle (programmatically) in the service of society or of (decisive (crucial)) social organisations and accordingly politics is looked at (regarded) as (considered (to be)) [the] extended (lengthened, prolonged) arm of society, as a part or “subsystem” of the same [society], which should be distiguished (differentiated) from the other [parts or “subsystems”] merely by (means of) (through, because of) its special functions (Nun scheint der Staat grundsätzlich im Dienste der Gesellschaft bzw. der (ausschlaggebenden) gesellschaftlichen Organisation zu stehen und
dementsprechend wird Politik als verlängerter Arm der Gesellschaft, als ein Teil oder „Subsystem“ derselben betrachtet, das sich bloß durch seine speziellen Funktionen von den anderen unterscheiden soll). Dies

belittlement (disparagement, downgrading) of politics and of the political indeed becomes (is made) possible, as we shall (are yet to) see, only through a conceptual narrowing (contraction, constriction) of the same [politics and the political], namely through (by (means of)) their reduction to an apparatus of government and [to] that which moves in its [the said apparatus of government’s] immediate environment; nonetheless it [the said belittlement and associated narrowing of politics and of the political] is carried on (is done) programmatically, while (in) attempting (trying, undertaking) to keep the political and the social apart (separated), and while (in) making (explaining) the social order (understandable, clear) with the help (on the basis) of “specifically sociological” categories

176 (Diese Herabsetzung der Politik und des Politischen wird zwar, wie wir noch sehen werden, erst durch eine begriffliche Verengung derselben ermöglicht, nämlich durch deren Reduktion auf den Regierungsapparat und das, was sich in seiner unmittelbaren Umwelt bewegt; nichtsdestoweniger wird sie programmatisch betrieben, indem versucht wird, das Politische und das Soziale auseinanderzuhalten und die soziale Ordnung an Hand „spezifisch soziologischer“ Kategorien begreiflich zu machen). Pride also encourages (emboldens) this basic (fundamental) positioning (or stance) in representing a(n) independent (or autonomous) (self-sufficient) and at the same time overarching (comprehensive) discipline, which (it) [the said discipline (of sociology)], as it were, prohibits (forbids) explaining as the constitutive principle of

176 Such [categories] are for Parsons the normative in contrast to the political or economic [categories], Structure, p. 768. The «conscience collective» was for Durkheim, likewise, a specifically sociological category. Cf. Ch. II, footnote 241.
The turning away from (break with, renunciation of) Parsons and the questioning (calling into question) of the normative [element] as [the] cement of the social order did not lead to a consciousness (or contemplation) of the constitutive social function of the political, but to endeavours (efforts) at solving the question (problem) of order either through constructions of the social on an individualistic basis or through the concept of the open system (Die Abkehr von Parsons und die Infragestellung des Normativen als Zement der sozialen Ordnung führten nicht zu einer Besinnung auf die konstitutive soziale Funktion des Politischen, sondern zu Bestrebungen, die Ordnungsfrage entweder durch Konstruktionen des Sozialen auf individualistischer Basis oder durch das Konzept des offenen Systems zu lösen), which took into account the individualistic approach and at the same time abolished (annulled, dissolved) it [this individualistic approach] inside of (within) (the) “system (systemic) rationality (rationality of the system)”. In both cases the theoretical strategy pursued (followed) ended up preparing or toning down the terms (i.e. terminology) (die Termini) of the question formulation (putting (formulation) of the [a] question, problem examination, examination of the [a] problem, central theme) (in) such (a
way) that the desired solution results (arises) unconstrainedly (uninhibitedly, effortlessly) from the (set) premises ([which have been] set). So (Thus,) one of the leading individualistic approaches, i.e. the economistic, starts from the notion (idea) of a rational-self-interested(selfish) individual as [the] ultimate sociological unit (eines rational-eingennützigen Einzelnen als letzter soziologischer Einheit); the concept (notion) of (self-)interest, which is supposed (meant) to (should) guide this individual, is however defined in such a way that it absolutely (really, virtually) excludes (precludes, rules out) (a(any)) motivation for [regarding] violent or deceitful (or fraudulent) action (er eine Motivation zum gewaltsamen oder betrügerischen Handeln geradezu ausschließt).

The economistic model indeed puts forward (represents) the individual abstractly (in the abstract), i.e. as if he [the individual] acts exclusively inside of (within) an ideal market(place) [market] (eines idealen Marktes), in which violence, compulsion (or force) or deceit (or fraud) (Gewalt, Zwang oder Betrug) would be detrimental (harmful, injurious), since they [such violence, compulsion or deceit] scare (chase, drive) away (off) partners in exchange (Austauschpartner) and consequently would sooner or later cause (bring about, give rise to, result in) the social suicide of the villain. Where(ver) the contracting parties (die Kontrahenten) are and remain equally free and where(ver) the market(place) [market] is constituted by (from, out of) equally and permanently free contracting parties, there the rational pursuit of selfish interests (self-interest) must certainly renounce (forgo, do (go) without, relinquish) violence or deceit (or fraud), since it [the said rational pursuit of selfish interests] constantly comes up against (across) (bumps (runs) into) the same freedom (and rationality) of the other [contracting party] (Other) (da sie ständig auf die gleiche Freiheit (und Rationalität) des Anderen stößt). However, the so (thus) defined rationality of (self-)interest (Rationalität des Interesses)
presupposes that nothing other than the isolated individual and the pure market mechanism (der pure Marktmechanismus) may (is allowed to) come into play. The thicket (jungle or labyrinth) of concrete social relations (Dickicht der konkreten sozialen Beziehungen) inside of which the poisonous herb (or weed) thrives (flourishes), which always has a(n) debilitating (undermining, impairing, diminishing, weakening) and sometimes (occasionally) fatal (deadly, lethal) effect on the given social order (die gegebene soziale Ordnung), is evaded (avoided) preventively (as a preventive (precautionary) measure). In spite of the assumed (supposed, presumed) egotism (i.e. selfishness) of individuals, the social order is therefore theoretically rescued (saved, recovered), on the one hand through the consistent atomisation (i.e. breaking up or fragmentation of society into individuals) of the social whole (die konsequente Atomisierung des sozialen Ganzen), and on the other hand through the disregarding of (the) social relations in the broader (wider) sense. It should be added that economistic sociology shares this disregarding with the normative theory of order (der normativen Ordnungstheorie), despite all the difference(s) of [in] the[ir respective] premises. Because the fiction of the isolated egotistical (i.e. selfish)-rational individual must (ought) take (pay heed to) [the] concrete and multi-dimensional social conditions (relations or circumstances) (konkrete und multidimensionale soziale Verhältnisse) into account just as little as personal temperaments, as (like) the fiction of the all-round (comprehensively, universally) socialised man (wie die Fiktion des allseitig sozialisierten Menschen) [as well, too, must not take these into account]177.

In its in(cap)ability (incapacity) to cope (deal) with (manage) the problem of social order on the basis of its own specific conceptuality, economistic social theory makes supplementary (additional, complementary) assumptions which are then used tacitly (silently) as the foundation (basis) of the [its, economistic social theory’s] theoretical construction (structure) (des theoretischen Aufbaus). The most important amongst them [such supplementary assumptions] may be [that] in the beginning (there would be no) (no) government(al) authority (would stand), but a consensus of individuals on (about, regarding, over) individual rights (am Anfang stünde keine Regierungsmacht, sondern ein Konsens von Individuen über individuelle Rechte)\textsuperscript{178}. How this consensus came about (took place) and what guarantees its duration remains dark (or obscure) (shady, vague). It [Economistic social theory] of course refers to existing social institutions, however these were supposed (meant) to, for their part, have come into being (arisen, emerged, originated) out of (from) the same calculus (i.e. calculation) accompanied (convoyed, escorted) by (with) (self-)interest which supports (bears) the market mechanism, so that a state of consensus (ein Zustand des Konsenses) on (about, regarding) rights cannot be imagined (thought of) before the pursuit of egotistical (i.e. selfish) matters of concern (vor der Verfolgung egoistischer Anliegen). Institutions are supposed (meant) to (should) be socially beneficial (agreeable) because they are (stand) functionally and [in respect] of the intellect(-spirit) in agreement with market-conforming behaviour (weil sie mit dem marktkonformen Verhalten funktionell und vom Geist her in Übereinstimmung stehen). The question however is whether through (by means of) (political) authority protected (safeguarded) institutions (abgesicherte Institutionen) were created in

\textsuperscript{178} Coleman, \textit{Foundations}, pp. 54, 170.
order to prop (shore) up (support) egotistical (i.e. selfish) behaviour or in order to set boundaries (or limits) exactly in respect of this [egotistical (i.e. selfish) behaviour] in view of (with regard to) other social aims (goals)\(^{179}\). Generally, in the economistic social-theoretical context [it] is (so, thus) argued as though egotistical (i.e. selfish) economic activity, free of every political-institutional binding (or dependence) (politisch-institutionellen Bindung), would essentially unfold (develop) no(t) differently than under the more or less noticeable (perceptible) pressure of such a binding (or dependence), as if (though) it [the said egotistical (i.e. selfish) economic activity], therefore, would readily compensate through self-disciplining (durch Selbstdisziplinierung ohne weiteres) for that which comes (arrives) on the scene (appears) as external (outer) disciplining (äußere Disziplinierung) – or even as if (though) that which seems like external (outer) disciplining basically (essentially) constituted (represented) a (delegated) (delegierte) self-disciplining. Even in the case of an institutionally regulated (controlled, orderly, well-ordered) self-disciplining (einer institutionell geregelten Selbstdisziplinierung), [it] must however be admitted (conceded) that it [such institutionally regulated self-disciplining] could not be concluded (brought about, made, entered into) or canceled (broken) with the same easiness (ease) as a private contract (nicht mit derselben Leichtigkeit wie ein privater Vertrag abgeschlossen oder gelöst werden könnte), if there are supposed (meant) to (should) be steady (stable, firm, fixed) rules (feste Regeln) in society in general (at all). The contract in itself, i.e. as [an] institution guaranteed by (political) authority, is qualitatively something other than the contract in the sense of an arbitrarily concludable (makable) or cancelable (breakable) agreement (arrangement) of arbitrary content (any content

whatsoever) between two arbitrary contracting parties (any two contracting parties whatsoever) (einer beliebig abschließbaren und lösbaren Abmachung beliebigen Inhalts zwischen zwei beliebigen Kontrahenten). This difference applies (is valid) a fortiori with regard to political-social institutions, (with)in(side of) which the individual is born and which can assign to him in advance a status with which he is not at all content (satisfied, pleased). The equating (identification) of the market(place) and society wants to suggest [that] this state of affairs can be redressed (remedied, rectified, removed) through (by means of) the proper (or right) (correct) use (employment, operation) (richtigen Einsatz) of calculus (i.e. calculation) accompanied (convoyed, escorted) by (with) (self-)interest. This possibility though is not excluded, yet it existed also in societies which resembled anything other than an open market. For (Regarding, In respect of) the case of the unwanted (or unintended) staying (remaining) in a socially or economically inferior position (status, standing), the economistic perception (view) can indeed assert [that] subjection (subjugation) becomes imperative (necessary, mandatory) here because of (through) egotistical (i.e. selfish) rationality, since rebellion (revolt, insurrection, uprising, revolution) would probably bring with it (entail, involve) far (much) greater troubles (difficulties, inconveniences) (“costs (or expenses)”)). But the possibility of apprehending (grasping) a political or social relation through (by means of) the logic or rather the vocabulary of an economic calculus (i.e. calculation) not in the least lets [one] infer (conclude, deduce) (allows the conclusion) [that there is] the consubstantiality of the political-social [element, sphere] and the economic [element, sphere] (läßt keineswegs auf die Wesensgleichheit von Poltisch-Sozialem und Ökonomischem), and indeed against the background of the latter [economic]. The economistic social model must be based (rest) both on the assumption (acceptance) of calculus (i.e.
calculation) accompanied (convoyed, escorted) by (with) (self-)interest as well as on that [assumption] of the in principle (fundamental) equality of the contracting parties inside of (within) an open market. The theoretical invocation of (appeal (reference) to) calculus (i.e. calculation) cannot, therefore, serve to make plausible the actual (real) lack (absence) of equality, without unhinging the economic concept of (the) social order.

In relation to the view (perception, opinion) [that] calculus (i.e. calculation) accompanied (convoyed, escorted) by (with) (self-)interest can constitute (provide, give, produce, make) the mainstay (or foundation) (basic pillar) of social order, a further remark (observation, comment) is here appropriate (called for, relevant). Obviously (Evidently) the dual (double, twin) and simultaneous channeling (canalisation) of this calculus (i.e. calculation) into general institutional regulations (arrangements) and into individual undertakings (in allgemeine institutionelle Regelungen und in individuelle Unternehmungen) implies that not only at the individual level, but also along the line of intersection between the individual [element, sphere] and the general [element, sphere] or the social [element, sphere] (entlang der Schnittlinie zwischen Individuellem und Allgemeinem oder Sozialem), long-(term) and short-term interests do not necessarily coincide. At the individual level, the individual (or person) concerned (in question) (der Betreffende) can get by (manage, cope) (with) this contrast(ing) (conflict or opposition) (mit diesem Gegensatz) [between long-term and short-term interests] without diverging (deviating, differing) stricto sensu from egotistical (i.e. selfish) calculus (i.e. calculation); in the end (finally, ultimately, eventually), he continues to work for himself when he does (goes) without (forgoes, abstains (refrain) from, renounces) his current (present) pleasure (or enjoyment) in the expectation (anticipation) of a still greater pleasure (or...
enjoyment) **of his own.** Long-term (self-)interest does not, that is, stop (cease) here being individual (self-)interest. But the socially-institutionally defined long-term (self-)interest (Aber das sozial-institutionell definierte langfristige Interesse) as a rule goes beyond (surpasses, exceeds), in duration and assertive force (power of imposition (pushing through); Durchsetzungskraft), (the) individual [one, long-term (self-)interest], which is why an entire (a whole) individual life can pass (by) (elapse, expire) without the individual, who takes the supposed (ostensible) identity of social and individual long-term (self-)interest seriously and acts in unison (accordance, harmony, conformity, agreement) with institutional commands, being able to arrive at (come (get) to) personal (short-(term) or long-term) pleasure (or enjoyment). In this case [i.e. in the case of personal (short-term or long-term) pleasure (or enjoyment)], (the) egotistical (i.e. selfish)-rational calculus (i.e. calculation) must mean (signify) a decision (choice, selection) (in favour) of (eine Entscheidung für) individual pleasure (or enjoyment) at the cost (expense) of social (self-)interest defined one way or another, particularly as (since) the individual cannot know about the period (amount) of time at his disposal (available to him). Egotistical (i.e. selfish) calculus (i.e. calculation) is active (or operates) (busies itself), in other words, exclusively in individual and indeed as far as possible short-term undertakings, and it [the said egotistical calculus] leaves the egotistical (i.e. selfish) calculus (i.e. calculation) of others to be channeled twice (doubly, in two directions) (individually and socially-institutionally). Then both aspects of egotistical (i.e. selfish) calculus (i.e. calculation) turn against each other, and the social order goes to pieces (is destroyed (ruined)) when (if) this happens (occurs, takes place) to such a degree that it exceeds (goes beyond) the daily (everyday, ordinary), so to speak (as it were), normal anomie. Egotistical (i.e. selfish) calculus (i.e. calculation)
cannot, therefore, in its social-theoretically inevitable (unavoidable) conceptual double-sidedness (bilateralness, doubleness, duality) or conflicting nature (ambivalence, contradiction), guarantee a sufficient cohesion (or unity) of the social order (Dann wenden sich die beiden Aspekte des egoistischen Kalküls gegeneinander, und die soziale Ordnung geht zugrunde, wenn dies in einem solchen Ausmaß geschieht, daß es die alltägliche, gleichsam normale Anomie übersteigt. Das egoistische Kalkül kann also in seiner sozialtheoretisch unumgänglichen begrifflichen Doppelseitigkeit oder Zwiespältigkeit nicht für eine ausreichende Geschlossenheit der sozialen Ordnung garantieren). This is of course (indeed) seen (appreciated, recognised, realised) by a number of (several) sides, however the conclusion of the socially constitutive function of the political is hardly drawn (daraus aber kaum die Schlußfolgerung con der sozial konstitutiven Funktion des Politischen gezogen). Instead of that, Parsons is either protected (backed up) against economism and a normatively loaded (or charged) concept (notion) of rationality is put in the place (takes the place) of (replaces) egotistical (i.e. selfish) calculus (i.e. calculation)¹⁸⁰, or a middle way (path, course) is taken, i.e. normative factors are in fact revalued against (vis-à-vis) "utilitarianism" („Utilitarismus“) and the achievements (accomplishments) of the state for the maintenance (or upholding) (maintaining) of (the) social order (die Aufrechterhaltung der sozialen Ordnung) are acknowledged (recognised) (which of course does not at all exhaust the social-ontological dimension of the political), however at the same time the theoretical question formulations (formulations of the [a] question, problem examinations, examinations of (a [the]) problem(s),

central themes) (are) consciously concentrate(d) (focus(sed)) on the “spontaneous mechanisms for coordination and cooperation”\textsuperscript{181}.

We shall linger over functionalistic system (systems) theory [a (little) while (little)] longer, because it also offers in this context the most complete inventory of mass-democratic commonplaces (banalities) and ideological errors (mistakes). Its [functionalistic system (systems) theory’s] teachings (or theories) (doctrines) about (on, regarding) politics and the political (die Politik und das Politische) do not, by the way (incidentally), arise (result) from its specific theoretical premises, but in reality they [the said teachings] constitute a variation of the mass-democratic concept of the “society of the economy (economy society)”. The [Its, functionalistic systems theory’s] agreements with economistic social theory, which are partly indirect-conceptual, partly direct-notional(conceptual) (die teils indirekt-konzeptuell, teils direkt-begrifflich sind), go correspondingly far. Conceptually, it [functionalistic systems theory] [has to do with] (comes under, belongs to, is a part of) the similarity between a market model, which is based (rests) on the extensive idea (notion) of several (equal and independent of one another) contracting parties ([who] have (having) (with) equal rights and [(who) are, being] independent of one another) (der flächigen Vorstellung mehrerer gleichberechtigter und voneinander unabhängiger Kontrahenten), and a system (systems) model “without [a] top (or peak) (apex) and without [a] centre” („ohne Spitze und ohne Zentrum“)\textsuperscript{182}, which does not want to allow any hierarchy amongst the subsystems (Subsystemen); the idea of a central social authority (die Idee einer zentralen sozialen Instanz) is in both cases programatically dropped

\textsuperscript{181} See e.g. Elster, \textit{Cement}, esp. chap. 3-4 (revaluation of normative factors (Aufwertung normativer Faktoren)) and see p. 249ff. Cf. footnote 158 above.

\textsuperscript{182} Thus, Luhmann, \textit{Polit. Theorie}, p. 22 (cf. the expression: “acentric societies without central organs” („azentrische Gesellschaften ohne Zentralorgane“)).
(abandoned). And in both cases, whenever (as soon as) it [functionalistic systems theory] requires the [a] content-related(filled) (substantive) description (account, portrayal) of society, the social superiority of the economic [element, sphere] over the political [element, sphere] (die soziale Überlegenheit des Wirtschaftlichen gegenüber dem Politischen behauptet) is asserted (maintained): the latter [political [element]] is connected with “tribal patterns of behaviour (behavioural patterns)” („tribalen Verhaltensmustern“), whereas the great (extensive, high [degree of]) complexity, freedom of choice and learning capacity (ability) [in respect] of the modern economy fosters (promotes) the cognitive element and consequently the rational shaping (formation, forming, moulding) of society (während die hohe Komplexität, Wahlfreiheit und Lernfähigkeit moderner Wirtschaft das kognitive Element und somit die rationale Gestaltung der Gesellschaft fördere)\textsuperscript{183}. Under modern conditions (In modern circumstances) “the state or politics” could not represent (constitute) a “steering (control or management) centre of society” („Steuerungszentrum der Gesellschaft“), the political system constitutes merely a(n) functional area (realm) (area of functioning) (einen Funktionsbereich) or a subsystem (or part(ial) system) amongst several [such functional areas or subsystems (or part systems)], [in respect] of which no [functional area or subsystem (or part system)] is capable of replacing or even (only) relieving another [functional area or subsystem (or part system)] [from its stresses, strains or tensions]; the attempt at going back to (continuing) “old European (paleo-European) traditions”, that is, to make out of politics an ultimate authority responsible (or answerable) for everything (all [things]) (eine für alles verantwortliche letzte Instanz) and to centre functionally differentiated

\textsuperscript{183} Thus, Luhmann, „Positivität“, esp. pp. 198-202.
society on politics, would bring about (on) (cause) the destruction (ruin) of the latter [politics], however such an attempt would today have little prospect (chance) (few prospects (chances, possibilities)) of success, since politics has, in the meantime, (now) become so little sovereign (commanding) that it can no longer determine (decide) which problems would [should, could] be politicised (welche Probleme politisiert würden)\textsuperscript{184}. 

The reduction of the political factor to a subsystem (or part(ial) system) (die Reduktion des politischen Faktors auf ein Teilsystem), which is sociologically equal to the rest [of the subsystems (or part systems)], now means that politics is understood in the narrowest (strictest) sense of the word, i.e. [it (politics) is] identified with government and the state apparatus (or machinery) (d.h. mit der Regierung und dem Staatsapparat identifiziert wird), whose area of having an effect (efficacy, impact, influence) (Wirkungsbereich) should (ought to) be separated (segregated, isolated) and delimited (narrowed down) just like those [areas of having an effect] of other subsystems (or part(ial) systems) too. With such an understanding of politics, the social-ontological question regarding (according to) the cohesion of society (die sozialontologische Frage nach dem Zusammenhalt der Gesellschaft) must of course remain unanswered, particularly (especially) when (if) – despite the tacit (silent, implicit) conceptual and content-related(filled) (substantive) putting first of the subsystem (or part(ial) system) “economy” – no subsystem (or part(ial) system) may in principle (lay) claim (to) social primacy; as [the, a] solution to (of) the social-ontological question, the (different (alternative)) description (die Umschreibung) of society cannot, on the

\textsuperscript{184} Thus, Luhmann, Polit. Theorie, pp. 19, 23, 138, 155; Ökol. Kommunikation, p. 207; „Positivität“, p. 201.
other hand, be regarded (considered, looked at) through (by (means of))
the notion (concept) of the system, because the “system” is postulated
only (purely, just, simply, merely) a limine. But even if we leave aside
(ignore) the social-ontological dimension momentarily (for a moment (the
time being)) and remain at (with, [fixed to]) the narrow (strict)
understanding of politics, not inconsiderable (insignificant, minor)
aporias (i.e. doubts, contradictions or paradoxes) crop (come) up (arise).
The assumed (supposed, presumed) equality and delimitation (narrowing
down) (Die angenommene Gleichberechtigung und Eingrenzung) of the
subsystems (or part(ial) systems) does not in fact in the least exclude
(preclude) [the possibility, fact] that one amongst these [subsystems (or
part systems)] could have (at its disposal) a broader area of having an
effect (efficacy, impact, influence) than [the] other(s) [subsystems (or
part systems)]. Because equality (having equal rights) can only mean
(signify) the same (identical, equal) indispensability for (as regards) the
constitution of the notion (concept) of the system (which is not to be
confused with the same (identical, equal) indispensability for system
(systems) reality (the reality of the system)), whereas the delimitation
(narrowing down) of the areas of having an effect (efficacy, impact,
influence) does not express (say, state) anything about their [those areas
(of having effect)’] relative magnitude (size) and also nothing about the
possibilities of their mutual (reciprocal) covering (over) (or overlapping)
(gegenseitige Überdeckungsmöglichkeiten). Looked at (seen) in this way,
the delimitation (narrowing down) of a subsystem (or part(ial) system)
can only mean that its reaching (or extending) inside other(s) [subsystems
(or part systems)] can take place (occur, happen) from (in) certain (of
course historically varying) points of view (respects): the economy can
considerably influence (have a considerable effect on) the art market, but
hardly [influence] the aesthetic quality of the works of art, the
government can (fiscally) burden (encumber) the economy (with taxes, in terms of tax, fiscally), but not triple (treble) (the) labour productivity per octroi (i.e. per the tax, tariff or duty collected or funds allocated) (die Arbeitsproduktivität per Oktroi).

Already in (the) light of such rather quantitative considerations (thoughts, reflections, deliberations), [it] can be indisputably (undoubtedly) ascertained historically and sociologically that politics constitutes (represents) the only “subsystem (or part(ial) system)” in which demands (requests) and challenges (or provocations) from all the other subsystems (or part(ial) systems) are addressed and which can reach (or extend) inside all other(s) [subsystems (or part(ial) systems)] from its own specific points of view (unter seinen eigenen spezifischen Gesichtspunkten). This fundamental constellation (or correlation (of forces)) has assumed (taken (on), adopted), according to each and every respective institutional order, the most diverse (multifarious) and most different forms, yet it [the said fundamental constellation] has characterised all (hitherto) polities (communities, commonwealths) (until now) (Diese fundamentale Konstellation hat entsprechend der jeweiligen institutionellen Ordnung die vielfältigsten und unterschiedlichsten Formen angenommen, doch sie hat alle bisherigen Gemeinwesen gekennzeichnet). With regard to (In view of) that, there is therefore no caesura (i.e. break) between stateless and state-organised [societies] (stateless societies and societies organised by a state), between pre-modern and modern societies (zwischen staatslosen und staatlich organisierten, zwischen vormodernen und modernen Gesellschaften). The (tribal) chief(tain) and the boule (i.e. legislative assembly or council, or senate) of the Athenians, the Roman Imperator (i.e. supreme army commander and Emperor) and the Chinese Emperor (Kaiser), the
absolutistic king and the modern sovereign parliament are indeed, as political forms of government, only parts of the corresponding societies (Der Häuptling und die Boulé der Athener, der römische Imperator und der chinesische Kaiser, der absolutistische König und das moderne souveräne Parlament sind zwar als politische Regierungsformen nur Teile der entsprechenden Gesellschaften), but those parts which can be called (upon) (appealed to or invoked) by all other(s) [parts] for the most various of reasons and which – no matter out of what motives and to what extent – feel answerable (or responsible) (accountable) and competent (responsible, appropriate, relevant) both in regard to (for) the behaviour or the state (or condition) (Zustand) of all other parts as well as in regard to (for) the relations of the same [other parts] with themselves (i.e. the said political forms of government) and with one another (i.e. with the other parts of society). For the economy as economy it may e.g. not matter (make any difference) whether criminal bands (or gangs) or religious sects fight bloody battles, politics however must see to (look after, take care of, worry about) civil peace ((the) peace for (of) citizens) just as to (after, of, about) the general state (or condition) of the economy – at least to the extent that the cohesion of the polity (community, commonwealth) (der Zusammenhalt des Gemeinwesens) appears to be affected by that (it) [(the) economy] (in accordance with each and every respective dominant (prevailing) interpretation of the situation). It is true that society as such and as a whole does not make up a system capable of acting\textsuperscript{185}. Nevertheless, the cause of (reason for) that does not lie only in modern society’s complexity. Societies were always incapable of collective action, namely, of (the) aim(goal)-directed (purposeful) coordination of (the) subsystems (or part(ial) systems)(,) so (as) long as

\textsuperscript{185} Thus, Luhmann, \textit{Soziol. Aufklärung}, II, pp. 80, 87.
the political subsystem (or part(ial) system) failed (neglected) to 
bindingly interpret society’s will (volition, intention) and to act in its 
[society’s] name (irrespective of whether the interpretation and the action 
were “correct (right)” or not), and there is today no sign (indication, 
symptom) (of (for) [the fact]) that the specific political readiness 
(willingness) to speak in the name of society (society’s name) in toto (as 
a whole) has become slighter (less, smaller) than in other times (Es ist 
wa h r, daß die Gesellschaft als solche und als ganze kein 
handlungsfähiges System ausmacht. Dennoch liegt die Ursache dafür 
nicht erst in der Komplexität moderner Gesellschaften. Gesellschaften 
waren immer zum kollektiven Handeln, nämlich zur zielgerichteten 
Koordination der Teilsysteme, unfähig, solange das politische Teilsystem 
es versäumte, den Willen der Gesellschaft verbindlich zu interpretieren 
und in seinem Namen zu handeln (gleichgültig, ob die Interpretation und 
das Handeln „richtig“ waren oder nicht), und es gibt heute kein 
Anzeichen dafür, daß die spezifisch politische Bereitschaft, im Namen 
der Gesellschaft in toto zu sprechen, geringer geworden ist als in anderen 
Zeiten). It is false (wrong, incorrect) to equate this readiness (willingness) 
with the (by the way, foolish (silly)) wish (desire) or endeavour (effort) to 
drive out (oust, displace) or even to replace the other subsystems (or 
part(ial) systems) by means of (through, with) the political (das 
Politische) and for instance as politics (als Politik) to represent the 
economy as economy (see next paragraph); it [the said political 
readiness] can only mean (signify) that the political subsystem (or 
part(ial) system) looks at (considers, regards) and handles (treats, deals 
with) the rest of [them, the subsystems (or part systems)] from a specific 
political point of view. That is why a(n) heavily (intensely, strongly) 
interventionistic (program) or for instance (a) (planned-economic) 
program (of [implementing, carrying out, enforcing, promoting] a
planned economy) cannot be necessarily and from the outset (beginning) deduced (derived) from it [(the) political readiness (in question)] (Daher darf aus ihr nicht unbedingt und nicht von vornherein ein stark interventionistisches oder etwa planwirtschaftliches Programm abgeleitet werden). Although the lack of desire for intervention can be a sign of political weakness, on the other hand it is no doubt (quite, well) conceivable (possible) that precisely (especially) a strong (powerful, great) political subsystem (or part(ial) system), from political points of view (standpoints) (for political reasons), leaves (allows, grants) very large free spaces [for activity] to other subsystems (or part(ial) systems). The historical experiences do not, incidentally, allow (permit) a causal interrelation to be established (made, produced, manufactured) between growing (increasing) social differentiation and [the] weakening (attenuation, toning down) of the political factor (always in the narrower (strict) sense) (Die geschichtlichen Erfahrungen gestatten übrigens nicht zwischen wachsender sozialer Differenzierung und Abschwächung des politischen Faktors (immer in engeren Sinne) einen kausalen Zusammenhang herzustellen). The European New Times (Modern Era) know(s), in any case (at any rate), the parallel development of the centralistic state and of society (increasingly) being differentiated (or differentiating itself) (more and more), and indeed both in the absolutistic as well as in the bourgeois age (Die europäische Neuzeit kennt jedenfalls die parallele Entwicklung des zentralistischen Staates und der sich immer mehr differenzierenden Gesellschaft, und zwar sowohl im absolutistischen als auch im bürgerlichen Zeitalter). [Something] analogous can be observed for (since) decades [ago] in (the) so-called developing countries (Entwicklungsländern) where political centralism and interventionism (der politische Zentralismus und Interventionismus) virtually (really, actually) becomes the motor (i.e. engine or driving
force) of social differentiation. And examples from the history of the 20th century as well as purely theoretical considerations (reflections, thoughts) allow (permit, lead to) the conclusion that also the reverse process, namely the sudden enormous (immense, vast) dynamicisation (making (more) dynamic) of the political subsystem (or part(ial) system) on [a] highly complex social basis remains quite (very) conceivable (imaginable, possible, thinkable) under certain conditions (circumstances) (nämlich die plötzliche ungeheure Dynamisierung des politischen Teilsystems auf hochkomplexer sozialer Basis unter bestimmten Bedingungen gut denkbar bleibt).

The seemingly (apparently) disarming thesis [that] the politicisation of a complex modern society (die Politisierung einer komplexen modernen Gesellschaft) would destroy (ruin, demolish) this [society], basically (essentially) constitutes a banality, which applies to (is valid for) all societies and with regard to every subsystem (or part(ial) system). No society could centre on a single (sole) activity, wholly (totally, entirely, completely) regardless (irrespective, independent) of each and every respective historically determined (conditioned) degree of interweaving (intertwining, interconnection, integration) of individual (separate) social activities with one another (jeweiligen geschichtlich bedingten Verflechtungsgrad der einzelnen sozialen Tätigkeiten miteinander). The dogged (determined) effort (endeavour) (Das verbissene Bestreben) at (to) centring (centre) social life on aesthetic, religious, scientific or economic activity would not have a less devastating effect than the (politics’) consistent claim of (on, to) [a] monopoly (of politics) (der konsequente Monopolanspruch der Politik). The specific political point of view concerns the manner (way) (or method) of the subsystems’ (or

part(ial) systems’) coherence (die Art und Weise des Zusammenhalts der Teilssysteme), not necessarily the manner (or method) [as to] how inside of (within) each and every respective subsystem (or part(ial) system) the corresponding social activity is carried out (performed, exercised, practised) (die entsprechende soziale Tätigkeit ausgeübt wird). So-called "totalitarian" attempts, of religious or other inspiration, at (comprehensively, generally, universally) subjugating (subjecting) (in an all-round way) the various social activities to one sole (single, only) point of view, can indeed lead to the reinforced (intensified or increased) control of man, but not to the abolition of the specific character of the corresponding activities. Even a (most) deeply (most) religious society must cultivate its fields, and it cannot replace tillage (or agriculture) with worship and prayer, even if prayers and ritual acts (would) constantly (continually) accompany (accompanied) agro-economic activity as such (und sie kann nicht den Ackerbau durch Kult und Gebet ersetzen, selbst wenn Gebete und kultische Handlungen die agrarwirtschaftliche Tätigkeit als solche ständig begleiten würden). The same applies to (is valid for) (the) other social activities, to say nothing of (let alone) (the) personal [activities], and that is why no “totalitarianism” and no “despotism” (kein „Totalitarismus“ und keine „Despotie“) can be so (as) comprehensive (extensive, broad) as they (would) perhaps want(ed) (it) to be [in respect] of [their] claim or as they often appear [to be] in demonising descriptions (accounts, portrayals). Over and above that, it is a purely fictive (fictitious) notion (idea) to (so, thus, in this way) interpret the evolutionistic schema of differentiation (das evolutionistische Differenzierungsschema) as though in the “pre-modern” past the lack of differentiation (die mangelnde Ausdifferenzierung) of the subsystems (or part(ial) systems) (made) (enabled) a primacy of the political (possible)(,) which is no longer applicable. In the hitherto described basic
constellation (Grundkonstellation)(, as described until now,) hardly anything has changed through(out) the centuries despite the (great) variety (diversity) of (the) institutional forms (der Vielfalt der institutionellen Formen). An “oriental despotism (i.e. despotic regime)” could and wanted to influence (affect) the production method (mode or manner of production) (die Produktionsweise) or (the) patriarchal institutions (die patriarchalischen Institutionen) of the village community (Dorfgemeinschaft) living under it [the said oriental despotism] only within narrow limits, whereas the theoretical precedence (primacy, priority) of “politics”(, understood in Aristotelian terms (aristotelisch verstandenen „Politik“)(, in the European Middle Ages (im europäischen Mittelalter) did not at all exclude (preclude, rule out) feudal fragmentation (splintering) (die feudale Zersplitterung) and local autonomy; phenomena of a refeudalisation on [a] highly technicised (i.e. high-technology) basis in (the) modern mass democracies have just as little to do with a drastic change (or transformation) in (of) the status and in (of) the function of politics, but they interrelate ((are) connect(ed)) with economic and social developments, which pose the question of the cohesion of society on a new basis. However, this question remains, and with it [the said question] politics remains too, particularly if no-one can know whether the material preconditions of the modern processes of differentiation will survive (endure, persist or remain) (continue) in the future or not.

Just as false (wrong, incorrect) is the deduction (inference) of a reduced status of modern politics from [the fact] that it [(the said) modern politics] cannot determine which problems are (will (should, ought) be) politicised. Here a constant feature (characteristic) of the political is again made out to be the result of a specifically modern development, out of
(from) which (then) the fictive (fictitious) contradistinction (contrasting) of (between) a weak present-day [politics] and a strong politics in the historical past comes into being (results, arises, ensues, is created (produced)). Yet the political [element, sphere] and politics have not exclusively or even principally (mainly) determined which problems should (ought to) be politicised. Their [The political(‘s) [element’s] and politics’] specific area (or field) was and is the cohesion of society and the maintenance (or upholding) (maintaining) of the social order (always (with)in [respect of] a binding interpretation of these terms (i.e. terminology) [(the cohesion of society and the maintenance (or upholding) of the social order)] by a concrete bearer (durch einen konkreten Träger)), but they [the political [element] and politics] have never been able to decide with which concrete question the in themselves abstract ideas of cohesion and of order have had to be connected on each and every respective occasion (mit welcher konkreten Frage jeweils die an sich abstrakten Ideen des Zusammenhalts und der Ordnung verbunden werden mußten); as a rule it was (so, thus, like this, [the case])(,) that this question came from the non-political subsystems (or part(ial) systems) and the political subsystem (or part(ial) system) then took a stand (declared its position, gave its view) in relation to them [the other subsystems (or part systems)] in its [own] way (manner) and in accordance with its own setting of an aim (goal, objective, target). If a main (principal, chief) source of such questions today lies in the economy, (then, so, thus) it [such a main source of questions] could have lied (lain) in times gone by (in the past, earlier) for instance in theology; the new-times (modern(-era)) state (has) (did) not e.g. cause(d) the long religious wars (wars of religion), however it had to come to grips (terms) (cope, deal) with (manage) the political questions [in respect] of cohesion and of order posed in the process (in the course of the said religious
wars), in its [own] sense (i.e. in accordance with its own wishes or purpose) and [in its own] (self-)interest.

Behind the (above-)mentioned false (wrong, incorrect) argument is the perception (view) [that] politics is necessarily connected with an, in terms of content, independent (or autonomous) (self-sufficient, self-standing) ideology about (on, with regard to) politics or a specifically political doctrine (or teaching) of faith (Politik verbinde sich notwendig mit einer inhaltlich selbständigen Ideologie über Politik bzw. einer spezifisch politischen Glaubenslehre), so that the many times (frequently, in many cases) promised end of ideology (Ende der Ideologie) in general must accompany the end of conventional (or traditional) politics (herkömmlicher Politik). It is indeed (actually, really) asserted (maintained) [that] the main (principal, chief) task of the political subsystem (or part(ial) system) in the framework of the progressive (or advancing) (progressing) differentiation of (the) social spheres (im Rahmen der fortschreitenden Differenzierung der sozialen Sphären) is the reduction of social complexity through (by (means of)) the law (and justice) (das Recht), and at the same time the extensive (comprehensive, broad) positivisation of this law (and justice) (und zugleich die umfassende Positivierung dieses Rechts), that is, its [the said law (and justice’s)] freeing (relief, exemption) from the premise of eternal validity and truth and the handing over (or ceding) of the question of truth to science (also seine Befreiung von der Prämisse ewiger Geltung und Wahrheit und das das Abtreten der Wahrheitsfrage an die Wissenschaft).187 The assertion contains severe (intense, strong, heavy, great) shortenings (i.e. curtailments, narrowings or reductions) (starke Verkürzungen) and distortions of actual (real) developments (processes or

events) (und Verzerrungen tatsächlichen Vorgänge) in today’s Western mass democracies. Positive law (and justice) (Das positive Recht) in fact does not apply here alone (by itself, exclusively) and without connection to (association with) articles of faith (Glaubenssätze) which lay claim to ontological truth and supra(hyper)-historical validity for themselves (die ontologische Wahrheit und überhistorische Gültigkeit für sich beanspruchen), that is, they [the said articles of faith of positive law (and justice)] belong to the mainstays (or foundations) (basic pillars) of the ruling (dominant) ideology and as such make up (constitute) the object of philosophical etc. investigations (examinations) and rationalisations (i.e. as explanations or justifications) (den Gegenstand philosophischer etc. Untersuchungen und Rationalisierungen ausmachen), while at the same time they are also in the foreground (to the fore) of juristic dogmatics (i.e. discussions of legal dogma) (juristischen Dogmatik). “Human dignity” and “human rights” („Menschenwürde“ und „Menschenrechte“) constitute just as little truths which the social subsystem (or part(ial) system) of science discovered and then put at the disposal of society, as for instance the doctrine (or teaching) of man as image and likeness of God (Gottebenbildlichkeitslehre), (in(to)) whose place they [the said “human dignity” and “human rights”] (stepped, found themselves, were put, stood) (took). The positivisation of the law (and justice) takes place at a logically subordinate(d) level (or stage), at which the ultimate questions of the polity as regards meaning and identity are not posed, because at the level of premises they are considered (held to be) solved (Die Positivierung des Rechts vollzieht sich auf einer logisch untergeordneten Stufe, auf der sich die letzten Sinn- und Identitätsfragen des Gemeinwesens nicht stellen, weil sie auf der Ebene der Prämissen für gelöst gehalten werden); essentially (basically) things are not different in respect of the Code of Hammurabi or in respect of Roman law (and
justice). That area (or realm) (field, sector, domain) of the law (and justice), which is seemingly (on its face, apparently) or really indifferent to those ultimate questions, can be called positive law (and justice) (positives Recht), its existence however proves nothing about (in regard to) the power (strength) and lack of power (powerlessness, helplessness, impotence) of politics, but only that a more or less greater part of the law (and justice) under conditions (in circumstances) of social stability (unter Bedingungen sozialer Stabilität) can be seen (perceived, regarded, considered) as (felt to be) politically irrelevant. Moreover, this part [of the law (and justice)] can never incorporate in itself (assimilate within itself) the entire (complete, whole of the) area (or realm) (field, sector, domain) of the law (and justice); as much as it may (even) expand (extend itself), it must remain outside of the ideologically sacrosanct (hallowed, sacred, sanctified) place in which the articles of faith mentioned above linger undisturbed (in peace, without being interrupted). And if positive law (and justice) in its indifference vis-à-vis (to) ultimate questions seems (appears (to be)) relativistic and (arbitrarily) manageable (as one likes, at will), (then, so, thus) this relativism only constitutes (the) one side of the dualistic complex “relativism-universalism” (die eine Seite des dualistischen Komplexes „Relativismus-Universalismus“), which, as we know\textsuperscript{188}, characterises (is typical of, typifies) the ruling (dominant) ideology in mass democracy. The consequence (result) of the relativism of the (positive-legal(-judicial)) content (pertaining to positive law (and justice)) should, in any case (at any rate), be the formalism of a legitimation, which would be based (rest) on the mere following (observance) of (or compliance with) certain procedures. However, the formal (i.e. form-related or form-adhering) procedure and the modes

\textsuperscript{188} See footnote 2 above.
(ways) of acting (action) connected with it (that (such) [formal procedure]) in themselves keep (occupy) intellects(-spirits) (or minds) busy only (then) when (if) the essential (substantial, fundamental) content-related(filled) (substantive) questions have found an acceptable solution for the socially decisive (substantial, leading) forces, when (if), that is, the material foundations (bases) of the social system appear (to be) so solid that the [a(n)] reference (allusion) to them [the said material foundations of the social system] could serve as [the] direct confirmation of ruling (dominant) ideological topoi (e.g. affluence (prosperity) as proof of the superiority of democracy). Should (it crackle in) these foundations (crackle), (then, so, thus) the procedure itself becomes (turns into) a content-related(filled) (substantive) question or else the content-related questions bluntly (openly) disregard (ignore, shrug off, flout) all questions of procedure (Die Folge vom Relativismus des positivrechtlichen Inhalts soll jedenfalls der Formalismus einer Legitimation sein, die auf der bloßen Befolgung bestimmter Verfahren beruhen würde. Aber das formale Verfahren und die damit verbundenen Handlungsweisen beschäftigen an sich nur dann die Geister, wenn die wesentlichen inhaltlichen Fragen eine für die sozial maßgeblichen Kräfte akzeptable Lösung gefunden haben, wenn also die materiellen Grundlagen des sozialen Systems so gediegen erscheinen, daß der Hinweis darauf als direkte Bestätigung der herrschenden ideologischen Topoi dienen könnte (z.B. Wohlstand als Beweis für die Überlegenheit der Demokratie). Knistert es in diesen Grundlagen, so wird das Verfahren selbst zu einer inhaltlichen Frage oder aber die inhaltlichen Fragen setzen sich unverblümt über alle Verfahrensfragen hinweg).

System (systems) theory can of course hardly, in accordance with its inner logic, get involved in a serious consideration (weighing up,
pondering) of crisis situations (eine ernsthafte Erwägung der Krisensituationen). There is no mention of (No word is said (lost) about) social and historical [crises] or [of (about)] crises caused (induced, brought about) by (out of, from) the internal (inner) contradictions of the system itself, which mess up (muddle (up), disorder) procedures and institutional normalities (welche Verfahren und institutionelle Normalitäten durcheinander bringen). Only the possibility of a crisis is taken into account (considered) briefly and in passing, which, as it were, could from the outside befall (descend upon, break into) the system should (if) the ecologically understood environment (should, is supposed (meant) to) again diminish (lessen) the meaning of its [the system’s] internal differentiation (internen Differenzierung). The question [as to] whether the political subsystem (or part(ial) system) would then master (overcome, control, manage) the necessary adaptation (adjustment) processes (Anpassungsprozesse) is merely touched upon and left unanswered\textsuperscript{189}. The helplessness of politics inside of a highly differentiated system, which in the face (view) of (given) large (great) problems as a rule only has “opportunistic strategies of consoling (i.e. feeding with hopes) and tolerating (enduring or putting up with) (standing)” to offer, is not supposed (meant) to (should (ought) not) be overcome through (by means of) another politics, but through (by means of) the modelling of society according to the pattern of the latest cybernetic models (die Modellierung der Gesellschaft nach dem Muster neuester kybernetischer Modelle)\textsuperscript{190}. But precisely such an undertaking would (be) depend(ent) on the farsightedness and the vigour (energy, drive, dynamism) of a political bearer (carrier, vehicle, supporter, representative), because during its [the said undertaking’s] carrying out

\textsuperscript{189} Luhmann, Polit. Theorie, p. 24.
\textsuperscript{190} Luhmann, Sozial. Aufklärung, III, pp. 290-92.
(execution, implementation) (the) specifically political questions would have to be posed – and indeed (all) the more emphatically, the more the reshaping (restructuring, reorganisation, rearrangement; Umgestaltung) of society would aim at remedying (rectifying, repairing, removing) [the] mistakes (errors, faults, lapses, weaknesses, shortcomings) and omissions (failings) of a bad or weak politics. Thus (Therefore, As a result), the services (duties) of a central authority of self-reflection (self-contemplation) of the social whole (die Dienste einer zentralen Selbstreflexionsinstanz des sozialen Ganzen) would also be in demand, which [the said services] however according to system (systems) theory’s view (or perception) cannot exist in highly complex societies, since in these [highly complex societies] only a variety (diversity, large number, multiformity) of descriptions of society is possible. The fallacy (or non sequitur) (der Trugschluß) in this thesis can be discovered without difficulty, and it is connected anew with an untenable contradistinction (contrasting) between (of) pre-modern and modern societies. In no society until now has there been, namely, a central authority of self-reflection (self-contemplation) which would have been acknowledged (recognised, accepted, appreciated) as such by everyone (all) without exception to such an extent that every individual would have done (gone) without (forgone, renounced, abstained from) his own reflection on (about, regarding) society as a whole. Whoever speaks politically, that is, in the name of the whole of (entire) society, does not do it because he, objectively and consensually (or amicably) (einvernehmlich) with all other(s) [people], represents (the) (society’s) central authority of self-reflection (self-contemplation) (of society), but because he, amongst the various actors (acting subjects; Akteuren) who

---

make the claim of doing this, prevails (or asserts (imposes) himself) or hopes to prevail (or assert himself) against weaker or stronger resistance, for [a] shorter or longer (period of) time (period), so that his reflection on (about, regarding) society, i.e. his perception (view) of its [society’s] cohesion and its order, is regarded as (considered (to be)) binding. The mass-democratic pluralism of world theories (i.e. world views) and of values (Der massendemokratische Pluralismus der Weltanschauungen und der Werte) in this regard (regarding (concerning) this) does not mean (signify) a radical break with the past – unless one has of (in regard to) this [past] a very clichéd (stereotyped, hackneyed) and one-dimensional notion (idea, representation, perception, vision, image; Vorstellung) in mind. Because the aforementioned pluralism constitutes, as we [have] already said, the other (flip, reverse) side of the ideological confession of faith in certain universal values, and it in fact (indeed, actually, even) is politically justified exactly by invoking (appealing to) (with reference to) these universal values; thus (so, (in) this way) e.g. through (by means of) the familiar (common) argument [that] pluralism brings [one] up (educates or trains [people]) to be tolerant (for [the purpose of] tolerance) and for [the purpose of] socially desired (desirable, welcome) peaceableness (peacefulness, love of peace, pacifism) (die Kehrseite des ideologischen Bekenntnisses zu bestimmten universalen Werten, und er wird sogar eben unter Berufung auf diese universalen Werte politisch gerechtfertigt; so z. B. durch das geläufige Argument, Pluralismus erziehe zur Toleranz und zur sozial erwünschten Friedfertigkeit). Seen (Looked at) in this way, value pluralism is not the negation of the possibility of the political [element], but, on the contrary, the ideological prop (support, mainstay) of a certain politics (So gesehen ist Wertpluralismus nicht die Negation der Möglichkeit des Politischen, sondern im Gegenteil die ideologische Stütze einer bestimmten Politik). Nonetheless (All the
same), politics functions in highly complex society principally (first and foremost, mainly) neither as [the] appendage [of,] nor as backing (support) [for,] (of) pluralism. Its [Politics’s] main (chief) task (job) consists in the supervision (or monitoring) (surveillance, policing, observation) of those knots (i.e. hubs) (der Überwachung jener Knoten) which hold the exceedingly fine (delicate) social network (web, net) together. A modern society is extremely vulnerable not because of its complexity in itself, but because of the dependence of this complexity on relatively few vital centres (Nicht wegen ihrer Komplexität an sich, sondern wegen der Abhängigkeit dieser Komplexität von relativ wenigen vitalen Zentren ist eine moderne Gesellschaft äußerst verwundbar).

Finally, the political factor is mitigated (or weakened) (toned down, diminished, reduced) or by-passed (circumvented, got around, evaded, avoided) inside of (within) system (systems) theory through (by means of) flight to (or taking refuge in) (escaping to) conceptual extrapolation and (to (or in)) the historical future (durch die Flucht in die begriffliche Extrapolation und in die geschichtliche Zukunft). This extrapolation and this future together (jointly) bear the name (of) “world society” („Weltgesellschaft“) 192. Conceptually, system (systems) theory needs (the) world society because only an all-embracing system can provide (give to) a system (systems) theory (with) universal validity (universale Geltung). However, one can play with constructions as one likes (arbitrarily, at will), and that is why the inner (internal) conceptual requirements (needs, necessities) of a social theory may (should, must) not (cannot) provide (give, make (up), constitute) the yardstick (criterion, benchmark) of its [own] [the (said) social theory’s] soundness (validity, conclusiveness). The offered real justification for the absorbing

(absorption) of (the) “old-European” politics in(to) (within) world society interrelates (connects), on the other hand, not in [a] specific way with the theoretical premises of system (systems) theory, but it [the said offered real justification] comes (emanates, stems) from (the) age-old (ancient) and still very widespread (widely common (diffused)) liberal thought (ideas (or thoughts)). The economy is here looked at (regarded) as (considered (to be)) [the] driving force of universalisation (Als treibende Kraft der Universalisierung), and since (the) political and (the) statelike are simultaneously identified with each other in practice (practical terms) (und da gleichzeitig Politisches und Staatliches praktisch miteinander identifiziert werden), (so, then, thus) the disintegration (breaking up, dissolution) of states inside of (within) an economically unified (uniform) world appears as [to be] the sufficient reason for the withering of politics (so erscheint die Auflösung der Staaten innerhalb einer wirtschaftlich einheitlichen Welt als zureichender Grund für das Dahinwelken der Politik). The logical and historical leap into this train (or line) of thought (Gedankengang) lies (is (found)) in the unproblematic, virtually (really) vulgar Marxist deduction (derivation) of the political constellation (i.e. conjuncture or correlation of forces) (der unproblematischen, geradezu vulgärmartxistischen Ableitung der politischen Konstellation) from (out of) the economic [constellation]. But [just] as an economically homogenous collective [entity, group] or a nation (ein wirtschaftlich homogenes Kollektiv oder eine Nation) does not necessarily coincide with a state, so too the concept of a world economy or world society eo ipso does not result in (produce, yield) either the abolition of all states or the founding (foundation, establishment) of a world state (so ergibt auch der Begriff einer Weltwirtschaft oder Weltgesellschaft eo ipso weder die Abschaffung aller Staaten noch die Gründung eines Weltstaates). With that [these thoughts] (As a result) (,) it is not in the least (being) said [we
are not in the least saying] that the state in its new-times (modern(-era)) European shape (or form) is eternal (everlasting, perpetual) and that a world state is historically or theoretically impossible. It is meant [We mean] that even inside of (within) an open world society the specifically political problem of social cohesion and of social order continues to exist, and in fact would assume (take on, adopt) an unheard of (unprecedented, unequalled, unparalleled) sharpness (or acuteness) (auch innerhalb einer offenen Weltgesellschaft das spezifisch politische Problem des sozialen Zusammenhalts und der sozialen Ordnung weiter bestehen und sogar eine beispiellose Schärfe annehmen würde). World society and the end of the world of states (das Ende der Staatenwelt) would ensure (guarantee) the end of all wars only (then) when (if) the only (sole) form of war until now had been war between different national collective(s) [entities, groups] (zwischen unterschiedlichen nationalen Kollektiven). We know, however, also of civil wars (Bürgerkriege), and we know that these are often still (even) crueler (more terrible (barborous, savage)). The only thing (for which) world society in itself can answer (vouch, guarantee) (for) is, first of all (in the first place, initially), merely the transformation (conversion) of all wars into civil wars. Accordingly, the task (job, duty), inside of (within) world society or [a] world state – should they ever come about (take place) – to prevent (avert) or to wage (conduct) civil wars (according to the objectives (settings of an aim, aims set; Zielsetzungen) of each and every respective political subject), remains an eminently political task (job, duty)193.

193 The analysis of this segment (or paragraph) (section) leads (takes) [us] to the threshold of the social-ontological discussion of the political. This [social-ontological discussion] is undertaken as [an] orientating sketch (outline) in Ch. II, Sec. 3C of the present (existing) (this) volume, and in detail in Volume 2 of this work. On (In relation to) the question of the world state, see my thoughts (considerations, reflections, observations) in „Der Traum“.
7. Outlook (Prospects) (Ausblick)

The suspicion (inkling) or accusation of ideology (The suspicion of, and reproach for, ideology) (Der Ideologieverdacht oder -vorwurf) proves very little when (if) it is expressed (voiced, uttered) sweepingly (generally, extensively, wholesale, indiscriminately) and from the outside. (In order) [For it] To be substantial, it [the suspicion or accusation of ideology] must be based (founded) on (take root in) an immanent (inherent) analysis(,) which discovers (detects, finds) logical and historical mistakes (errors) or gaps (holes) in the fundamental (basic) assumptions (suppositions, positions) of a theory. Should (If) the analysis bring(s) to light (unearth) such mistakes (errors), (then, so, thus) these are traced back (reduced) to either individual in(cap)ability (incapacity) and subjective biasses (prejudices), or they spring (arise) from a (to some extent (somewhat, fairly, up to a point)) coherent thought style (way (manner, mode) of thought), which finds expression (is reflected (echoed, articulated, crystallised)), for its part, in a thought figure (schema) which shows (displays, exhibits) central structural correspondences (equivalents, equivalences, analogies, parallels, parallelisms, counterparts) (zentrale strukturelle Entsprechungen) with (towards) the (idealised) structuring and way (mode, manner) of functioning of a certain society. We have here drawn (directed) our attention to mistakes (errors) of this second type, and [we] think (mean, believe) that the immanent, logical and historical discussion carried out (undertaken) [in respect] of (by) the same [mistakes of the said second type] bears out (confirms, corroborates, substantiates) the suspicion (inkling) of ideology, that is, an ideological thought style has been fixed (set, settled) as [is] (demonstrated to be) the source of the mistakes (errors). It should (ought, may) have become clear in which sense this thought style (way (manner, mode) of thought) can be
called (described, referred to) (as) mass-democratic, and how it happens
(comes about in relation to that) that it [the (said) mass-democratic
thought style] brings about (causes, creates) unconscious commonalities
(similarities, common ground) between social theories even (there) when
(where) these [social theories] are consciously demarcated (delimited,
dissociated, separated, differentiated, distinguished) from one another
(daß er unbewußte Gemeinsamkeiten zwischen Sozialtheorien selbst da
stiftet, wo sich diese bewußt gegeneinander abgrenzen).

The incursion (invasion, break-in, penetration) of ideology into social
theory is not of course a new phenomenon, and also not temporary
(passing, transient). The (ideological-critical) examination (testing, proof,
verification) of social theories (in terms (respect) of the critique of
ideology) (Die ideologiekritische Prüfung von Sozialtheorien) becomes
(turns into), however, precisely through (by means of) the frequently
proclaimed end of ideologies, [a] particularly topical (current) task (job,
duty). Because it is a matter (question) of (about) (concerns) the
following: the assumption (supposition, acceptance) of the end of
ideologies – as [the] inevitable (unavoidable) victory of (the)
“knowledgeable society” or of, expressed in different terms, (the)
economically or ethically rational (hu)man(s) – constitutes one aspect of
the evolutionistic philosophy of history, on which, as [we have] shown,
mass-democratic social theory depends. This philosophy of history
asserts (maintains) [there was] a radical break (rupture) between modern
and pre-modern society, and the social theory, which starts from (takes)
the fact of this break (as its starting point), accordingly looks
disparagingly down (up)on (at) the long tradition of social-theoretical
thinking (thought), especially (up)on (at) that of anthropological and
political orientation. Social theory should (ought) (is supposed (meant))
(to) now change (alter) its content-related(filled) (substantive) and methodical (i.e. methodological) orientation to the extent that the factors of shaping (forming, moulding) (formative factors; Gestaltungsfaktoren) of the social are changed (transformed) by (through) the (effected) historical break (which took place, carried out). But it is by no means self-evident to infer (conclude) from a historical break [that there was] the [a] change in (of) the factors of shaping (formative factors) of the social, that is, [a change] in (of) the social-ontological factors (der sozialontologischen Faktoren), or, it is only for the ideological self-understanding of modern mass democracy self-evident, or (seen (looked at) from the outside) [it is] understandable [that] it [modern mass democracy], no less than earlier social formations, would like (likes, wants) to believe [that] the world-historical Last Judgement would have passed (given, handed down) an irrevocable (irreversible) judgment (decision) in its favour. Nonetheless, it is a question of whether historical developments or breaks (and the transition from pre-industrial to industrial society (undoubtedly) constitutes (without (a) doubt) a deep break, which can only be compared with the transition from from the Neolithic Period to high culture (developed or advanced civilisation) (zum Neolithikum zu den Hochkulturen)) must unhinge (disrupt, disturb, dislocate) the fundamental (or basic) (elementary) social-ontological factors or whether they [the said historical developments or breaks] take place (unfold, are acted out) inside of (within) this marked (pegged, staked) out (or delimited) (demarcated) framework (abgesteckten Rahmens) [of fundamental (or basic) social-ontological factors]. In the first case, the historical break was supposed (meant) to have actually (in fact, really) brought forth (about, produced) a social theory which would say goodbye to earlier (former, previous) assumptions (suppositions) about (regarding, on) man and society, in the latter [case], that break
would remain in principle (fundamentally, basically) an object of historical and sociological analysis, which would have not gone into (dealt with, showed an interest in) the (basic (fundamental)) social-ontological (basic (fundamental)) questions (sozialontologische Grundfragen) or only in passing.

Now, the self-understanding of a social formation appears as objective self-[knowledge] and (historical) knowledge (of history) (objektive Selbst- und Geschichtserkenntnis) only so (as) long as the social formation in question (concerned) is on the up and up (on the rise) and gets (clears) (gets rid of, eliminates) its adversaries (opponents) (out of the way). That is today the case with mass democracy. However, precisely at its planetary high(est) point (culmination, zenith, peak, summit, acme) its own contradictions, in fact its explosive potentialities, which were intimated (hinted at, indicated) at the beginning of this chapter, become increasingly apparent (obvious, evident, noticeable, visible). Social-theoretically, they [mass democracy’s contradictions and explosive potentialities] are of importance because they make known in themselves the topicality of the classic(al) question formulations (formulations of the [a] question, problem examinations, examinations of (a [the]) problem(s), central themes). The increasing (rising, growing) complexity in terms of detail(s) brings about (gives rise to, causes) a reduction of the great aporias (i.e. doubts, contradictions or paradoxes) to formulae of almost (virtually) archaic simplicity. After the decline (downfall) of bourgeois anthropocentrism and under the conditions (in the circumstances) of planetarily unfolded (developed) highly technicised (i.e. technologically advanced) mass democracy (Nach dem Untergang des bürgerlichen Anthropozentrismus und unter den Bedingungen der planetarisch entfalteten hochtechnisierten Massendemokratie)(, the
question regarding (about, in accordance with) man’s essence (or nature) and possibilities (nach Wesen und Möglichkeiten des Menschen) is posed still (even) more directly and more acutely (sharply) than at the threshold of the European New Times (Modern Era). On the one hand, the image (picture) of man (human image, image of Man (men, people)) is unified (standardised) like never before through (by means of) the from now on (henceforth) dense (compact, thick) existing side by side (co-existence)(,) or existing inside of one another(,) cultures, nations and races (das nunmehr dichte Neben- oder Ineinander von Kulturen, Nationen und Rassen), while at the same time the waning (decreasing) significance (meaning, importance) of historical and social attributes for the determination of (the) human identity(,) as a result of the spreading (diffusion, dissemination) of universalistic ideologies(,) paradoxically but logically reduces man to his constitution (composition, texture or nature) as biological being; on the other hand, this man reduced to his mere humanness (or human quality), that is, man in general and as such, stands across from (facing, opposite) nature, he must in a time (times, an age) of highly demographic and ecological tension (stress, strain) measure his powers against (with) its [nature’s] powers (die abnehmende Bedeutung von geschichtlichen und sozialen Attributen für die Bestimmung menschlicher Identität infolge der Verbreitung universalistischer Ideologien paradoxe- aber logischerweise den Menschen auf seine Beschaffenheit als biologisches Wesen reduziert; andererseits steht dieser auf sein bloßes Menschsein reduzierte Mensch, also der Mensch überhaupt und als solcher, der Natur gegenüber, er muß in einer Zeit hoher demographischer und ökologischer Spannung seine Kräfte mit ihren Kräften messen). The question about (regarding, in accordance with) the animal (beast), which creates tools (implements, instruments) on a planet populated by billions which has already become narrow (i.e.
cramped) (tight) (auf einem von Milliarden bevölkerten und schon eng gewordenen Planeten), is posed (arises) no less acutely and no less elementarily than (before) a few millions of years (ago) in the African savannas when hordes of them [animals [or (proto)humans]] wandered around. And likewise the other great social-ontological question must appear on the horizon [as] acute and elementary, that [great social-ontological question] regarding (about, in accordance with) (the) social cohesion and (the) social order, if namely the relations between humans (men, people) reach (attain, achieve) such a density and intensity that the bound(aries) of every known political unit (unity or entity) from the past will become full of holes (undermined, perforated) or even burst (forced) open (blown up, blasted) (die Beziehungen zwischen Menschen eine solche Dichte und Intensität erreichen, daß die Grenzen jeder aus der Vergangenheit bekannten politischen Einheit durchlöchert oder gar gesprengt werden).

Contemporary history therefore does enough (acts sufficiently) for its part in order to heighten awareness of (make clear, open our eyes to, make us realise) the examination (study) of (a) problem(s) of a social theory centred on man and the political (um die Problematik einer auf den Menschen und das Politische zentrierten Sozialtheorie bewußt zu machen) – provided (on condition) of course that one is in a position (able) to (capable of) put in order (or classify) (categorise) (putting in order) contemporary history in terms of universal (or world) history (universally-historically) (universalgeschichtlich) and to recognise (see, detect, discern) deeper continuities (tiefere Kontinuitäten), without being put off (disconcerted) by the evolutionistically underpinned (supported, sustained, backed (shored) up) arrogant (presumptuous, overbearing) self-assessments (von evolutionistisch untermauerten überheblichen
Selbsteinschätzungen) of modern society. Our main (chief) concern here, however, is not the (universal-historical) status (pertaining to universal (or world) history) of contemporary history, but that dimension of depth(s) (in-depth (deep(er), depth(s)) dimension) [dimension of depth] of social theory, which is called social ontology (sondern jene Tiefendimension der Sozialtheorie, die Sozialontologie heißt). As our preceding (previous) arguments (or discussions) have hopefully shown, no large-scale (great, grand) social theory (großangelegte Sozialtheorie) can manage (do) without the [a(n)] – even (though) (however) reluctant or tacit (silent, implicit) – recourse (reverting, recursion) to basic (fundamental) anthropological and political categories (anthropologische und politische Grundkategorien). The political and man were and are the most comprehensive (extensive) (broadest) and most flexible theoretical framework for the putting in order (or classification) (inclusion, incorporation) and the understanding of social-theoretically relevant phenomena (Das Politische und der Mensch waren und sind der umfangreichste und flexibelste theoretische Rahmen für die Einordnung und das Verständnis der sozialtheoretisch relevanten Erscheinungen). This priority of the theoretical, that is, of the descriptive standpoint (Diese Priorität des theoretischen, also des deskriptiven Standpunktes) implies, on the other hand, that for us the point (our concern) cannot be (it cannot be a matter of) to protect (come to the defence (take the side) of) (protecting) “man (the human, the person)” against the inhuman anonymity of “systems” or to save (rescue) his ethical personality from its [the ethical personality’s] supposed (ostensible, alleged) degradation (debasement, belittling, disparagement) by (means of) (through) materialistic economism etc.. Those, who project onto his [man’s] nature an ethical-normative ideal (die in seine Natur ein ethisch-normatives Ideal hineinprojezieren) so that the lack of realisation (achievement,
attainment) of the same [ethical-normative ideal] amounts to a degeneration (degeneracy) or devastation of man, complain and worry about “man”. Man (A human (person)) is, however, indestructible and [is] (here) in complete existential fullness (here), and the only (sole) presupposition (or precondition) for [with regard to] it (this, that, [his indestructibility and complete existential fullness]) lies in the fact of his mere existence, not in a certain way (mode) of life. That is why both the functionalistic dissolution (disintegration, breaking up) of the human [sphere or element], as well as its [the human(‘s) [(sphere or) (element)]’s] ethical-normative interpretation, which directly or indirectly pays homage (tribute) (subscribes) to (indulges in, embraces) a substantialism against which functionalism then turns, are to be rejected (disapproved of) (Der Mensch ist aber unverwüstlich und in ganzer existenzieller Fülle da, und die einzige Voraussetzung dafür liegt in der Tatsache seines bloßen Vorhandenseins, nicht in einer bestimmten Lebensweise. Abzulehnen sind daher sowohl die funktionalistische Auflösung des Menschlichen, als auch seine ethisch-normative Auslegung, die direkt oder indirekt einem Substanzialismus huldigt, gegen den sich dann der Funktionalismus wendet). A third, social-ontologically and historically sound (viable) way of looking at things has to start from the banal (trite) ascertainment [that] from (since) the times of the primeval (or primordial) horde there is no period of (in) history in which we would not recognise specifiable (namable or assignable) basic given (actual) facts of our own behaviour. Similar considerations (thoughts) enable (make) (the) insight into the social-ontological importance (status or value) of the political (possible), of which we likewise expect exclusively theoretical and not ethical-normative explanations (insights or information). Indeed (Actually), the theoretical fertility (fruitfulness, productivity) of this insight can be proved in several
and important part(ial) questions (i.e. secondary (incidental or minor) questions), thus (so) e.g. during (in) a methodical (i.e. methodological) clarification of the relations between social theory and the science of history (historical science), or in the attempt at an overcoming of the artificial alternative [in, between] “individualism vs. [and] holism” (Eine dritte, sozialontologisch und historisch tragfähige Betrachtungsweise hat von der banalen Feststellung auszugehen, von den Zeiten der Urhorde an gebe es keine einzige Periode der Geschichte, in der wir nicht angebbare Grundgegebenheiten unseres eigenen Verhaltens wiedererkennen würden. Ähnliche Überlegungen ermöglichen die Einsicht in den sozialontologischen Stellenwert des Politischen, von der wir uns ebenfalls ausschließlich theoretische und nicht ethisch-normative Aufschlüsse versprechen. In der Tat, die theoretische Fruchtarkeit dieser Einsicht kann an mehreren und wichtigen Teilfragen unter Beweis gestellt werden, so z. B. bei einer methodischen Klärung der Beziehung zwischen Sozialtheorie und Geschichtswissenschaft oder beim Versuch einer Überwindung der künstlichen Alternative „Individualismus vs. Holismus“).  

The programmatic putting first of the political and of the anthropological allows (permits), finally, the [a] constant (continual), positive or negative continuing (or picking up the thread) of (fastening (tying) (on)to) a thousands of years old social-theoretical tradition – and indeed not only of the West and not only of the (Western) modern era (age, epoch) (Die programmatische Voranstellung des Politischen und des Anthropologischen gestatten schließlich die ständige, positive oder negative Anknüpfung an eine jahrtausendealte sozialtheoretische Tradition – und zwar nicht nur des Westens und nicht nur der 

194 See Ch. II, Sec. 2BC in this volume.
(westlichen) Moderne). The frequently mentioned smug (self-satisfied, complacent) self-confidence (self-assurance) of mass-democratic social theory, the conviction [in respect] of the [a] radical break with the “pre-modern age (era, epoch)” etc. is often articulated in the form of an ignorance or ignoring (disregarding) of older theoretical positions. The translation (or transmission) of age-old (ancient) questions into an ever-changing (always changing) and all the more (always) complicated vocabulary gives rise to the impression of constant (continual) theoretical progress, in relation to which the claim to (on, of) originality is based (rests) not seldom (rarely) on the lack (shortage, dearth, deficiency, paucity) of sufficient (adequate) knowledge of (the) sources and of (the) literature; what for the obscure doctoral candidate (Ph. D. student) is prohibited (forbidden, banned), brings (gives) others fame (or glory). The reminding (recollection, remembrance) of the age of central methodical (i.e. methodological) and content-related(filled) (substaniative) questions seems to cause (give rise to, create, induce) uneasiness (an uneasy feeling) because it [the said reminding] eo ipso refreshes (restores) the memory (recollection, remembrance, reminding) [in respect] of (regarding) the age of the (social) world and of man (humans). For our part, we certainly do not want to contest (dispute, challenge, deny) either the change and the breaks (ruptures) in the history of society nor the renewal and the deepening in the history of social theory. On the contrary, we shall develop our own social-ontological perception (or view) also in (the) confrontation (dispute, debate, discussion, argument) with important social-theoretical approaches of the 20th century, and i.a. expound (set out (forth), explain) how formal-sociological and interactionistic points of view can be constructed (made) as a(n) comprehensive (extensive, broad) theory of the social relation (und u.a. darlegen, wie sich formalsoziologische und interaktionistische
Gesichtspunkte zu einer umfassenden Theorie der sozialen Beziehung aufbauen lassen). At the same time we want to furnish proof of (prove), even (there) where the distance between anthropological and political question formulations (formulations of the [a] question, problem examinations, examinations of (a [the]) problem(s), central themes) seems to be the greatest, how for instance in formal sociology (in der formalen Soziologie), questions pertaining to justification (substantiation or a rationale) (Begründungsfragen) would have to remain unanswered so (as) long as reference is hardly (barely) made to man (humans, people) and the political. As much [long] as the substantialistic and normativistic perceptions (views) of the political and of man do not hold (are not valid (applicable, true)): the political and anthropological basic (fundamental) orientation of the oldest and older social theory is not in the least outdated (outmoded, out-of-date, antiquated, obsolete) (So sehr auch die substanzialistischen und normativistischen Auffassungen vom Politischen und vom Menschen nicht zu halten sind: Die politische und anthropologische Grundausrichtung der ältesten und älteren Sozialtheorie ist keineswegs überholt). iii

---

1 The translator sees this notion of theory not being able to “climb down to the specific features of the individual ontological strata of reality”, as well as aspects of Kondylis’s further critique of the cybernetic thought model immediately following the aforementioned notion, as being also applicable, mutatis mutandis, to all ideologies in general, and in particular to the (often heavily) ideological (including hedonistic-consumerist lifestyle-based) theories which dominate mass-democratic Western universities and associated ideologues in fields once commonly known as the “humanities”; and since their mainly non-sociological variants ((forms of:) postmodernism, (post)structuralism, deconstruction, intertextuality, feminism, etc.) are qualitatively (and quantitatively) irrelevant in relation to the expounding of Kondylis’s social ontology and to the production of (social) theory with serious claims to scientific validity (as to the description and explanation of reality), that is why they are justifiably paid no (e.g. Barthes, Derrida, Lacan, Baudrillard, Kristeva et al.), or relatively little attention (e.g. Lévi-Strauss, Foucault, Bourdieu), in Das Politische und der Mensch. Cf. Kondylis’s analysis in Das Politische und der Mensch p. 29 in regard to mass-democratic Western society, with the exchange of signs and symbols as being the focus of labour, rather than industry and agriculture as was the case in bourgeois-(liberal-)capitalistic society (where of course ideology still had the place it has in every society, but which could at least provide the social backdrop for the theoretical propounding of the concept of “action” and not “communication” as opposed to the centre stage held in “learned thought”
by “the Holy Spirit” in previous societies). See, inter alia, also p. 37 in relation to the ignoring of the material preconditions of “differentiation” and “complexity”, and of the overcoming of the shortage of goods, for the variety of values and world views in Western mass-democratic societies. Cf. pp. 57-59 in regard to the dispelling of anthropology (and anthropocentrism) from normative social-theoretical constructs, social theory and ideology in general.

ii The translator here clarifies for English readers that Kondylis is referring to e.g. theocentric and post-modern ideologies having different content but similar or the same thought forms (which also applies to the position in favour of “Man” itself and all intellectual(-spiritual) positions or stances in general): an identity formed against an inimical identity, a normative stance which seeks to diminish or eliminate other stances, etc.. Therefore, theocentric and post-modern ideologies, in attacking anthropocentrism, i.e. instead of “Man”, “God” or “acceptable (or politically correct as to gender, race etc.) pluralism and tolerance (based on e.g. reality being trapped in or determined by language or communication)”, in other words, an anti-anthropological stance, function to ideologically guide theorists or those involved in politics in both the narrower and broader senses.

iii For the benefit of any ideologues who may be interested in the possibility of science, because neither Kondylis nor the translator (as translator) had or has an ideological program, it is a matter of complete indifference as to whether a human is referred to in the English language as “man”, “woman”, “human”, “person” etc. or whether anyone is referred to as “he” or “she” etc.. Linguistic conventions are employed in accordance with the choice of the translator (if someone were to edit the current text by changing “he” to “she” or to “she/he/it/they” etc. absolutely no substantive gain would be made whatsoever in terms of knowledge, and the translator, personally, would not care less). It is, from the point of view of value-free, i.e. non-normative, observation and explanation (science), absolutely of no emotional interest whatsoever whether there is slavery, freedom, equality, inequality, racism, sexism, patriarchy, prosperity, poverty, genocide, torture, oppression, normal or deviant sex etc. – regardless of how all of these are defined on each and every respective occasion. Facts are facts, and the ideologically captive, who cannot see with absolute consistency beyond ideology and their own “false consciousness”, will always be the main actors in any field of human endeavour pertaining to (general and or popularised) theoretical knowledge (with the possible exception of (aspects of) e.g. the physical, mathematical and mechanical-technical sciences, or the domain of logic, when very narrowly defined, or e.g. when the social sciences deal strictly with quantitative analysis within clearly set parameters, provided the theoreticians involved have a consistent non-normative attitude and underlying dedication to facts and logical coherence).

273