Panagiotis (Panajotis) Kondylis (Παναγιώτης Κονδύλης) - Power and Decision

A note on terminology (the following acts as an introductory understanding of key terms and concepts. A reading of Kondylis's notes and reflections contained in: 

1. «Ταυτότητα, ἰσχύς, πολιτισμός» (πενήντα δελτία) ("Identity, power, culture (civilisation)" (fifty statements (proclamations or assertions)), Εὐάγγελος Γκανᾶς (ἐπιμ.) in Νέα Ἑστία, Year 78, Volume 156, Issue 1769, July-August 2004,

2. „Reflexion[en] über Gewalt, Herrschaft, Macht“. (Zettel 3850-3880 und 3569-3577), übersetzt und kommentiert von Fotis Dimitriou In: IABLIS. Jahrbuch für europäische Prozesse, 12. Jg., 2013 http://www.iablis.de/iablis_t/2013/kondylis13.html ,

3. „Macht und Entscheidung - Nachgelassene Notizen zur Sozialontologie“. Aus dem Griechischen von Fotis Dimitriou. In: Tumult. Vierteljahresschrift für Konsensstörung, Sommer 2014, S. 36-44,

4. „Faktoren der Menschwerdung - Nachgelassene Notate zur "Sozialontologie"“. Aus dem Griechischen von Fotis Dimitriou. In: Zeno. Jahrheft für Literatur und Kritik, Heft 35 (Jg. 36), 2015, S. 58-71,

indicates that there are many further, finer levels and gradations of meaning and distinctions between at least some of the key terms and concepts...

“Power” („Macht“, in Greek: «ἰσχὺς») is (human) life and (human) life’s continuation (self-preservation) in human culture (society), informed by the acceptance of meaning («νόημα», „Sinn“) (not found in the non-human animal kingdom), i.e. (restricted by and) relative to other (individual and collective) crystal(lisation)s of (forms of) power, as well as, in its broadest sense, encompassing all forms of the (in part usually, not always, overlapping in meaning) terms: dominance, predominance, domination, rule, ruling (over others), authority, sovereignty, dominion, control, influence, pre-eminence, hegemony,... violence,... force (as human coercion, strength, violence, etc. and not in the strict sense of the natural sciences as energy), etc.. Power and all its aforementioned manifestations can be physical and or (more often) ideational (ideological), and ultimately always refers to (human) society (and its culture, and the multifarious manifestations of identity, of individuals and groups) as the (a) political (collective) with some form of social order and social cohesion (as well as social disciplining)°. ("Power" in a more general sense that is beyond human culture/society, i.e. in the non-human animal kingdom and in nature in general, is force akin to mere energy in living and surviving). [Nietzsche's conception of power is undifferentiated and refers to both organic and inorganic, animal and human nature, and thus is tantamount to force (energy) in the sense of the natural sciences; man then becomes the bearer of the Will to Power - and the concept of power loses its hermeneutic precision in relation to humans (i.e. lacking in Nietzsche is a social-ontological and sociological-historical understanding). Nietzsche's distinction between a healthy-innocent(-extra-ethical) (existing in all of the universe) and sick, degenerate (religion and ethics-based) Will to Power, notwithstanding his disparate (contradictory) positions throught his life, leads him to comparing a bad nihilism to a good nihilism (when nihilism is simply normatively Nothing, i.e. (ethical and religious) Value Freedom), and to overlooking that any kind of power must take place in human society as human culture and amongst the humans and relations therein, including the falsehoods and lies necessary for the preservation of human (social) life. See p. 27-28 of Kondylis, P. (ed.), Der Philosoph und die Macht (Anthologie). Hamburg: Junius. 259 S.. Einleitung = Introduction S. 9-36, i.e., S. 27-28 = pp. 82-85 of Ἡ ἡδονή, ἡ ἰσχύς, ἡ οὐτοπία (1992)). Foucault, building on his interpretation of Nietzsche, effaced the conceptual boundary between power (Macht) and dominance (domination, ruling over others or authority; Herrschaft (ἐξουσία)) (but cf. S. 34, loc. cit., where Kondylis clearly shows that Autorität = κύρος = κῦρος (p. 94 of Greek text) = authority, in relation to Jaspers; at S. 24 (p. 79, Greek text) Autorität = ἐξουσία = authority (dominance or dominion), in relation to Diderot). Even though Foucault correctly understood that power permeates all of society as a network of relations or correlation of forces, he did not see that power crystallises into innumerable forms so that power becomes an object of historical investigations, and not just anthropological and psychological investigations. Foucault did not explain the social hierarchisation of the relations of power and of institutions, nor the existence of relations of power outside of the institutional grip (or control) of the state. Furthermore, Foucault's microphysical way of looking at power is incapable of analysing the coming into being, character and decline of social formations, and ends up ideologically reflecting the circumstances of Western mass democracy, including the interweaving of Public and Private and bidding farewell to traditional notions of power. The individual and its self-realisation (Selbstverwirklichung; αὐτοπραγμάτωση) take centre stage so that oppression is experienced in the affluent society; "... and so he is declared a great philosopher, [he] who promotes liberation through the unmasking of the mechanisms standing behind [such oppression]" (= Kondylis is telling us, in effect, that Fame (and a kind of Deification) goes hand in hand with what (a section of) the Public Believes, Wants and Craves, and has Nothing to do with Science as the absolutely consistently dispassionate and non-normative Observation of Human Affairs = As soon as the fundamental circumstances of Western mass democracy end, the post-modern CIRCUS will leave history's stage; then it becomes a question of whether another circus will take (its) place or whether the elements of Anomie will lead to greater relative Disorder (= relatively low levels of Order) or to relatively heavy-handed Authoritarian Order, under which the Fun is not so free and widespread). See, loc. cit., S. 35-37 = pp. 97-99] [Conceptual distinctions can reach rather frustrating levels of complexity: e.g. Kondylis in note 3656 (see °° below) confines "power" to something like "influence", as opposed to "authority", which is like "dominance", "domination" with a strong component of "force" as "violence". See also my discussion of „Herrschaft“, which highlights that "authority" in English, at least as it appears to the translator, does not carry the weight and force of "domination/dominance" it used to when Parsons did his translation of Weber many decades ago (when the full effects of e.g. The Wild One (Brando) and Rebel without a Cause (Dean) had not fully "blossomed"). Presumably the new translation of Economy and Society by Keith Tribe will be of interest on this point. In any event, Kondylis's notes are NOTES, i.e. not in any "final form" (with the context of specific, refined distinctions between definitions being fully laid out), and fine conceptual-terminological distinctions always bear within them the Danger of losing Sight of the Bigger Picture, and to be frank, they don't interest the translator that much - there is ultimately nothing better, if one wants to go into the greatest possible conceptual detail, than learning German!] 

There is usually no, at least at first instance or first glance, necessarily strict and absolute distinction made between the terms related to “power” (with the notable exception of „Gewalt“ as "violence" and "force" meant strictly physically):

„Herrschaft“, which is usually translated as “dominance” and far less commonly as “domination” or “rule” (“ruling (over others)”) [Talcott Parsons's translation is mainly "authority", though "domination" is also used not infrequently, and Parsons observed that whilst there was no satisfactory English equivalent for the term „Herrschaft“, "imperative control" as used by N. S. Timasheff was nonetheless closest to Weber's meaning (see Weber Max, Economy and Society, Vol. 1., pp. 61-62, note 31, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1968, 1978; see also: pp. 217ff. („legale Herrschaft“ = "legal authority"), 226ff. („traditionale Herrschaft“ = "traditional authority"), 241ff. („charismatische Herrschaft“ = "charismatic authority"), 262ff. („Herrschaft“ = "authority"), etc. - elsewhere in the same edition of Economy and Society, as already noted, „Herrschaft“ is translated as "domination" (pp. 53ff., 212ff.) or as "legitimate domination" (p. 212ff.); "legitimer Herrschaft" is translated as "authority" (p. 215ff.), etc. Kondylis's own Greek rendering of „Herrschaft“ as «ἐξουσία» or «κυριαρχία» suggests the English word "authority" (or even "power", "control", "dominion", "governance"), or in the case of «κυριαρχία», "sovereignty", "domination" or "dominion", rather than just "dominance". The translator's view is that "authority" in English does not adequately convey a sense of the relatively high degree of "power" or "imperative control" contained within „Herrschaft“ and «ἐξουσία» or «κυριαρχία» (keeping in mind as well the diminution and or dispersal in the force of actual (top-down) "authority" in the West in the decades since Parsons was intellectually active), and therefore has opted for "dominance" ("domination" or "rule"/"ruling (over others)"). This is not to say that "authority" is not a valid choice, however the translator notes that in Kondylis's notes there is a clear distinction made between „Herrschaft“ and „Autorität“ (provided the German is an adequate reflection of Kondylis's Greek terminology), and if „Herrschaft“ is to be translated "authority", where does that leave „Autorität“? [I have however occasionally seen it as appropriate to e.g. translate „eine Herrschaft“ («μιὰν ἐξουσία») as "an authority (a regime of dominance)"] [In "The philosopher and power" I found it useful to translate „Herrschaft“/«ἐξουσία» often, though not always, as "authority as dominance", rather than just "dominance", in particular in contrast to „Autorität“/«κῦρος»/"authority"] [In e.g. "'War and politics': Clausewitz's position" I rendered «ἐξουσία» as "dominant authority"].

(3850) Gewalt ist das Mittel, Macht ist der Zweck; wer Gewalt nicht als Mittel zur Macht einsetzt, ist politisch belanglos (so z.B. ein Verbrecher) [Violence is the means, power is the end (goal); Whoever does not use violence as a means for power, is politically inconsequential (thus, e.g. a criminal)].

(3851) Autorität: Gehört zur Herrschaft, bildet das, was an der Herrschaft Macht ist. Die Autorität gehört wesensgemäß zur Macht, nicht zur Herrschaft [Authority: Belongs to dominance (domination, rule or ruling (over others)), [and] constitutes that which is power in dominance. Authority belongs of its essence (nature or texture) to power, not to dominance (domination)]. 

(3852) Macht = die Fähigkeit eines individuellen oder kollektiven Subjekts, das eige-ne Selbstverständnis als objektiv wahre Schilderung durchzusetzen. (So wird Einfluss gewonnen usw., vorausgesetzt im Selbstverständnis ist der Anspruch enthalten.) [Power = the ability of an individual or collective subject to impose its own self-understanding as objectively true description (or account). (In this way, influence is gained, etc., provided that the claim is contained in the self-understanding.)].

(„Reflexion[en] über Gewalt, Herrschaft, Macht“. (Zettel 3850-3880 und 3569-3577), übersetzt und kommentiert von Fotis Dimitriou In: IABLIS. Jahrbuch für europäische Prozesse, 12. Jg., 2013 http://www.iablis.de/iablis_t/2013/kondylis13.html)];

„Vorherrschaft“ (in Greek: «ἐπικράτηση» or «κυριαρχία») as “predominance” (another proposed translation, not adopted here, is “pre-eminence”, which in German is or can be „Vorrang“ (Greek: «προβάδισμα» or «πρωτεῖα»; usually translated here as “precedence”; ), or „Vorrangstellung“);

„Beherrschung“ («ἔλεγχος», «συγκράτηση», «ἐξουσίαση» or «κατεξουσίαση») as “control(ling)”,  “domination” or “absolute domination”;

„Gewalt“ («βιαιότητα» or «βία») as “violence” (in relation to Montesquieu and the separation of powers, „Gewalt“ = «ἐξουσία» = "power");

„Kraft“ («δύναμη») as “force” or “strength”, and less often “power”;

„Autorität“ («ἐξουσία» or «κῦρος» or «κηδεμονία» (in the Montesquieu introduction)), „Instanz“ («βαθμίδα δικαιοδοσίας») as “authority” (or "authority (custody, guardianship)" in the case of „Autorität“ as «κηδεμονία» - though strictly speaking, P.K.'s German „von der Autorität des höheren Willens“ is rendered in Greek: «ἀπὸ τὴν κηδεμονία ὑπέρτερων αὐθεντιῶν» = "from the authority (custody, guardianship)/custody (guardianship, authority) of the higher will (or: of higher authorities)");

„Durchsetzung“ as “imposition” («ἐπιβολὴ») or “predominance” («ἐπικράτηση») or “prevailing” («νίκη»);

„Souveränität“ («κυριαρχία») as “sovereignty”;

„Hegemonie“, which is rarely used, («ἡγεμονία») as “hegemony”; „hegemonial“, which is much more commonly used than „Hegemonie“, («ἠγεμονικὸς») as “hegemonic”; 

in the case of „Großraumaspirant“ («ὑποψήφιος ἡγεμόνας τοῦ μείζονος χώρου»), the English rendering is “aspirant to a large space (i.e. prospective hegemon of a large space”; „Großraumaspiranten“ («ὥστε νὰ προβάλλουν μὲ τὴ φιλοδοξία τῆς ἡγεμονίας σ' ἕναν μείζονα χῶρο») as “aspirants to a large space (so much that they have the ambition of hegemony in a large space)”, or when «ὑποψήφιες γιὰ τὴν ἡγεμονία σὲ μείζονες χώρους» as “aspirants to a large space (i.e. Powers which are candidates for hegemony in large spaces)”. 

It appears that the English common usage of “hegemony” today is for Kondylis more like „Herrschaft“ («ἐξουσία», «κυριαρχία»; “dominance”, “authority”); „Autorität“ («ἐξουσία», «κῦρος»; “authority”), or, „Vorherrschaft“ («ἐπικράτηση», «κυριαρχία»; “predominance”), without the totally physical phenomenon „Gewalt“ («βιαιότητα», «βία»; “violence”). Kondylis understands and uses “hegemon”/“hegemony”/“hegemonic” much more in Machiavellian, rather than in Gramscian terms (and never refers to “soft power” (which relates to “(pre)dominance”, “authority”, etc.), and “hard power” (which is “power” with “violence” always as a physical phenomenon));

„Gebiet“ can be defined as “dominion” («ἐπικράτεια»), though more often as “field”, “area”, “sector” («πεδίο», «χῶρος», «τομέας»);

„gebietend“ («ἐξουσιαστικὸς») as “commanding”;

„Einfluß“, and less often „Wirkung“ («ἐπήρεια», «ἀποτέλεσμα», «ἐπιρροὴ», «δράση», «ἐπίδραση», «ἐπενέργεια», etc.) (primarily, but by no means exclusively, “effect”), as “influence”;

„Geltung“ («κῦρος») as “prestige” and or “authority”, though Kondylis has translated „Geltung“ into Greek as «δράση», «ἰσχύς»,... with my choice in English usually being “validity”;

„Ansehen“ («κῦρος») as “prestige” and or “authority”;

„Prestige“ («γόητρο») as “prestige”;

„Kompetenz“ and „Zuständigkeit“ («ἀρμοδιότητα») (which while denoting skill, capability, etc., are by no means ever independent of (some kind of) considerations of (or forms of) power, or power-related phenomena such as „Interpretationsmonopol“ (= «μονοπώλιο τῆς ἑρμηνείας», “monopoly of interpretation”), „Verbindlichkeit“ (= «δεσμευτικότητα», “bindedness”), etc.) as “competence”, or, in the case of „Zuständigkeit“ also as “domain” or “responsibility”, along with “competence”;

„Hierarchie“ (or far less often „Status“) («ἱεραρχία») as “hierarchy”;

„Energie in der Natur“ («ἐνέργεια μέσα στὴ φύση») as “energy in nature”;

„Lebensenergie“ («ζωτικὴ ἐνέργεια») as “life's vital energy”;

„Wille zur Macht“ («βούληση γιὰ ἰσχὺ») as “will to power”;

in the case of „(ob)walten“ (verb) and „Obwalten“ or „Walten“ (noun), the situation is literally that of a dog's breakfast, with Kondylis himself using in Greek «ἐπικρατῶ, προεξάρχω, δεσπόζω, κυριαρχῶ,...», «ὑπερίσχυση», «κυριαρχία»,... and I choosing almost always "prevail", "prevailing", with the other possible choices being "dominate", "rule" or even "take the lead", depending of course on the context;

and so on, and so forth…

The translator is not in principle opposed to the making of strict(er) definitional distinctions between the above-mentioned terms, however, due to the degree in the overlapping of such terms’ meaning, neither Kondylis nor the translator has engaged in such an endeavour. Definitional distinctions are important. They cannot or should not however constrain the relative elasticity of meaning when exactly such flexibility is epistemologically appropriate. The fact that some non-human animals can and do exercise some forms of power over other animals not necessarily through direct physical contact or violence, and can control their impulses or instincts to some degree in certain circumstances, does not alter the fact that the non-human animals as social animals which display such self-control, do not behave („verhalten“, «συμπεριφέρομαι») in a way which could encompass human-like action (acting, act(s)) („Handeln“ («πράξη», «δράση», «πράξεις», «δραστηριότητα»), “Handlung” («δράση»), „Akt(e)“ («πράξη», «πράξεις»), “Tätigkeit” («δραστηριότητα» = “activity”; and “Tun” («δραστηριότητα», “activity” or “doing(s)”))°°° accompanied by a symbolic network or “system” of meaning (language etc.) created by humans beyond what pre-existed, or exists without human intervention, in the natural world. 

[Perhaps the basic starting point should be that "power" is the most general form of energy plus and in relation to meaning (social relations, interaction and identity (/recognition)), created by humans through symbols etc.; that "dominance", "domination", "authority" implies acquiescence of the person who is "obedient", but under at least the threat of "force" and (stronger) "violence", whereas "influence" can be seen, though not necessarily, as containing no such threat. "Violence" is always physical, and there is no such thing in Kondylisian conceptuality as "verbal violence", or Foucaultian "microaggressions", etc., or any other such inanities and or biassed use of present-day "theory", which is more interested in the exercise of power and control over certain (i.e. a particular class of) people, in favour of certain other (i.e. particular classes of) people, than in understanding social phenomena in a dispassionate, non-normative value-free manner (diachronically, macro-historically and social-ontologically-anthropologically).]

Furthermore, terms such as:

„Weltbild“ («κοσμοεικόνα») (“world image”),

„Weltanschauung“ («κοσμοθεωρία»), „Weltansicht“ («κοσμοαντίληψη») (“world view”) or „weltanschaulich“ («κοσμοθεωρητικὸς») (“world-theoretical”),

„Weltauffassung“ («κοσμοαντίληψη») (“perception of the world” or “world view”), and „Weltwahrnehmung“ («κοσμοαντίληψη») (“perception of the world”),

„Ideologie“ («ἰδεολογία») (“ideology”),

„Ideologeme“ («ἰδεολογήματα») (“ideologems (i.e. kinds of sub-ideology)”),

„falsches Bewußtsein“ («ψευδὴς συνείδηση») (“false consciousness”),

„Religion“ («θρησκεία») (“religion”),

and,

„Interaktion“ («διάδραση») (“interaction”),

„Wechselwirkung“ («ἀλληλεπίδραση») (“interaction (or mutual influence)”) [in the Montesquieu book/introduction, „der Wechselwirkungen“ is rendered in Greek also as «τῶν ἀλληλεξαρτήσεων», which I translated into English as "of the interactions and mutual influences (or mutual dependencies)"], 

have more or less overlapping but also context-specific meanings e.g. when defined strictly or more broadly, etc.; by no means are they always meant totally mutually exclusively.

 „Entscheidung“ («ἀπόφαση») as “decision” ultimately pertains to the question of identity (Identität («ταυτότητα»)), which in turn can only exist, be (re)formed or solidify, become more fluid, etc. only in connection with power and within or in relation to pre-existing society encompassing the friend-foe spectrum etc. (cf. Das Politische und der Mensch, S. 257-258).

„Absonderung“ («ἀποχωρισμὸς» or «διαχωρισμὸς») is translated as “segregation” in order to convey a stronger sense of separation („Trennung“ «ἀποχωρισμὸς» = “separation”, whereas when «διάκριση» = “distinction”; „Teilung“ («χωρισμὸς») = “division”).

„Geist“ («πνεῦμα») is usually, but not always, translated as “intellect(-spirit)” (it is felt that “spirit” alone in English often does not sufficiently convey the role of the mind within the “spirit” of both the German and the Greek terms („geistig“ («πνευματικὸς») = “intellectual(-spiritual)”))."Spirit" and "spirit(-intellect)", as well as "spiritual(-intellectual)", have nonetheless also been used, including in relation to Hegel and the past more so than as regards the mass-democratic present.

„Kultur“ («πολιτισμὸς») is always translated as “culture”, even though "civilisation" is not (always) necessarily a wrong choice („kulturell“, «πολιτισμικός», as “cultural”), and the relatively rarely used „Zivilisation“ (again «πολιτισμὸς» in Greek) as “civilisation”, though conceivably in certain instances “culture” would also be appropriate; however, “culture” is never chosen for „Zivilisation“.

Given Kondylis only ever uses one term for each of the pair “friend-foe”, i.e. „Freund-Feind“ («φῖλος-ἐχθρός») („Freundschaft-Feindschaft“ («φιλία-ἐχρθότητα) = “friendship-enmity”; „freundlich-feindlich“ («φιλικὸς-ἐχθρικός») = “friendly-inimical”), and given that the meaning of common words can and does change throughout history and according to context etc., I see no point whatsoever in worrying about an “enemy-foe” distinction in English, even though others like G. Schwab ("interlocutor of Schmitt") might choose to do so, for whatever reason (e.g. the Latin "hostis"-"inimicus" distinction, etc.), and even though “enemy” is just as valid as “foe” in English. “Foe” to me simply sounds better in contrast to/with “friend”.

The careful reader will no doubt notice a number of other key terms which have customarily been and can be rendered into English in ways other than those chosen by the translator. Of utmost importance here is the conveyance into English of as many nuances in the German (and Greek) as is possible, and not the English as attractive or "easy-to-read" English. In any event, whoever wants to really study Kondylis in depth will have to learn German - there is no other way. Of course, it is well-known that Kondylis in his translations of other authors into Greek, as well as in regard to his own works, nearly always chose one word to signify another word, and placed great importance on the translation seeming like it was written in the language being translated into; and whilst we cannot but agree with the wisdom of such an approach to translation, for the purposes of this site, and because of the desire to make concepts more clearly understood or "fleshed-out" in English so as to encourage eventual recourse to the original German, another approach has been taken. Were the translations contained in this site to be published in book form, in order to be sold in the world's book market, so to speak, then further editing and "textual adjustment" would obviously be necessary. 

° For a more detailed discussion, bearing many fine distinctions, of various aspects of "power" and "dominance/domination/rule/ruling (over others)" (or "authority"), see the following: Petridis Raymond, ""Power" and "Authority" in Panajotis Kondylis's Late Work", first published in Greek (Νέος Ερμής ο Λόγιος (Neos Hermes ho Logios), Έτος (Year) 4, Τεύχος (Issue) 10, Καλοκαίρι (Summer) 2014, Αθήνα (Athens), Εταιρεία Μελέτης Ελληνικού Πολιτισμού (www.emep.gr), pp. 118-162) - notwithstanding a number of perhaps "annoying" but "inevitable" differences in the translation of key terms, an advanced student of Kondylis's thought has much to gain from Dr. Petridis's study, and the initial "instinctual hunch" is confirmed, THAT if someone wants to study Kondylis's thought to the full extent possible, learn German!: